On Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds by Roth, Thomas Edgar
ON  D O M A I N  U N I F Y I N GC A T E G OR I C A L  K I N D S
T H E  F O R M A T I O N  O F  A  P S Y C H O P H Y S I C A L  A L G E B R A
Thomas Edgar Roth
Dissertation at the
Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences
Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität München
November 2018
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Godehard Link
Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
First Reviewer:        Prof. Dr. Godehard Link
Second Reviewer:     Prof. Dr. Carlos Ulises Moulines
External Reviewer:     Prof. Dr. Detlef Dürr
Date of Submission:     June 16th 2017
Date of Defense:     November 9th 2017
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences which made the
completion of this thesis possible. I would also like to express my special thanks to my
first supervisor, Prof. Dr. Godehard Link, for his comprehensive understanding in all
matters. And finally, I am much indebted to Christian Zott, who generously supported
my work.

Not without Rini

Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Hyperstructures 7
2.1 The Emergence of Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Emergent Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Emergent Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 The Observational Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 A Computer Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 The Ansatz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Memory Evolutive Neural Systems 33
3.1 The Category Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 The Binding Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.1 Patterns and Collective Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2 Cat-Neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.3 Representism, or something near enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 The Hierarchy Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 Interacting Cat-neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.3 The Hierarchy of Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3.4 Reductionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 The Emergence Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds 65
4.1 The Minimalist Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1.1 Condition for Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1.2 Guided Matter Point Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Bohmian Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.1 Wave Function Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 The Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 DUCKs and Bohmian Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4 Aggregations, Systems, and Substrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.1 Emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.2 The Mental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5 Conclusion 125

Abstract
DUCKs – Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds – provides an (onto)logical framework,
within which the mental is conditionally captured as an emergent object via the induc-
tive limes in the logical language of categories, known as category theory. DUCKs is a
proposal for unification on three levels: (i) epistemic unification of scientific domains, i.e.
physics, biology, psychology, as well as mathematics and logic; (ii) ontological unification
of the existent, i.e. of matter and the mental; (iii) meta-unification of the epistemological
and the ontological themselves.
Category theory is examined as a meta-mathematical structuralist language for its suit-
ability to formalize dynamic hierarchies of natural systems.
The Hyperstructure approach of Baas from the field of theoretical biology determines
which structures and new
”
properties“ can be viewed as existent when dependent on a
classifier. The role of the observer is examined, which is itself constituted as a higher-order
structure.
Using theMemory Evolutive Neural Systems construction developed by Ehresmann and
Vanbremeersch, we examine how the colimit can have a real correspondence in nature,
first by using neural networks. On this basis, we also clarify the individual aspects of
mental
”
properties“, such as multiple realization, reductionism, causality, and necessity
trying a category theoretical reconstruction particularly of the central concepts of systems,
emergence, and functions.
As a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bohmian Mechanics is intro-
duced as an established experimental metaphysics with the aim of giving an ontological
foundation to the mathematical determiners by their spatially integration into DUCKs.
We clarify the need for the local observer (the mental), as an inductive limes via the non-
locality of his quantum mechanical substrate, to be locally emergent, which determines
the aimed at psychophysical algebraic structure.
With the rational and ontological reconstruction of mental (bi-directional determina-
tion, DUCKs is developed as the framework. Given that, it becomes clear why the
reduction of the mental to the physical must fail. Instead of reduction, the necessary and
sufficient conditions of existence and the changes in these conditions must be identified.
The result is a materialization of the conditioning and the proposed unification.
The problem of the mental is not solved by DUCKs, rather it is reformulated and made
more precise. The mental as an emergent object seems in principle to be outside the limits
of human understanding. It is treated as a physical object, i.e. as an object in space and
time. And as such, the reformulation requires a new physics that must include the mental
if it purports to be complete, since at the least, the latter is determined by the physical.

1 Introduction
Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds, in short DUCKs, is a reductionist proposal to sort
our intuitions on the existent and its change. In the case that reductionism fails, we are
emergentists. The crucial point in the attempt to unify the domains, i.e. all the sciences,
in particular those concerned with natural phenomena, the so-called mind-body problem
shows to be persistently recalcitrant. The mental seems to be impossible to integrate into
a physicalist worldview, i.e. to identify with, or to reduce to, the physical. And thus, we
are forced to search for a new framework by which this problematic case can at least be
reformulated such that the inconsistencies become clearer.
Therefore, the actual endeavor is to deliver both perceptual and conceptual beliefs to
Ockham, and he shall tell us where the axe should fall between the ontological and epis-
temological domain. It may be that Ockham proves to be a psychologist giving us fair
warning not to fall victim to our early childhood imprinting. What is good for the routine
of worming our way through the world’s obstacles might manifest an obstacle in under-
standing the world. But is it really about understanding? We don’t plan on explaining
the phenomena, but rather to coherently describe them. Our objective is to find the right
objects to yield the right phenomena and to find the right phenomena to yield the right
objects.
Setting out to investigate existence, one is challenged with defining these objects that
are considered to be candidates of what as a result is then called the existent. The
objective is to catch sight of the epistemological more than the ontological status of those
objects in keeping with the constraint that every existent entity must be conceptionalized,
i.e. put into a conceptional framework, which lets one go
”
absent without leave“ to some
extent, accepting that nothing can be done about it. But there is no need to desert yet.
What remains to be done is to find a kind of framework that is sufficiently minimalist
to get closest to reality, which immediately prompts the question, what are the criteria
for considering a theory minimalist enough to be closest to reality? Imagining the world
that naturally comes to our minds, it consists of objects, and it’s the objects we have to
construct a minimalist theory to or of. That seems to be a reasonable endeavor, and we
continue asking what kind of thing these objects are and how they interrelate.
Thus, we have objects and interrelations, and the most obvious thing to seek is a theory
that is concerned with objects and their interrelations. Adding associative composition of
the interrelations and the neutral element, which is the identity, we have swiftly defined
a category. And with these, we now have available a rigorous relational language, which
is up to the challenge of clarifying the epistemological and ontological status of the con-
cepts and phenomena to be analyzed. We seek a theory that is capable of dealing with
structures and structures of structures, and it is a certain theory of categories that will
be proposed as the requested minimalist account for initiating an aufbau of the world.
And category theory will be this fundamental language.
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1 Introduction
But before we define the categories we will work with, we should reflect further on their
morphisms. Amenable to the slogan ‘It’s the arrows that really matter!’, we investigate
to what extent time-delayed and non-time-delayed determinations can be said to be key
for the evolution of the world, or the universe, not only the objects themselves.
The right ontology, i.e. one that is vague enough not to be possibly convicted of being
none but significant enough not to be trivial, is the basis for the definition of the categories
that will be provided by the domain unifying categorical kinds evolving in time. These
kinds will be the objects and morphisms in the category of ontology, and category the-
ory will give the algebraic structure to them for the formation of a psychophysical algebra.
The language of category theory, which is a language rather than a theory, would then
be
”
spoken“ and with the programmatic speaking hopefully automatically revealing new,
i.e. yet unknown, insights. Thus, which category to use is not arbitrary but of arbitrative
importance to get the right
”
feeling“ of the possible, that is the necessarily occurring
NEXUS in (chap 4), which is the fundamental process of changing existents.
With the adopted ontology, we have the ingredients to define the category of existence
which is owed to our intuition of that being existent that is now, endorsing presentism.
The existents, the category theoretical objects, are quality particulars and their necessary
conditions for change at the same temporal and spacial location.Those categorical kinds
are real, but what about their interrelations? They are not real but true. Inter-time
determination should not be seen as some dubious force or even causal power, determi-
nation is not a pressing into existence or change, it is rather a true relation about states
of affairs, holding scepticism at a minimum due to serious metaphysical investigation.
The objects behave in a deterministic manner: they are necessitated to be there, and
the necessitation resides in their existence. Thus, the morphisms only state the objects’
existence (ontological intra-time determination) or their change in existence (nomological
inter-time determination). There are no additional natural laws needed.
Thus, DUCKs intends to provide an (onto)logical grounding of existents and change
of existents and its necessity. And in order to give it a serious basis, it has to show its
consistency with a well-established, fundamental physical theory. Since the ontology that
has been developed by then is about existents and their change in position, it stands to
reason to look for the physical theory that best allows for one-to-one correspondences,
and of course, we will have to ask whether this ‘best’ is good enough. This procedure in
(chap 4) could be termed an experimental metaphysics approach, with the emphasis on
‘metaphysics’ to be experimentally confirmed. The theory is called Bohmian mechanics.
This provides us with two ingredients for our minimalist theory: primitive objects and
their primitive interrelations. But can that be all? Maybe considerable benefits accrue, if
we go for gathering and introduce families of primitive objects and their primitive inter-
relations representing the building blocks necessary to construct higher orders or levels
of objects and interrelations by some complexification process. Thus, one could allow
for composing the objects to some object with composite interrelations yielding new, i.e.
emergent objects. And that is the idea: the mental, formerly known as ‘mental phe-
nomenon’, doesn’t show as ‘properties’, ‘states’, or ‘events’ but as some existing object
with existing necessary conditions for change. In (chap 4), the consequences of experi-
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encing and thinking the existing mental will be discussed.
But before this is done, in (chap 2) DUCKs will be established by building on the elab-
orations on the construction of hierarchies of higher orders that are already formulated
in the language and logics of category theory. The starting point is the hyperstructure
construction set in which the mathematician Nils Baas explicitly introduces the observer
as both a result of and a condition for the emergence of new properties showing in new in-
terrelations, the so-called bonds. The difficulties of the conditioned result will be pointed
out and made explicit in a computer simulation performed a by him and others of the
evolution of proto-cells that are on the way to becoming living matter.
In (chap 3) the mathematician Andre´e Ehresmann and the physician Jean-Paul Vanbre-
meersch try to overcome those issues of coming into existence by introducing the mental
object as some representation of lower structures resulting from the colimit construction
process. But it turns out that the complexification process in their Memory Evolutive
Neural Systems (MENS) is also based on troublesome building blocks, which renders it
to be more an epistemic model than an ontology. This forces us to go further since we
are interested in preparing for unifying the mental and the physical by referring to ex-
perimental constraints provided by the—at least for today—most fundamental theory of
existence, which is the theory of guided matter points introduced in (chap 4).
5

2 Hyperstructures
2.1 The Emergence of Structures
Since the early 90s, Nils Baas has been developing a theory of hierarchical or higher order
structures. The aim in this branch of his explorations is to have on hand a framework
suitable to allow for, register, or set up new entities and their properties. Baas’ theory of
hyperstructures is about the observed emergence of new structures with the final objective
of providing the transition from mere self-assembled matter to living systems1.
An important aspect of his construction set is the observer begging the question of the
ontology of the evolution of novelty. Without an observer, i.e. without some kind of per-
ceiving and conceiving classifier, would there exist something like higher-order structures?
The observer is considered an “internal or external mechanism”2 that declares some ag-
gregate as new iff some property is detected conditioned by a certain composition of the
primitives. And Baas distinguishes between self-assembly and biological evolution. But
what are the criteria for that kind of discrimination, and are they admissible? For isn’t
evolution nothing but self-replicating self-assembly under natural selection in the sense
that selecting for existence is implicitly given in the self-assembly process—no external,
”
downward causal“ intruding needed?
These questions will be investigated but not without first having delineated his ground-
ing construction set while already modifying the theory where necessary for our purpose
of sufficiently integrating the observer to see how real higher-order structures could be
registered.
Baas’ idea of something new coming into existence is that its emergence from the old
is or is also an appearance, i.e. it has to be observed to be an emergent structure with
emergent properties. There is a number of approaches to the (de)complexification process3
that are necessarily in a way akin—they all assert a kind of hierarchy of interrelated
structures of subsequent order.4 The unifying concept here is the construction of so-called
hyperstructures as the most fundamental hierarchy, which is the result of an iteration of
structures beginning at a defined order 1:5
Definition 1 (First-order structure). First-order structures S1i1 are primitives. They
constitute a family of structures
(S1i1)i1∈I1 (2.1.1)
with I1 denoting some finite or infinite index set. N
1Significantly, his grounding article has been published in an anthology on artificial life.
2Cf. [60, 516].
3Cf. e.g. [50], [1], and especially [3] which we refer to intensively in (chap 3).
4Cf. [60] and [63].
5Cf. [60, 517].
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The properties of the “observational mechanism” or “mechanism of registration” are
necessary for these first-order structures to be obtained. It has to be discussed to what
extent they are part of or woven into the properties and interrelations of the struc-
tures themselves. In particular, it is questionable what is being observed when one—an
observer—states the existence of those primitives as such and as constituents of higher-
order structures:
[T]o register that something new has come into existence, we need mechanisms
to observe the entities.6
That could mean that it is a fact that the novel phenomenon emerged, and it simply
has to be recognized. But it is also said:
[W]e apply our observational mechanisms—Obs—to obtain properties of the
structures Si, Obs(Si). Next we subject the Si’s to a family of interactions—
Int—using the properties registered under the observation [...].7
Hence, the next higher order, the second-order structure, would be generated by the
primitives in interaction with the observer, and the primitives would be both the ob-
served primitive first-order objects (S1i1 ) and their observed primitive first-order interac-
tions (Int1i1). The “role” of the observer to register or to generate remains unclear.
We first give the definition of Baas’ “construction process” of second-order structures
and then proceed to his theory in favour of our motivation of stating the nature’s entities
as ontological:8
Definition 2 (Second-Order Structure). A second-order structure is a relation
S2 = R((S1i1 ), (Int
1
i1), Obs
1) (2.1.2)
with
(i) R: result of the construction process,
(ii) (S1i1 ): first-order structures,
(iii) (Int1i1): first-order interrelations,
(iv) Obs1: observer of (S1i1) and (Int
1
i1).
N
The crucial point of introducing emergent structures and properties is the process of
observing properties of both the first-order structures and the interrelations between them
given the constraints being imposed from the outside.9 The observer itself being included
in these constraints from the outside interacts with the first-order structures. The re-
sult R of the process, which is the second-order structure S2, depends on the primitives
6Cf. [60, 516].
7Cf. [60, 517].
8Cf. [63, 554].
9These constrains will be one of the key issues to be reflected on in (chap 4.2) in the ontological
grounding referring to the experimental metaphysics of the fundamental physical theory of existence
which is chosen to be Bohmian mechanics.
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(S1i1 ), their primitive interrelations (Int
1
i1), and the observer Obs
1 observing the (S1i1)
interacting with Obs1, which then are the objects’ properties Obs1(S1i1 ) and the objects’
interactions Obs1(Int1i1). However, Baas points out that “[i]n some cases the structures
and the interactions may not be separable; Obs will then act upon them jointly.”10 This
is of course a major problem and brings to mind dispositionalism—the structures showing
up, more precisely their (observed) properties, just by interaction.11 And we have to ask:
interaction of what? Obviously, it is the observer that is acted on by
”
watching“ the
first-order interacting first-order structures, in a way captured by the ominous R, such
that the result is the observer’s stating the second-order structure via having observed
the alleged first-order properties Obs1(S1i1 ) and interactions Obs
1(Int1i1). What are the
dependencies then for the process R such that the outcome S2 is either an ontological or
an epistemic entity? Given the primitives (S1i1) and (Int
1
i1)
12 and the observer Obs1 in
(2.1.2) are real, the question for ontology then would be down to R. It would have to de-
scribe how first-order structures interact with a non first-order structure—or an aggregate
of first-order structures—Obs1 which renders two uncertainties given that the primitives
are seen to be unproblematic: Obs1 and R, i.e. the existence of an observer and his real
interactions such that a construction process R brings about a new structure S2.
A first idea to avoid the difficulties is to drop the observer or to have it included in the
families of the primitives:
S2 = R((S1i1 ), (Int
1
i1)) (2.1.3)
That would give us an important advantage over (2.1.2). The higher-order structures
were observer-independent unless the process of construction, or its result, R embraced
the non-primitive observer.13
Another attempt to face the problem is to substitute the ontological observer in (2.1.2)
by an epistemic observation of the first-order structures and their first-order interactions,
which are then families of observed properties:
S2 = R((S1i1), (Int
1
i1), Obs
1(S1i1), Obs
1(Int1i1)) (2.1.4)
The task of the process R then is to describe the emergence of the real stated second-
order structure S2 from the primitives and their observational properties. But without the
observer Obs1 explicitly taken into consideration, the observed structures Obs1(S1i1) and
observed interactions Obs1(Int1i1) would be ”
living on their own“, meaning the second-
order structure would be the result of the construction process on the primitives and
observed primitives only. But why then wouldn’t we just leave the entities alone and
pack the observing into R again?
Ontologically speaking, for the second-order structure to evolve or emerge or just be,
why should we dwell on the observation of the primitives and not just make do with
10Cf. [60, 517].
11Cf. [51] for dispositionalism in the context of quantum properties necessitating change in the domain
unifying process in DUCKs (chap 4).
12We take the first-order interrelations also to be primitives in anticipation of the condition for the
change underlying “interaction”.
13This is what Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch favor in their colimit construction. Cf. [60, 532], [63],
and [4].
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looking at S2:
Obs(S2) = Obs(R((S1i1 ), (Int
1
i1 ))) (2.1.5)
Firstly, it is because we again wouldn’t know about the ontological status of the observer
and secondly we would just see Obs(S2), even without knowing that the observation is
due to a second-order structure S2. We would see a structure S having properties Obs(S).
But we observe first-order structures and second-order structures, and we want to relate
the observed second-order structure to the observed first-order primitives:
Obs(S2) = R(Obs1(S1i1), Obs
1(Int1i1)) (2.1.6)
having neglected the primitives for the observations while still expecting some objectivity.
But that wouldn’t work either unless the relation R again included the observer in addi-
tion to everything necessary for the observer to observe, i.e. further boundary conditions.
Focussing on Obs1, if we wish to stay as vague as possible and admit the observer as
one determinant for the result of the construction process R, we have to explicitly add the
observer to the observed in equation (2.1.4), yielding the observed second-order structure:
Obs(S2) = R((S1i1), (Int
1
i1), Obs
1(S1i1), Obs
1(Int1i1), Obs
1) (2.1.7)
with the observed second-order structure being identified with its observed properties
(S2 := Obs(S2)). In words, this puts emphasis on the observer: the observer is necessary
for the observed primitives to obtain their observation that are proceeded to result in an
observed second-order structure which is its observed properties.
Focussing on R, with (2.1.7), the construction process is quite reduced then, but we
still have to ask what is left for it if it isn’t the primitives, the observed properties of
the primitives, the observer, and their interrelating? Obviously, it is the remainder, the
boundary conditions, e.g. including an experimental apparatus Baas was referring to.
And one must still find a criterion as to where to draw the line between the process, the
observer, the observed, and their complement. If one wished to emphasize the observer
to be the process of construction itself but without neglecting the necessary remainder,
call it R¯, the
”
equation“ (2.1.7) would turn into
Obs(S2) = Obs1((S1i1 ), (Int
1
i1), Obs
1(S1i1), Obs
1(Int1i1), R¯) (2.1.8)
Despite significant effort, we sense that these considerations do not really achieve suc-
cess, and that is just the beginning. We have an issue already with separating the process
from the observer, let alone the observer from the observed. It indeed appears to be un-
promising to further attempt to create new entities with such vague tools at hand, and it
is not necessarily the complexity of the subject but, as is often the case, our intuitions as
human beings that lead us astray. But because of the highly intuitive elaboration14 and
exemplification15 of Baas’ concept of hyperstructures and the clarity of how they fail, we
will follow his procedure of complexification. We want to show the redundancy of giving
the process R and the observer of whatever order Obs disjunctive treatments. And we will
uncover which of the difficulties are homemade and which are genuine. Thus, we follow
14Cf. (chap 2.1.2).
15Cf. (chap 2.2).
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Baas in his definition of R covering (the result of) the process and the boundary condi-
tions in the observation of higher-order structures in the confidence that the segregation
of R and Obs appears obsolete, and it will be interesting why.
For now, R is the result of some kind of process not further understood ontologically
which has to be introduced in order to follow the intuition of higher-order structures to
exist.
Before we further elaborate our main interest in the emergence of novelty, there is still
a remark to be made on the order of the observer in (2.1.7). If Obs1 itself is not meant to
be a structure of order 1, it must be seen to be an observer of some higher order
”
looking
at“ the primitives, i.e. operating or interacting at order 1. Here, as said, we do not
want to inquire after the origin of the observer, but we state that an observer at order 1
cannot possibly detect some higher order structure, e.g. S2. Thus, whether the observed
properties of the primitives can be still seen to be of order 1 is also doubtful—they could
be externally imposed:
The interactions may be caused by the structures themselves or imposed by
external factors.16
And with the interactions may come the assigned properties.17
We do not want to distance ourselves too far from Baas’ process of
”
producing“ higher-
order properties and again change the dependencies in (2.1.8) the “internal or external
observational mechanism” being one factor in the construction process. Thus, the relation
we work with instead of Baas’ (2.1.2) is
Obs(S2) = R((S1i1), (Int
1
i1), Obs(S
1
i1 ), Obs(Int
1
i1), Obs) (2.1.9)
Again, what is the difference? Although Baas addressed the dependence of the prop-
erties on the observer, he is not very strict in his notation—the structures and their
interactions, even those of first order, are not indicated as being observed. Of course,
one could state the aggregation (S1i1) with the interactions (Int
1
i1) was what is by the
observer being acted on, and all observed higher-order properties did intrinsically relate
to these primitives, and thus it wasn’t necessary to refer to the observation of the prim-
itives Obs(S1i1) and Obs(Int
1
i1). R then wouldn’t proceed on the observations but on
the observer only. But as long as R is not specified, one can just admit higher-order
structures are constructively observed or assumed. Without an observer higher-order
structures wouldn’t exist, and with an observer those structures are epistemic. There-
fore, Baas’ elaboration is on epistemic emergence, and he makes the uncovering easy for
us since he explicitly introduces the observer as a necessary ingredient in the procedure of
construction or registration such that the properties—including the interactions—can be
stated as mere observations. That is a merit which can’t be valuated highly enough since
in the endeavor of searching for an appropriate framework for construction procedures
the observer, or the observer’s ontology, doesn’t explicitly attract attention, for the most
part.
16Cf. [60, 517].
17Cf. (chap 2.1.2) in detail in the category theoretical framework.
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2.1.1 Emergent Properties
In order to build a hierarchy on subsequent structures of increasing complexity, new
structures have to be identified, and that is done by R and Obs together—the process of
observing their emergent properties. Thus, Baas’ definition of emergence is:18
Definition 3 (First-order emergence). P is an emergent property of S2 iff
∀i1 ∈ I1 : P ∈ Obs(S
2), and P < Obs(S1i1) (2.1.10)
S2 is called an emergent structure, and P an emergent property of level 2.19 N
Figure 2.1: Left: The figure shows a given family of first-order structures (S1i1)i1∈I1
. Noth-
ing is being observed yet. Middle: In addition, their first-order interactions
(Int1i1) are shown. It is still a mere aggregation without an observed prop-
erty P ∈ Obs(S1i1). Right: The edging signifies the second-order structure
S2 has been observed: the observer Obs has detected a new property P with
P ∈ Obs(S2), and P < Obs(S1i1) ∀i1 ∈ I1.
This kind of observational complexification process defines structures of consecutive
order with the family (S1i1 )i1∈I1 being the primitive structures and (S
2
i2
)i2∈I2 the first
complex structures emerging.20 The procedure can be continued by an observer which
can be considered a selection mechanism somehow producing, according to Baas, new
higher-order structures possibly corresponding to new levels.21 “The adaption of higher-
order observers” then is said to be regarded as an or the evolutive process itself. The
result of the adaption is a hierarchy of structures, the so-called hyperstructure:22
Definition 4 (Hyperstructure). A hyperstructure of order N is a relation
SN = R((SN−1iN−1), (Int
N−1
iN−1
), ObsN−1(SN−1iN−1), Obs
N−1(IntN−1iN−1), Obs
N−1, ...) (2.1.11)
with iN−1 ∈ IN−1, ... N
And the observer or the process of observation is still the weak point. In the ontological
view, a first-order token observation is not a first-order observable, i.e. an instantiation of
18Cf. [63, 554].
19With Baas, Obs would be Obs2 but, as said, the order of the observed primitive assigns the order of
the observations.
20Cf. (fig 2.1).
21Differentiation order–level see below.
22Cf. [60, 524].
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a variable but the very observed property itself. The observerObs1 observing the primitive
S1i1 resulting in the property Obs
1(S1i1) would result in the same property observed by
a higher-order observer, e.g. ObsN−1: Obs1(S1i1) = Obs
N−1(S1i1).
23 But what is Obs1
in terms of the primitives? Is it a primitive itself or some higher-order structure just
observing a primitive? It is not some higher-order structure, since they are explicitly
noted, namely ObsN−1 for instance. Hence, it is a first-order structure observing a first-
order structure, and the observation could just be a first-order interrelation. Thus there is
no need to mention all the observers explicitly in (2.1.11) as just being ij-order structures.
But on the other hand, those structures give the structures their observed properties, and
we shouldn’t omit them all. Given that Obs1(S1i1) = Obs
N−1(S1i1) for all index sets, it
may suffice to admit the highest-order or the observer equation (2.1.11) resulting in:24
Obs(SN ) = R((S1i1), (Int
1
i1), Obs(S
N−1
iN−1
), Obs(IntN−1iN−1), ..., Obs) (2.1.12)
The hyperstructure SN is merged of lower-order structures not forming some kind of
Figure 2.2: The evolution of a structure of order 3. Left: Six first-order structures S1i1
and their first-order interrelations Int1i1 are identified. Middle: Two second-
order structures S2i2 are detected but no additional interrelation. Right: Those
two second-order structures interrelate through Int2i2 (double line), which is
observed by Obs2. The result is structure S3.
new substance but remaining the old substance and is only detectable by showing a new
property or interrelation due to the property and vice versa. Then according to defi-
nition (def 3), Obs(SN ) is a set of N th order emergent properties exclusively shown by
hyperstructures of order N , but the family (SNiN ) can also admit preceding lower order
properties.
Before we show the difference between (2.1.11) and (2.2) in a biochemical example in
order to make clear the necessity of sorting the epistemic from the ontological part, we
first proceed with Baas’ more refined framework on abstract matter as a generalisation of
the hyperstructure concept in which the connection between properties and interactions
are especially elaborated—properties to be observed due to the bonding of the observer
with the observed.
2.1.2 Emergent Interactions
As described, at the time that Baas was forming a hyperstructural framework for hier-
archies, higher categories—so-called n-categories—came in vogue again. The result was
23It is not included in equation (2.1.11) since the properties are already detected at lower orders.
24In (chap 4) the structures will be called systems and the observer identified with the mental.
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that he re-formulated his conceptual findings in the language of higher categories, which
emphasize the interrelations of entities of levels or layers rather than the objects them-
selves in the sense of the category theory’s motto: ‘It’s the bonds that really matter!’
Again, we want to call to mind that we are urged to leave out mathematics, because the
objective is still to stay as ontological as possible. And we are encouraged to look closely
at whether Baas’ formulation suits our needs. The emphasis on relations—and relations
of relations as it will turn out—rather than the related real or observed objects could lead
us astray as elegant as this construction set is. But this begs the question: Is focussing
on arrows—the “bonds”—more suitable in the endeavor to get us as close as possible to
reality? And we will see that it might not be, although it is a tool we human beings
cannot go without:
The Hyperstructure Principle: In order to study or use a collection of objects
it is useful to put on a suitable Hyperstructure to reach a goal. Hyperstructures
are tools for thought and tools for organizing complex information.25
The suspicion that hyperstructures is all about cognition and that the relations refined
in this chapter do not exist outside the mind shouldn’t keep us from trying to integrate
the imagined in proper diagrams—and see how we demonstrate this.
In his newly couched framework, Baas calls the unfolding of higher structures a con-
struction, but we call it what it is—a constructive definition. The primitives here are of
order 0:26
Definition 5 (Objects of order 0). Objects of order 0 are basic units, and X0 is their
set. N
Definition 6 (Properties of order 0). To each subset S0 ⊂ X0 it is assigned a set of
properties or states of order 0 :
Ω0 : P(X0)→ Sets
S0 7→ Ω0(S0)
(2.1.13)
with P(X) = {A | A ⊂ X} is the power set and Sets a suitable set of sets.27 N
Interestingly, Baas doesn’t distinguish between properties and states that the primitives—
allocated to a subset of X0—taken together or individually have or are in. And it is true.
Is it possible for a primitive or a set of primitives to change the state without differing in
at least one property? Being in a state means having a certain property.
The interrelations will now be introduced very differently. They depend on the observed
first-order properties of the subsets of the first-order structures, called bonds here:
Definition 7 (Bonds of order 0). Given a set of basic units X0, to each pair of subsets
of basic units and properties (S0, ω0) ∈ Γ0 = {(S0, ω0) | S0 ∈ P(X0), ω0 ∈ Ω0(S0)}, it is
assigned a set of bonds B0(S0, ω0) of order 0 :
B0 : Γ0 → Sets
(S0, ω0) 7→ B0(S0, ω0)
(2.1.14)
25Cf. [62, 21].
26Cf. [61, 158].
27In the language of category theory, P(X0) would refer to the category of subsets and Sets to the
category of sets.
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N
Comparing these definitions of the set/category theoretical framework with those of
the former construction set already shows what Baas is aiming for. He wants to distract
our attention away from the materially existent towards their interactions:
(i) X0: set of first-order structures (S
1
i ),
(ii) S0: family of first-order structures (S
1
i1
),
(iii) Ω0(S0): set of all first-order observed properties Obs
1((S1i1 )) of the family of first-
order structures (S1i1),
(iv) ω0: first-order observed property of (S
1
i1),
(v) B0(S0, ω0): set of all interrelations Obs
1((Int1i1)) of (S
1
i1
) given an observed first-
order property of (S1i1),
(vi) b0(S0, ω0) ∈ B0(S0, ω0): a specific choice of above interrelations being the resultant
R of an observational process.
The properties become apparent from the interactions—an intuition we will return to
repeatedly.
In the following complexification process, the higher order objects are bonds:28
Definition 8 (Objects of order 1). Given a subset S0 ⊂ X0 of objects of order 0,
their observed properties or states Ω0(S0), and their bonds B0, then X1 = {b0 | b0 ∈
B0(S0, ω0), S0 ∈ P(X0), ω0 ∈ Ω0(S0)} is the set of objects of order 1 with
Ω1 : P(X1)→ Sets
S1 7→ Ω1(S1)
(2.1.15)
and the projection map π0
X1
pi0

P(X0)
(2.1.16)
with π0(b0) = S0: the objects of order 1 are observed bonds of families of objects of order
0. N
With the bonds X1 of families of objects of order 0, their source and target is implicitly
given so that they need not be carried along for further discussions. The bonds define
the bonded, or to put it another way, without a new bond emerging, no new structure
can be observed.
Definition 9 (Bonds of order 1). Given a set of units X1, each pair of subsets of units
and properties (S1, ω1) ∈ Γ1 = {(S1, ω1) | S1 ∈ P(X1), ω1 ∈ Ω1(S1)} is assigned a set of
bonds B1(S1, ω1) of order 1 :
B1 : Γ1 → Sets
(S1, ω1) 7→ B1(S1, ω1)
(2.1.17)
N
28Cf. [61, 158,159].
15
2 Hyperstructures
And with it, just as important for our considerations, a vertical unfolding of projection
maps again suggests a hierarchical organization:
Definition 10 (Objects of order 2). Given a subset S1 ⊂ X1 of objects of order 1,
their observed properties or states Ω1(S1), and their bonds B1. Then X2 = {b1 | b1 ∈
B1(S1, ω1), S1 ∈ P(X1), ω1 ∈ Ω1(S1)} is the set of objects of order 2 with
Ω2 : P(X2)→ Sets
S2 7→ Ω2(S2)
(2.1.18)
and the projection map π1
X2
pi1

P(X1)
(2.1.19)
with π1(b1) = S1. N
Further observations of new properties set up new observed objects, i.e. bonds, with
the iteration process resulting in level N :
(i) Observations: ΩN−1 : P(XN−1)→ Sets,
(ii) Bonds: BN−1 : ΓN−1 → Sets,
(iii) Objects: XN = {bN−1 | bN−1 ∈ BN−1(SN−1, ωN−1), SN−1 ∈ P(XN−1), ωN−1 ∈
ΩN−1(SN−1)}.
Compared to (def 4), with this procedure of construction we can now define hyperstruc-
tures in a somewhat more integrative way:
Definition 11 (Hyperstructure of order N). The system H = (X ,Ω,B, π) is a hyper-
structure of order N with
X = {X0, ..., XN}
Ω = {Ω0, ...,ΩN−1}
B = {B0, ..., BN−1}
π = {π0, ..., πN−1}
(2.1.20)
N
Thus, a hyperstructure of order N is all there is up to a level N including the observers:
“An Observer mechanism is implicit in the Ωi’s.”
29 And they also “represent the emer-
gent properties”.30 In this framework then, one should not compare observed properties
of a subset of primitive existents Ω0(S0) with the observed properties of a subset of bonds
Ω1(S1). Rather, due to an observed new bond, some criterion for a subset has been found.
29Cf. [61, 160].
30Cf. [61, 159].
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In a further step of the construction process, Baas introduces a second criterion for
selection, besides the observation. Only those sets of units are assembled for which certain
bonds are observed—“bond-type structures”:31
P(Xi)→ Coll(Xi) (2.1.21)
meaning that only some sets of units are allowed, resulting in a collection of assemblies,
“and then define Ωi and Bi on these.” This step however appears to be a simple act of
bookkeeping after having already assigned properties to those that are of special interest.
But “[t]his is just a useful refinement to be aware of”, as Baas states himself.
Still, the assemblies in Coll(Xi) are said to have no “internal structure”. But this could
be remedied by allowing a sequence of families of structure types S : S0,S1, ...,SN . The
types in Si at every level could then be seen as a classification of the objects of the set
Xi due to some criterion, and the property and state assignment Ωi would be classifiable
in properties and states of structures of some certain type. And the bond assignment
Bi(Si, ωi) on structures in types Si ”
creates“ the higher level Xi+1, resulting again in an
iterating process. Baas includes these types in the hyperstructures:32
Definition 12 (Hyperstructure of order N and structure type S). The system H =
(X ,Ω,B, π,S) is a hyperstructure of order N with structure type S = {S0, ...,SN}. N
Summing up, the two refinements of hyperstructures are due to a separation into bond
types and in types of internal structure. An example for hyperstructures with structure
types would be “multilevel systems like biological structures bound together level by level,
for example, molecules, cells, tissues, organs, organisms.”33 Generalizing physical entities
Baas shows how to build “life-like matter” starting with objects in a category theoretical
sense—so-called categorical or abstract matter. Hyperstructures then are constructed to
be higher order diagrams.34
Finally, Baas tries to define the stable result of the observational process by families
of rules. The key concept of the construction procedure is the emergence of new bonds
bN ∈ BN (SN , ωN)35 but which means that they evolve in time. Baas doesn’t explic-
itly take the sets of structures SN to be time-variant. Rather, he concentrates on the
states/properties ωN (t) and bonds bN (t) and gives a definition for a discrete time evolu-
tion of hyperstructures:36
Definition 13 (Hyperstructural Dynamics). The dynamics of a hyperstructure of order
N is given by families of rules R = {Ri} at each level i
Ri : ωi(t) 7→ ωi(t+ 1)
bi(t) 7→ bi(t+ 1)
(2.1.22)
such that the change is compatible with the states/properties Ω = {Ω0, ...,Ωi, ...,ΩN−1}
and the bonds B = {B0, ..., Bi, ..., BN−1} in H = (X ,Ω,B, π). N
31Cf. [61, 160].
32Cf. [61, 161].
33Cf. [61, 161]. The ingredients for artificial life will be extensively discussed in the next section.
34Cf. [61, 168].
35and not of sets of basic units due to the emergence of those bonds
36Cf. [61, 172].
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In this dynamical hyperstructural construction process, the change of the observed
states/properties and the observed bonds, i.e. the observables, is ruled by the basic units
X0 and the observer, and naturally the question arises: isn’t the observer itself some
existent? And the rules R = {Ri(t)} themselves are not time-invariant since they are not
separable from the behavior of the existent and the observational mechanism. On this,
Baas says, “[T]he rules could be” and even “[t]he whole dynamics may be organized as a
hyperstructure.”37 And again, the question arises: what is change and what is changing,
anyhow? In the hyperstructure construction set, the line between epistemics and ontol-
ogy is not clearly drawn. Especially, intermediate levels appear to be mere conceptual,
i.e. epistemological. In the transition to the ontological view in (chap 4), there will be
objects only—and their necessary conditions for change. And the task will be to investi-
gate whether some objects are
”
special“, of course still employing fundamental epistemics
which will be the so-called colimes construction.
But first we want to give a clarifying, concrete example of dynamical hyperstructures
resulting in dynamical hierarchies of “abstract matter represented by stable equilibria or
fixed points.” Now we are on the way to “living matter”.
2.2 The Observational Mechanism
In a physicochemical example, the physicist Rasmussen and Baas elaborate the concep-
tion of the spontaneous formation of structures in a dynamical hierarchy showing novel
properties. They develop a computer simulation38 based on the framework introduced
of interrelating levels in addition to orders showing so-called observed multiple function-
alities. As will be seen, the collective dynamics of the structures result in higher-level
behavior that is actually defined by the observation of their higher-order properties.
Therefore, they present a relatively easy-to-handle physicochemical paradigm of a dy-
namical hierarchy that is comparable with experimental self-assembly systems: micelles39
as third-order structures together with water molecules as first-order structures showing
functional higher-level properties of the aggregation.
However, in a reply to the process of micellation, two other fellow soldiers of the artificial
life community argue for micelles to be of only order 2. And it will be analyzed whether
they are right and whether their arguments can be used to up the ante and reduce the
order down to 1—the micelles not showing new properties at all, with all the implications.
2.2.1 A Computer Simulation
The reason why one would simulate some dynamics in a computer is either to generate
unpredicted or unpredictable phenomena grounded on certain input data or to uncover the
process resulting in well-known ones. In this case, both of these apply. The phenomenon
is supposed to be micellation and all that which is observed in the biochemistry being
assumed an exemplar of hyperstructural emergents. And the goal of this simulating
37Cf. [61, 172].
38Cf. [76] and [75].
39Cf. [29, 146], [46], and [54, 45].
18
2.2 The Observational Mechanism
epistemics is to confirm the rules for the structures occurring and see how they fit the
advocated ontology.40
Thus, there is ontology, epistemology, and simulation, and the reason for counting the
latter in addition to the epistemic domain is that the epistemics has to be modified to be-
come computable.41 And this computer-adequate adaption could prove to be inadequate
to represent proper knowledge, possibly laying a false trail in getting the ontology right.
We will see that, not just here, it might well be so.
Rasmussen et al. exercise a concrete descriptive42 physicochemical example for spon-
taneously formed structures at three levels, i.e. length scales:
(i) Level 1: water and monomers,
(ii) Level 2: water and polymers (linear monomer aggregates),
(iii) Level 3: water and micelles (polymer aggregates).
Building up the simulation, we need a set of axiomatically given basic objects at level
1 and a set of dynamical rules43 which determine that these objects behave in certain
ways. The objects might have an intrinsic structure according to which their properties
and higher-level functionalities emerge. It is acknowledged
that the specification of observable properties is somewhat arbitrary. This is
quite analogous to the arbitrariness involved in the specification of the primitive
objects and their interactions.44
But for the simulation and the final conjecture—the ansatz45—the possibility of zooming
in on the structures and revealing new structures doesn’t pose a problem.
The primitive objects—the monomers and water molecules—are equipped with these
intermolecular interactions: attraction and repulsion.46 More precisely, there are hy-
drophilic monomers (hydrophilics) which tend to attract water molecules and hydropho-
bic monomers (hydrophobics), which tend to repulse them or attract them more weakly.47
Both monomers are mutually attractive but in a weaker way than they bind water
molecules if they bind. And the strongest attraction is between water molecules.
In a simplified version for the sake of clarity in the 2-dimensional model, water is just
implicitly involved by interpreting vacant lattice sites as a mixture of vacuum and water
resulting in mean field interactions reducing the effects of the many bodies to a single
averaged effect providing for heat bath
”
kicks“. In the more sophisticated 3-dimensional
model, water is simulated explicitly with all the additional individual interrelations, which
allows for more realistic behaviors to evolve while the principle of emerging properties of
40Cf. (chap 4).
41Cf. [58], [9].
42To what extent they want to build an ontology is not clear at this stage.
43Cf. (def 13).
44Cf. [76, 334].
45Cf. (con 1).
46Monomer-monomer bonds are also listed and actually used in the simulation. And we already see
that they might be just an add-on due to observation and simplification. Cf. [76, 333].
47Attraction and repulsion are here considered to be a symmetric relations: the objects attract or
repulse each other equally.
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higher-order structures stays the same.
What is not the same is the notation of the hyperstructural complexification process,
and we will see whether the change is a shift again.48 In the example, the objects, the
monomers and water molecules constitute our first-order family of n primitives:49
S1r = S
1
r (sr, frs, τr), r, s = 1, ..., n (2.2.1)
with
(i) sr: the object’s state (e.g. type, position, orientation of the molecule),
(ii) frs: the object’s interactions,
(iii) τr : the object’s local time.
The novel element in the theory sr defines the state of the first-order object S
1
r com-
prising e.g. the “aspect” of being in the state of being a certain molecule or being in
the state of having or being at a certain position. So far, in the hyperstructure context,
states did not arise explicitly50, rather they were included in the observation function Ω0,
or Obs1 respectively, of the structures yielding the observables, i.e. properties:
For example, being hydrophobic or hydrophilic are observable properties of
monomers that can be observed using an observation function O1.51
But then one wonders whether being a hydrophobic or hydrophilic monomer is considered
being a type, i.e. being in a state, or a property. This is a difficulty that stems from the
vagueness of the definition of the structure S1r itself. Is it a kind of a carrier or a sub-
stance? We will return to that soon. Here we will just point out: states are not properties.
Another novelty is that the interactions frs directly determine the structure and are
not explicitly listed52 or, in a subsequent step, allocated by certain observed properties53.
This is especially a problem where the property of being e.g. hydrophobic, if it is a
property, is the result of an observed interaction54 with other first-order structures, the
water molecules. The reason that the interactions are introduced as part of the primitive
will be also addressed soon.
Probably the most important innovation is to provide the structures with a local time
τr, which is indeed necessary to make the change computable: the structures now come
with a spacio-temporal location.55
To build a dynamics, one has to choose the constituents, i.e. what is going to change,
and what are the conditions for change? The “updating” is executed on the above object’s
states and interrelations between them that are itself considered objects: in the math-
ematical framework, called molecular dynamics lattice gases56, matter and force fields
48Cf. (def 1).
49Cf. [76, 333].
50Cf. (def 1).
51Cf. [76, 333].
52Cf. (def 2).
53Cf. (def 9).
54Cf. (def 7).
55Cf. (chap 13).
56Cf. [55].
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propagate locally as force-communicating information particles between neighboring lat-
tice sites indexed by integers: (i, j), i, j ∈ N . An object r then corresponds to a location
in the lattice L, i.e. given the object r is at (i, j), it transfers its values of the state
variables to the lattice:57
sr = (i, j, x1, ..., xq) ∈ S (2.2.2)
with
(i) S: state space of the n objects,
(ii) i, j: position of the internal states of r in the triangular lattice representing physical
space,
(iii) xl ∈ Xl, l = 1, ..., q: q-many aspects of r at lattice site (i, j).
Considering the object-view, i.e. spot-lightening the position of the n objects, the total
state of the
”
system“ then results in
zobj ∈ Zobj =
∏
obj
S (2.2.3)
with the dynamics being proceeded by the update operator Uobj : Zobj → Zobj sweeping
over the objects:
zobj(t+∆t) = Uobj(zobj(t)) (2.2.4)
These are the preparations made for the following computer simulation, and it is said
that they are still in correspondence with equation (2.2.1):
So, the reidentification and movement of each primitive object is represented
implicitly by the local propagation of state information about each site, just as
a glider’s reidentification and movement is represented in a cellular automata
like the Conway’s game of life.58
Thus, the claim they make is that there has been no loss of realism on the way from
the epistemology S1r = S
1
r (sr, frs, τr) to ”
its“ simulation sr = (i, j, x1, ..., xq), resulting in
the q-many aspects’ re-formulation of the objects’ being and behavior, but that has to be
discussed. Firstly, we inspect the transition from the structure S1r to its state sr, on which
seemingly all attention is being concentrated—letting go of S1r and also the interrelations
frs. And secondly, we examine why the point of view will be changed from the moving
objects to fixed spacial locations.
Unifying States and Bonds
Referring again to equation (2.2.1), the primitive S1r is only being specified by further
information, i.e. it is in dependence on and not identified with its determinants: the object
is in the state of being a monomer, it is not the monomer itself. But what is left for S1r
then? Why not commit to S1r := (sr, frs, τr) leaving behind the ”
carrier“ as just being a
superfluous specifier or designator? In their own notation, the fact of being in the state
of being a monomer is treated equally with other states, like being in a certain position.
57Cf. [76, 335].
58Cf. [76, 335].
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And furthermore, is it appropriate to add the interrelations to the object in the sense of
belonging to it—and not to the state? They are related to force particles, as indicated by
the authors, and should be treated as such, especially where the interrelations are covered
separately in the original framework.59 Of course, they somehow determine the object,
in the manner of what it is, a sink and a source60 for changing the object’s state—the
monomer having a new position. And we will see in the simulation, the force particles
are indeed not separated from the object’s aspects. If we drop the self-evident time of
existence to be a specification on top, the object would result in the state itself:61
S1r = s
t
r (2.2.5)
That is perfectly fine and almost ontological.62 In our example63, the specific object or
structure r (of order 1) is a monomer at time t at a certain position, for example, (i, j)
having properties Obs(S1r ) to be observed, e.g. a monomer being hydrophobic.
Thus, we can indeed endorse the equation (2.2.2)
S1r = s
t
r = (i, j, x1, ..., xq , t) (2.2.6)
with time-dependent “aspects” xl of r at time-dependent position (i, j). Now certainly,
it is key to specify the aspects properly. In the first place, they were said to be a state or
a bunch of states, e.g. the type of object and its position. However, if they are not states
but aspects, what are the aspects of a monomer, and those for a second-order structure, a
polymer? It dawns on us that the state-changing force particles are woven in, the aspects
just being some explication tool for the dynamics. We will discuss that decisive point in
detail.
But first we concentrate on position to prepare for the simulation. On the left side
in (2.2.6), the integer r is an indexical and refers to the state or family of states, and
on the right, there are given integers (i, j) assigning some position, but the position of
what? There are two readings of the “transfer of the variables of the values”. Firstly, the
position follows the states of object r, i.e. the spotlight is thrown on a particular object’s
trajectory: (i, j)(t) = (i, j)(r(t)). Then the equation (2.2.6) turns into
sti,j = (1x
t
i,j , ..., qx
t
i,j) (2.2.7)
Thus, the raison d’eˆtre of the conceived
”
carrier“ S1r in (2.2.1)—it never makes an
appearance—is just to mark particular states to be dropped again with the consequence
that clustered states inherit a certain position—r-bounded tokens. And that is what is
lost in the second, the lattice data structure view, but which enables the glider’s game
interpretation. It is not (i, j)(t) = (i, j)(r(t)) any longer, but the integers are fixed,
constituting a lattice site Di,j , and the tokens simply become variables gliding through
it, allowing for coordinates pointing at nothing:
The internal states have now been modified to enable representation of vacant
lattice sites.64
59Cf. (def 2).
60Cf. (chap 4).
61The order 1 is implicitly given by the designator r, and we give the objects a common time.
62We refer to the ontology put forward in (chap 3).
63We take the easy case: 2-dimensional lattice and no orientation in space.
64Cf. [76, 335].
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This is indeed a shift in the focus on existence: if one doesn’t stick to the objects but
to adjacent sites of certain length scales, there is now room for spotting higher-order
structures.
Looking at the whole volume available, the total system is
zlat ∈ Z lat =
∏
lat
D (2.2.8)
where Di,j ∈ D = X1 × ... × Xq represents the data structure at (i, j) which is the r’s
cluster state sti,j if it just happens to be there at t = τr . And the corresponding update
operator U lat : Z lat → Z lat—now sweeping over the lattice sites—is
zlat(t+∆t) = U lat(zlat(t)) (2.2.9)
Those two state-space formulations are said to be “equivalent”65, and indeed, why
should the traditional, more intuitive molecular dynamics framework be more suitable
just because the focus is on some particular entity drawing a trajectory? That brings us
back to the question as to whether there is a loss of realism in choosing the lattice gas view.
The objective is clear, the bias is on (slowly) moving gatherings to be observed. While
looking at a grid, we define new length scales—levels—at which higher-order structures
are ready for observation.
The update operators then represent the internal dynamics, and one could state there
is no other. And indeed in a strict sense, there is no dynamics but that which is brought
along with the sr’s interactions and certain properties:
A family S1r of objects with specified interactions and properties represents a
process, and the stable outcome or result of this process—in some situations
the attractor for the system—will be represented by R(S1r ).
66
And, as we stated before, “by properties we mean the resulting values of the observ-
ables applied to the system”67, here obtained by the observation function Ω0, or Obs
1
respectively yielding the second-order structure68
S2v = R(S
1
r ), r = 1, ..., n, v = 1, ...,m (n > m) (2.2.10)
which again is being observed by the observation function Obs2 yielding properties P that
are emergent iff
P ∈ Obs2(S2v ) and P < Obs
2(S1r ) (2.2.11)
Those properties P will be now discussed, and in the simulation, we will see that in
order to gain additional structure some extra sort of dynamics has to be included—a
higher-level observer mechanism, which is nothing but a pattern classifier on the basis
of distinct dwell times of the particulars in neighboring voxels which define a new length
scale by the asymptotic behavior of the objects’ gluing together. Therefore, we need a
new higher-order higher-level data structure.
65Cf. [76, 335].
66Cf. [76, 335].
67Cf. [76, 335].
68Cf. [76, 335].
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Higher-Level Data Structure
We have to distinguish between the data structures Di,j , i.e. all “information” at position
(i, j) including the update operator U lat—and that is all there is—and structures that, at
a higher scale, allow for identifications of higher-order structures at higher levels. Those
higher-order structures are not observable at the lattice sites, since at (i, j), there is only
the information gathered at the position itself and the “information-particles” arriving
from its very next neighbors. However, Rasmussen et al. state that “data structures [are]
acting as internal observers [as opposed to external observers] generating second-order
interactions.”69 But setting up a second-order bond is a property of a second-order struc-
ture and, according to (def 2.2.11), an exemplar of first-order emergence, which means
that there must be at least a second-order observer, which is an external observer at a
higher level, i.e. higher scale. And we can take them at their word saying: “Second-order
interactions are, for instance, the interactions we find between polymers.”70 It is the
human being that literally steps out of the picture, i.e. data structure Di,j , and identifies
the polymer due to some criterion at a higher length scale, probably its constituents, the
monomers, staying together for a significant amount of time, assigning it a new bond
between structures of all levels capturing the structures of order N , which in fact are
between first-order structures just extending the neighborhood. In other words, in order
to detect higher N -order structures, we need additional data structures DNi+∆i,j+∆j with
new matter and force fields as “information particles”—the higher-order structures and
their higher-order interrelations. And of course, these data structures are at higher levels.
Rasmussen et al. seem to be reasonably aware of their transition from the “first-
order epistomological”D1i,j to the “higher-order epistomological”D
N
i+∆i,j+∆j saying: “The
second-order structures are therefore only implicitly given.”71 And with that confession
the description language changes completely:
The local use—or interpretation—of the different kinds of communicated in-
formation defines the operational semantics of the information. [...] The
interpretation of the information depends on which hyper-structural level the
communicating objects belong to.72
However, those higher levels, the level of the polymers and the level of the aggregates
of the polymers do not appear in the data structure closer to ontology, and indeed all
new hyper-structures and hyper-structural levels are a matter of semantics.
This shows even more plainly when we return to the topic of emergent properties. For
instance, the polymers are said to exhibit the property of being elastic, which is due to “a
unique combination of the transmitted information”, but who is the sender and who is the
receiver? The answer is that the information comes from the monomers (plus the solvent
water) and arrives at the solute and the external observer, the
”
investigator“, whatever
he constitutes. For example, elasticity is defined as the tendency to fold again when the
chain of the monomers, which is the polymer, is stretched out. This is due to the fact that
the polymer is in a heat bath—the water molecules giving random kicks—, and it is more
likely that the chain takes an unfolded geometrical configuration. A measure for elasticity
69Cf. [76, 343].
70Cf. [76, 342], inverse italics added.
71Cf. [76, 343].
72Cf. [76, 343].
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is said to be the average end-to-end length and the radius of gyration as a function of
the polymer length.73 And that “emergent observable”—the measure for elasticity—is
outside the data structure D1. Indeed, Rasmussen et al. state that elasticity is not a
property of the monomers or monomer-monomer bonds, but it is also not a property of
the polymer floating in the heat bath. ‘Elasticity’ is the property of the observer together
with all that is necessary to identify certain behaviors of the first-order structures, which
is at least in bonds with them and the first-order structures constituting the experiment
apparatus that is in bonds with them in turn, such that the result of the process is having
observed a token suitable to the concept of ‘elasticity’.
The same applies to aggregates of polymers and water molecules—micellar third-order
structures. They are assigned emergent properties or “functionalities” like bringing about
the dichotomy of inside/outside, permeability, i.e. the possibility that, for example, some
hydrophobic monomer inside the micelle is able to leave the single-layer “membrane”, or
even self-reproduction by adding a surface-induced reaction as long as
”
fuel“ molecules
are available.
As is seen, the transition from data structure to semantic talk is somewhat abrupt. We
will arrive at that at the end of the chapter to see how the transition can be justified and
motivate the category theoretical framework in the following chapter. But first, we will
focus on the
”
experimental“ data structure, the observer receiving a closer treatment, and
end with a modification of the authors’ ansatz.
The data structures D1i,j are seen to act as internal observers, explicitly opposed to
external observers, and that is a view one could indeed hold, since the first-order object
is a kind of interpreter of what happened to him, including an automatic updating, which
simply is the execution of conditionalized change. And so far, there is no need to change
to information and its semantics. But in the undertaking of installing a hyperstructural
hierarchy the crucial point would be to find a criterion for the next higher order or
meaningful length scale, i.e. level. It must be found intrinsically by the next level observer,
but how could that be accomplished? There are first-order objects showing first-order
interactions with variations in strength, and the imperative must be to observe a second-
order interaction due to the selection of first-order interactions. Rasmussen et al. content
themselves with:
These interactions are generated from a composition of first-order interac-
tions, since each pairwise interaction always occurs between the first-order
objects.74
Higher-order interactions were generated by composition of lower-order interactions. In
the case of polymer-polymer second-order bonds75, the composition would be directed
towards the monomer-monomer interactions as is delineated in (fig 2.3), for instance.
As is said, the data structures D1i,j are acting as internal observers—the primitives just
receiving information-particles constituting the first-order interactions. But given that
there were data structures covering an appropriately bigger length scale, what would be
73Cf. [76, 338].
74Cf. [76, 342].
75Interactions are not restricted to bonds in the sense of spacial attachment in general, but in the
simulation, it’s about aggregation of higher levels, and that is staying together due to bonding.
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Figure 2.3: Left: polymer-polymer second-order interaction (double line), the crossing
interactions being neglected. Right: first-order interactions. Cf. (fig 2.1) for
zooming in to the atomic level.
the information-particles of the polymer-polymer interactions being
”
generated“ by the
composition of the primitives’
”
information-particles“? Is it just the superposition of the
first-order interactions, and if so, of all of them or just a selection? Rasmussen et al.
simply state:
The only way a unique, concurrent means of communication can be ob-
tained is by a unique combination of the transmitted information. Each inter-
level communication needs to have at least a partially independent information
channel.76
Now they make a clean breast of it—at least only semantic terms are being used, and
obviously, they talk about themselves, the observers. But we are not too quick on the
trigger, we still want to stay close to the physical and ask: is there a unique combination
of first-order interactions or interchanging
”
force particles“ conceivably resulting in a
second-order interaction? The situation is delineated in (fig 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Left: four monomers interrelating (the crossing interactions being neglected
again). Right: two polymers interacting.
The square on the left is to be uniquely combined or composed to the single interrelation
on the right, and it is more than just some ordinary composition since it is an emergent77.
76Cf. [76, 343].
77Cf. (def 3).
26
2.2 The Observational Mechanism
Formally, the figure reduces to the diagrams below
s11
Int14
s14
s12
Int11
Int12
s13
Int13
necessary
for
// s21
Int21
s22
(2.2.12)
neglecting the dynamics and the spacial aspects. This basic example already raises fun-
damental questions which will be extensively discussed in (chap 3), especially analyzing
the consequences of focusing on time and space separately and finally making a process
of (2.2.12). Composition turns out to become the key concept worthy enough to seek for
a new framework in which it takes the center stage.
And of course, another grounding assessment for the framework is how it can handle
necessity and sufficiency. The four first-order interactions in (2.2.12) are necessary for the
second-order interaction to emerge. More precisely, Int11 and Int
1
3 are necessary for the
polymers S21 and S
2
2 to emerge and in the next time step together with Int
1
2 and Int
1
4 for
the higher aggregate with the polymer-polymer interaction to evolve in accordance with
the hyperstructural dynamics (def 13). But the result of the process further depends on
the external, which is an observer or observers and the remainder, called the boundary
conditions. They are also necessary to render the conditions for existence complete, and
we have to discuss whether or not they are sufficient.
What is the overall goal in the end? To make the objects move, at least in the simulation
on display. That is what the lattice gas framework is good for. But given that there were
no observers watching the grid, a cellular automaton78, the first-order structures would
behave the same, because by definition, no higher-order structures and bonds would have
emerged. By the same token, if the second-order structures, the polymers, brought about
new
”
communication channels“ within the lattice sending and receiving not only new
information but force particles, we would have a serious case of overdetermination just
by watching.
And indeed, Rasmussen et al. recognize some necessitation in the constitution of the
higher-order structures by lower-order ones: “[A] two-way causation exists in these dy-
namical hierarchies.”79 In addition to the upward causal composing of the whole, they
spot downward causal constraints on the constituents:80
The dynamics of the monomers are more restricted once they form a polymer
and polymers are more restricted once they form an aggregate. Thus, there is
a clear downward causation in such systems as well.81
It is not at all clear how the parts cause the whole and how those restrictions of the
parts by the whole are being executed, and how the asymmetry in the direction of inter-
order action or sending and receiving of information is to be conceived. Looking at (fig
78Cf. [76, 335], [55].
79Cf. [76, 345].
80Cf. figure (fig 2.5).
81Cf. [76, 345].
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2.5), one would naively ask where, for example, the points of origin of the information-
particles or force-particles are.82 And how many objects are on the right, anyway: two
or three?
Figure 2.5: Asymmetric upward and downward causation: the first-order to second-order
causation is of second order whereas the second-order to first-order causation
is of first order.
The real, i.e. spacial, situation is depicted in (fig 2.6), where the edging is being dropped
and the ordered direction doesn’t make sense any more. Left on the plate, it is shown a
monomer binding with two monomers, and an additional unbound monomer. Now the
question is, how does the free monomer
”
effect“ Int14 while interacting with the monomer
S11
83 resulting in the aggregation right on the plate? It might be, which is an empirical
question, that the “first-order”-interactions Int14 in the left and in the right figure are not
identical, meaning that there is a restriction by Int11, as is said in the above quotation.
That is what is meant by ‘composition’—the two monomers S11 and S
1
2 binding
84 together
result in a different interaction Int14 as it were the case without having bound. In this
reading of ‘restriction’, one could except downward causation, e.g. the monomers S12 , S
1
3 ,
and S14 imposing a necessary condition for change or boundary condition on S
1
1 , or one
would just state that the composition is not a superposition.
Figure 2.6: The physical view: the primitives occupying spacial positions. Left: four
monomers, S12 hypothetically free. Right: S
1
2 being in bond with S
1
1 effecting
Int11. Cf. diagram (2.2.12).
Naturally, one would ask why the aggregation in the figure on the right is not four
monomers but two polymers? It is because one observes that Int14 is weaker than Int
1
1
82The points of origin are assigned by grey circles.
83Cf. (2.2.12).
84or, more neutrally, interacting
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and Int13, i.e. given slightly different boundary conditions, the geometrical distance be-
tween the monomers S12 and S
1
4 might become greater, where the ones between S
1
1 and
S12 , S
1
4 and S
1
3 respectively stay pretty much the same, the criterion for selection being
just metrical.85
Another criterion for the observer to classify structures is tracking back the objects.
It is more likely that it is not the situation depicted on the left side in (fig 2.6) that is
registered, but rather the process in (fig 2.7)—two
”
polymers“86 coming close and docking.
Figure 2.7: Classifying structures by back tracking of the constituents: the result on the
right side appears to be the same (cf. (fig 2.6)) but the starting structures
being different.
2.2.2 The Ansatz
Rasmussen et al. define: “An ansatz is a hypothesis taken to be true but acknowledged
to be unproven that is used to reach further conclusions.”87 This German loanword is
normally taken to refer to heuristically guessed solutions of differential equations.88 But
here perhaps it is meant to be more than an “educated guess”—it is rather a conjecture.
The question is: is a certain degree of complexity of the primitives necessary or even suf-
ficient to gain any order of structure in the hyperstructural hierarchy? And in which way
does the chosen framework of description—including simulation—determine the emerging
”
functional“ properties of the higher-order structures?
Coming back to all that specifies the object S1r = S
1
r (sr, frs, τr), which is the states or
aspects sr and the interactions frs together with the update operator U that determine
the primitive object S1r at some local time τr. Sorting the specifications we find that the
aspects embrace the interactions, more precisely the corresponding “informative particles”
that have the first-order structure as target or receiver.89 In the 2-dimensional lattice gas
85The same holds for
”
functionalities“ just being certain observed sequences of spacial behavior.
86We see that it is quite convenient to refer to
”
new“ structures observed just for the sake of conve-
nience, which is the reason why these concepts or theoretical terms needn’t be eliminated along with the
theories .
87Cf. [76, 347].
88“An important technique for solving differential equations is to guess the functional form of a solution
(called an ansatz, or trial answer), substitute it in, and then see if the free parameters can be adjusted
to make the solution work.” Cf. [64, 10].
89That will match the duality proposed in (chap 4) defining two kinds of objects: those that send and
receive and those that are sent and received.
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simulation at position (i, j), there are seven aspects in sti,j = (i, j, x1, ..., x7):
90
x1: scheduling color
x2: type of matter (if any)
x3: incoming excluded-volume particles (“repellons”)
x4: incoming force particles (“forceons”)
x5: velocity
x6: bond directions
x7: incoming binding-force particles (“bondons”)
and six update steps
U1: propagate information particles (repellons, forceons, bondons)
U2: create new bond (if any)
U3: compute move direction (if any)
U4: move monomer
U5: clear lattice
U6: repeat steps 1 to 5 for the other scheduling color
Those aspects and update cycles are sufficient, for example, for a monomer at an
instance of time t to exist at position (i, j) and move with a certain velocity. That would
be the framework also sufficient for some observer to identify higher-order structures,
including their functional properties, and of course, “[i]f a different framework were chosen,
these details would also be different[...]”91—Rasmussen et al. referring to the above seven
aspects being enabled or disabled, resulting in the observed or not observed properties,
e.g. a monomer being hydrophilic.92 There might be, or indeed are, frameworks with
less complex primitives resulting in equivalent behavior and properties of e.g. the first-,
second-, and third-order structures in the given simulation, but Rasmussen et al. quite
rightly ask: “[W]hat would that give us?”93 As we see, the above aspects already strike
us as odd, strange particles like “repellons”, “forceons”, and “bondons” being computed,
diminishing the explanatory power. The notion of ‘force particles’ is weird enough, but
inventing aspects to make them do what the observer commands conforms to Columbus
banging his egg on the table.94
But that is not the crucial point—let the simulation follow the epistemics and make
the particles move. It will just stay moving particles, all the other being
”
within“ the
observer. Thus, there are two object complexities to be taken in consideration, but first
we quote their ansatz :
Conjecture 1 (Ansatz). Given an appropriate simulation framework, an appropriate
increase of the object complexity of the primitives is necessary and sufficient for generation
of successively higher-order emergent properties through aggregation.95 
90Cf. [76, 338-340] for details.
91Cf. [76, 346].
92Cf. [76, 345]: Figure 5.
93Cf. [76, 346].
94“When the egg came round to the hands of Columbus, by beating it down on the table he fixed it.”
Cf. [31, 17].
95Cf. [76, 347].
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The simulation framework is set to do only the epistemic-like simulation as far as the
moving is concerned, and the suitability simply reflects the object complexity bringing
about the observed aggregations. Thus, there is no need to separately mention the frame-
work but the complexity of the observer:
Conjecture 2 (Ansatz*). An appropriate increase of the object complexity of the prim-
itives (ontology1) and an appropriate increase of the object complexity of the observer
(ontology2) is necessary and sufficient for the generation of observations of successively
higher-order emergent properties through aggregation. 
And this is almost trivially true. No matter whether the higher-order emergent prop-
erties are epistemic or ontological, if there is no external law that comes on top given a
certain order of structure then it is sufficient for the generation of the higher-order obser-
vations. A major issue of course is the remainder, if there is any. As was said, it is not
clear what the result of the process R is meant to include. Obviously, the observation of
the aggregation needs some stage to perform on, and again we have to ask: what is the
observed, what is the observer, and what is the stage?
The more or less unwelcome dichotomy of ontology1 and ontology2 is what DUCKs
will be about: what objects will be necessary and sufficient to be followed by the very
observation itself—letting go of the common association of an observer.
Composition
As we have seen, Baas assigns a subset of structures showing new properties to the
higher-order interactions or bonds that aremeaningful for the observer.96 These emergent
structures and properties could be now called on to build a hierarchical system of sets of
structures having properties at a certain level, which is in accordance with the general
view what cognition is to carry out:
Intuitively we would like to see higher levels and their properties emerge from
the lower levels.97
In the hyperstructure context, the level structure would then constitute of sets of units
showing properties at the subsequent levels98
X1, X2, ..., Xi, ..., Xn (2.2.13)
with an ordering of
”
production“
X1 < X2 < ... < Xi < ... < Xn (2.2.14)
where Xn denotes the highest level.
The corresponding properties and functionalities then define a system of “semantic
representations” Si with a compositional ordering
S1 ← S2 ← ...← Si ← ...← Sn (2.2.15)
96Cf. (def 7).
97Cf. [60, 530].
98Cf. [60, 530].
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such that the allocation
Xi 7→ Si (2.2.16)
is by construction intrinsically given.
The key aspect of course is the kind of compositionality principle, which here is the
composition of mappings of the sets of properties and functionalities, which “corresponds
to Frege-type compositionality of meaning as used in linguistics”99, showing a syntac-
tic/structural part (2.2.14) and a semantic/functional part (2.2.15) with an evolution
(2.2.16) corresponding to the hyperstructural dynamics (def 13).
In the next chapter, memory evolutive systems, a certain powerful compositionality
principle will be employed to introduce new objects that are the result of gluing ob-
jects together in the manner that this new object is identified with the “observed”—the
gluing—such that it does exactly the same as the compound system does. Thus, the dif-
ference to hyperstructures is that there are no emergent properties but emergent objects
with emergent bonds that are just as good as the corresponding compound bonds of the
composite.
Rasmussen et al. regard the observer as being organized as a dynamic hyperstructure,
but as we concluded, there is no emergent structure without emergent properties and
emergent interactions. Thus the observer as a higher-order structure observing lower-
order structures cannot possibly show emergent properties and interactions, since a still
higher-order structure is necessary.100 The observer has to be external—or there is no
observer.
With the memory evolutive systems, the situation is different, since in this framework
the observers have no bonds in their own right. They are just a certain representation
of already existing ones. But that means we will encounter unsolvable difficulties again,
motivating us to go on, arriving at DUCKs, and one already senses that these will make
trouble as well, but not due to the observation or cognition as much as the experiencing
of the cognition if it exists.
99Cf. [60, 529].
100Cf. (def 3).
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Memory Evolutive Neural Systems (MENS)1 has been developed as an application of
the more general model Memory Evolutive Systems (MES).2 It is deemed appropriate to
describe the emergence of animal behavior-like pattern recognition and classification of
objects into invariance classes up to and including human capacities, like the evolution of
semantics, the development of language, and even the phenomenon of consciousness. Since
all behavior is assumed to emerge from pattern formation of a neural network, i.e. the
brain, in MENS the philosophical position is suggested to be an “emergentist monism”3
or ”emergentist reductionism”4 claiming ontological emergentism. Again as with the
hyperstructures, the formation of a hierarchy of increasingly complex objects renders the
construction process on the neuronal constituents to be “at the root of the emergence
of mental objects”5, therefore allowing for the physical, biological, psychological, and
even sociological domain to be unified in an overarching theory—MENS. This approach
of an integrative theory of human behavior seems promising, even though it rests on a
concept called multiple realization (MR).6 But it turns out to be dubious whether MR
has any physical reality and that general memory evolutive systems depend on it. This
and further discussions of the assumptions in MENS will again lead to a reconsideration
of the hierarchy of levels and finally result in the realization that something else has to be
called for, i.e. a more fundamental, or ontological, theory of Domain Unifying Categorical
Kinds (DUCKs).
3.1 The Category Theoretical Framework
MENS is introduced to be a category theoretical modeling of brain7 and mental states,
thus the components are objects and morphisms with composition. Another theoretical
term will be the definition of a colimit, which is actually the key concept of MENS along
with multiplicity, i.e. more than one pattern admitting the same colimit. Those category
theoretical notions have sharp definitions.8 If the rigor proves to be too rigid to be clari-
fying (at first sight), the definition is given in a more descriptive manner. But one has to
be on guard, since the definitions are only valid within categories, which will be further
explored in (chap 4).
1Cf. [4].
2Cf. [3].
3Cf. [4, 154].
4Cf. [4, 172].
5Cf. [4, 130].
6In fact, MR is argued to be the only reason that reductionism fails.
7brain meaning all physical
8Cf. [70] and [39].
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MENS, just like Baas’ hyperstructures, argues for a hierarchy of levels:
The main idea is that these higher levels emerge from the basis through
iterative binding processes, so that a mental object appears as a family of syn-
chronous assemblies of neurons, then of assemblies of assemblies of neurons,
and so on.9
It might be true that assemblies of assemblies of neurons, i.e. neurons, are necessary for
a certain mental object to emerge, but it also has to be clarified sufficiency for the mental
“to appear as” is not identical to the real reductionist account of ‘to be identically equal
to’ neurons. This is after all the mind-body problem, and some philosophers think there
is a whole science behind that appearance—and make a living off it.
In the following, the picture of MENS will be redrawn insofar as the concepts are
essential to motivate DUCKs. Therefore, we mainly concentrate on the existence and
interrelation of its category theoretical objects in order to obtain a minimalist ontology
that could help to reconstruct what this psychophysical algebra is thought to refer to.
The Category of Neurons
Biological neurons are at the basis of MENS. All constructions in the complexification
process are grounded on the category N t, the objects being neurons living in a time
interval [t, t+∆t] and the morphisms being their activating relation:
The operations are not instantaneous but require some period of time; thus
what is particularly interesting is the category of neurons and their links ex-
isting during such a period, and we generally operate in this category.10
Thus, a neural system or diagram consists of neurons Ni(t) at an instant of time t, with
their internal state of being active or not as a function of time. Or alternatively, they can
be thought of as states of neurons11 being enumerated with an ordering (time) index t: N ti .
These states can be, for example, a conjunction of firing rates, thresholds, depolarisations,
etc., all variables that classify the entities as active or non-active neurons:
[A]n item (external object or neuron) activates N ti [notion modified] at t if
it causes an increase in the activity of N ti at this date; and we think of the
resulting activation as a kind of information transmitted by the item to N ti .
12
In MENS, the neurons and their synapses13, also called links sti,j , are modelled in
a graph and “with the composition defined by concatenation, this graph becomes the
category N t of neurons at t”:14
9Cf. [4, 129], inverse italics added.
10Cf. [4, 133].
11rather than the neurons themselves
12Cf. [4, 131].
13‘Synapse’ here is to be considered an activating connection rather than the single physiological
synaptic bouton. For the sake of clarity, all the boutons shall be w.l.o.g. embraced by a unique directed
connection between two neurons.
14Cf. [4, 132].
34
3.1 The Category Theoretical Framework
Conjecture 3. Neurons and their activation links build a category N t with
(i) The objects ob(N t) are neurons N ti .
(ii) For every pair N ti , N
t
j ∈ ob(N
t), the set of morphisms hom(N ti , N
t
j ) is the synapse
from N ti to N
t
j .
15
(iii) For every three objects N ti , N
t
j , N
t
k ∈ ob(N
t), the composition is a concatenation of
synapses, called a synaptic path.
(iv) For every N ti ∈ ob(N
t), there exists the identity on N ti .

Our guideline is to stay ontological as long as possible, since the objective is to approach
the existence of “mental objects” as close as possible. Thus we need to examine whether
the category N t is indeed built on existent entities, because biological neurons are the
basis of MENS.
(i) The Objects
Are the neurons N ti objects in a category theoretical sense? They are introduced to
be “determined by [their] activity around t”16 and therefore constitute a set of neurons
(N t
′
i )t′∈[t,t+∆t], which on that basis alone renders the objects not physical, but concep-
tional. In the first place, the objects being sets should do no harm to a category theoretical
modeling17. But with the sets, we become detached from ontology without good reason.
It’s obvious that the sets don’t exist in spacetime.
Thus those neurons N ti do not exist, and the reason for their circuity is to introduce the
idea of action and activation. An active neuron contributing to the activity of another
neuron is popular parlance in the neurosciences, and there is a good reason for that,
since it proves to be very convenient not to talk of several neurons being necessary for
several neurons. It’s one neuron activating another one. And that talk of single neurons
doesn’t cause confusion, because what really matters in the hard science is doing time
series analysis—recording or modeling change following change.
But that is a problem that can be easily resolved, albeit awkwardly, meaning in a rig-
orous ontological process view, the separation of time and space of the
”
neurons“ enables
us to refrain from counting on sets of sufficiently similar neurons to be classified as one
but to unfold them in a time series which admittedly appears to be somewhat clumsy.
The transition between the categories N t would then only be refined. This process of
unpleasant unraveling is necessary to avoid inconsistencies that inevitably follow from the
construction process of higher levels in MENS, as we will see. In DUCKs, however, this
difficulty is evaded, because neurons aren’t an issue any longer.
(ii) The Morphisms
The synapses, which physically connect the neurons, are characterized by their strength
and propagation delay and activate the subsequent neuron due to the transmission of
15More than one synapse between every pair of neurons won’t be taken into account in MENS.
16Cf. [4, 131].
17Instead, the question could be, is (Nt
′
i
)t′∈[t,t+∆t] a family of one neuron N
t
i
changing in time or
several neurons taking over in time: (Nti
i
)i∈T , with T being an ordered time-index set. That would hold
for the morphisms, too. This kind of distinction will be explored extensively in (chap 4).
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so-called action potentials. And again, the activating link (st
′
i,j)t′∈[t,t+∆t] is itself actually
a family of synapses—or states of the synapse varying in time. Thus, there are both ac-
tive neurons and active synapses at a time around t, but only the
”
material“ neurons are
objects, while the synapses, which are also
”
material“, are considered to be morphisms.
But firstly, there is no need to separate the axon, including its presynaptic endings, from
the neuron, since the whole device—constituting the object then—is necessary for
”
acti-
vating“ or
”
inhibiting“ the subsequent neuron. And secondly, a more serious objection,
these synaptic connections are indeed seen both as material and conceptual activating
links18, which leads to difficulties concerning the composition of synapses as follows.
(iii) The Composition
The composition of synapses has to satisfy
N t((N tj ), (N
t
k))×N
t((N ti ), (N
t
j ))→ N
t((N ti ), (N
t
k)) (3.1.1)
((stj,k), (s
t
i,j)) 7→ (s
t
i,j)(s
t
j,k) (3.1.2)
In a diagram the neural network would be
(N ti )
(sti,j)(s
t
j,k)
77
(sti,j)
// (N tj )
(stj,k)
// (N tk) (3.1.3)
according to the definition of a synaptic path:
A synaptic path from (N ti ) to (N
t
k) [notion modified]
19 is activated at t if
(N ti ) activates (N
t
k) at t along it.
20
The activation process being executed via the sequence 〈(sti,j), (s
t
j,k)〉 would result in
exactly the same (activated) neuron (N tk) as the composition (s
t
i,j)(s
t
j,k) would have re-
sulted in. The set hom((N ti ), (N
t
k)) of all possible paths between the neurons (N
t
i ) and
(N tk) would include a path that is equal to the composition in respect to strength and
propagation delay: (sti,k) = (s
t
i,j)(s
t
j,k). But of course, (s
t
i,j)(s
t
j,k) does not exist in general
as a real path, it is only conceptual satisfying (3.1.1) for the neural system qualifying as
a category. Thus, the threefold interpretation of (sti,k) as activation, synaptic path, and
synapse doesn’t allow for the physical neural network to live within the category N t.
Furthermore, what could indeed happen to exist is (sti,k) being a material connection
between (N ti ) and (N
t
k), creating the graph
(N ti )
(sti,k)
''
(sti,j)
// (N tj )
(stj,k)
// (N tk) (3.1.4)
18and not as objects in addition to neurons or as components of neurons
19Notions will be modified from now on if necessary.
20Cf. [4, 132].
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Then the situation would be
(N ti )
(sti,k)
''
(sti,j)(s
t
j,k)
77
(N tk) (3.1.5)
both activating links being morphisms without distinction from reality. As said, a recom-
mendation to modify the approach could be to refrain from thinking of synapses as some
material sort in addition to neurons, but belonging to them and keeping up interpreting
the activating link conceptually as a condition for the following neuron to be active or to
change to activity or non-activity.21
(iv) The Identity
The identity on (N ti ) is
(N ti )
id(Nt
i
)
// (N ti ) (3.1.6)
The interpretation of this diagram remains completely unclear, and no assistance is
provided in the treatise of Memory Evolutive Systems.22 Every neuron showing self-
activation—synaptic or just conceptual—isn’t what we find.
As an intermediate result, N t being a category is a misleading concept and does not
reflect physical entities without inconsistency, especially concerning the interrelations of
the counterparts in nature. Modeling the material world would instead remain a graph,
because no composition and no identity can be reasonably motivated. In DUCKs, a sug-
gestion will be given for another interpretation of the concepts ‘neuron’ and ‘activation’
that is consistent with the concept of natural laws and the category theoretical framework.
However, by reason of important results of these explorations, in the next sections N t
will be rehabilitated and the category will be expanded by objects being colimits with
different interpretations: physical neurons, mental objects, and (mental) concepts. We
will see whether new inconsistencies arise or whether they accrue from the old. The finely,
but maybe not appropriately, wrought framework will be probed to make out what can
remain for and in the formation of an alternative Memory Evolutive (Neural) System
without neurons or sets of neurons.
The key idea so far is local change necessitating local change, i.e. an active neuron at
a certain position being necessary for a certain activity of a certain neuron at another
position, which is actually activity moving in space, and which all happens within a time
period t + ∆t. And the category theoretical framework is considered to be tailor-made
for that kind of motion:
21The claim here is that the objects that matter are active neurons and not, for example, active
synapses. It could be discussed whether the synapses aren’t the critical piece, the neurons just being
their
”
provider“.
22Cf. [3].
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[A] diagrammatic representation [...] allows one to imagine motion along
it. For instance, paths in a graph are a way of jumping from one object to
another.23
On the other hand, in N t, synchronously activated assemblies of neurons are said to
exist during the time slice t+∆t. That raises the question how long ∆t can be at most
not to risk being interrupted by a transition into the next category N t
′
. Otherwise put,
what is the criterion for an assembly of active neurons to live within the same category?
In MENS, it is more the representation of being, i.e. the active or activated assembly of
neurons is represented in the simple case by a physical neuron and in a more complex
by a so-called cat-neuron (N̂ t).24 The focus here is clearly not placed on the process of
activation.
3.2 The Binding Problem
We now want to go a little deeper into the concept “of an object, which is itself a system
of systems” relating “the properties of the overall system to those of its component sys-
tems”25 to be brought to a categorical setting in order to evaluate the achievements in
trying to solve the hierarchy problem and the emergence problem, and we begin with the
core problem, which is the binding problem.
3.2.1 Patterns and Collective Links
We don’t spoil the ending when we say that for the rest of the inquiry, it will be all about
representation, because firstly, it is already clear with (chap 2), and secondly, it is already
clear that there is no such a thing. But before we substantiate this allegation we first
define what is to be represented, the so-called patterns:26
Definition 14 (Pattern). A pattern P t is a diagram in N t consisting of
(i) a family (N ti )i∈I of objects N
t
i ∈ ob(N
t) with I being a finite index set. The objects
N ti are the components of the pattern.
(ii) a family (dti,j)i,j∈I of arrows d
t
i,j ∈ hom(N
t
i , N
t
j) called the distinguished links of P
t.
N
Now to begin the next step, all information concerning a representing object is given
by the morphisms, and the question is raised:
How can we use the links to recognize that a given object is complex, in the
sense of having an internal organization that allows its components to operate
synergistically?27
23Cf. [3, 30].
24Cf. [4, 134].
25Cf. [3, 49].
26Cf. [3, 52]. In the following, for the sake of clarity, we again refrain from the set notation of the
neurons and synapses and keep in mind that activity and activation takes time.
27Cf. [3, 50].
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In order to understand what is meant by saying that a complex category-theoretical
object has “components”, we need to define the “information giving links” that are di-
rected towards that object. It is the so-called collective link that allows the components to
synergistically operate on the object, which then could possibly function as the pattern’s
representation. But first, we look at an arbitrary object that is not the representative:28
Definition 15 (Collective Link). Let P t be a pattern in the category N t. A collective
link from P t towards an object N t ∈ ob(N t) is defined as a family (sti)i∈I of individual
links sti ∈ hom(N
t), such that:
(i) every component N ti of the pattern P
t has a synapse sti to N
t,
(ii) for every distinguished link dti,j from N
t
i to N
t
j , the correlating equation s
t
i = d
t
i,js
t
j
is satisfied.
N
On the basis of a simple pattern, we want to discuss the implications of the collective
link:29
N t
N ti
sti
BB
dti,j
// N tj
stj
\\ (3.2.1)
In the diagram, the following boundary conditions are to be covered:
[T]he behaviour of each component must be coherent with that of the compo-
nents to which it is connected in the pattern, so that the constraints imposed
by the distinguished links are respected.30
The neuron N tj in the period of time t+∆t activates the neuron N
t via the synapse stj ,
while it is subject to the constraints imposed by the neuron N ti given by the distinguished
link dti,j . In short, N
t
j activates N
t while being activated (restricted) by N ti .
31 With the
additional activation of N t by N ti , it is that the neurons N
t
i and N
t
j together activate the
neuron N t, while the neuron N tj is being influenced by N
t
i . But that’s not all. There is
the correlation equation:
[...] N ti interacts with N
t
j along d
t
i,j , and so N
t
i must coordinate its action s
t
i
on N t with the action stj of N
t
j on N
t, the coordination being done along dti,j,
and thus sti must be the composite d
t
i,js
t
j (in conformity with the correlation
equations). If there is also a distinguished link from N tj to N
t
i , both components
must reach an accord.32
28Cf. [3, 53,54].
29Cf. [3, 54].
30Cf. [3, 53].
31Cf. (fig 2.6) as an example for the correlating equation to be satisfied in the hyperstructure context.
32Cf. [3, 54], notation changed.
39
3 Memory Evolutive Neural Systems
It should be mentioned that the pattern consists of N ti
dti,j
−−→ N tj and is not to be
identified with the whole diagram (3.2.1), meaning that the neural net is restricted to the
pattern with a special focus on the object N t. These are the preparations for the concept
of representation, which follows below.33
3.2.2 Cat-Neurons
To construct an expanded category of neurons Kt, the category of real neurons N t are to
be coherently enlarged by so-called cat-neurons and their activating links. In particular,
the interpretation of these new objects and morphisms must be examined carefully to
see whether composition can possibly uncover certain features of nature. And we again
don’t give away the ending when we say that the whole investigation of (epiphenomenal)
representation will be about exactly that: composition.
The following exploration is concerned with the question of whether cat-neurons could
be physical neurons, or at least a physical object, and thus an element of ob(N t), if we al-
lowed all physical to be included, or just a means for an intuitive, more or less metaphoric,
modeling of cognition. This will be the groundwork for considering the ontological status
of mental objects, e.g. the experiencing of cognition or the “mental image” of physical
objects as Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (EV) call it in their Memory Evolutive Neural
Systems.
A cat-neuron is semantically defined to be a representation34 of a (neural) pattern and
formally a colimit in the category Kt. “[H]owever, in a category, the objects themselves
have no distinguishing features, and the only information, we have about them, comes
from their links.”35 Thus, it’s more the binding collective links from the objects constitut-
ing the pattern to the colimit, the cat-neuron, that give the significance. The cat-neuron
is also said to have an “internal organization”36 but, as cited, “no distinguishing fea-
tures”. If the binding collective link is added to the colimit object, one can accept both
taken together exhibiting some kind of structure. But looking at the neural net to be
represented, there is neither such a collective link nor an object to be called a cat-neuron.
There are only neurons, i.e. an
”
active“ assembly of neurons to be followed by another
”
active“ assembly of neurons. That is what we want to analyse now.
In MENS, the basis for all representations is an active assembly or pattern P t of neurons,
say N ti and N
t
j with an activation link d
t
i,j , as depicted in the diagram:
33We will return to the troublesome correlating equation st
i
= dt
i,j
st
j
. Cf. (3.1.4).
34Cf. (def 16).
35Cf. [3, 50].
36Cf. [3, 50].
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N t
Ct
st
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
N ti
cti
@@✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁
sti
CC
dti,j
// N tj
ctj
^^❂❂❂❂❂❂❂❂❂
stj
[[ (3.2.2)
But there is something else, too. It is said that if the pattern P t could collectively
activate a cat-neuron Ct and a (cat-)neuron N t, and the cat-neuron Ct and only Ct
could activate N t in the same way as P t could, then Ct is called the binding of P t.
In short, “the collective links (st) = (sti, s
t
j) from P
t to any (cat-)neuron N t are in 1-1
correspondence with the links st from Ct to N t.”37 The binding Ct can be seen as the
unique representative of P t. It is said that “P t as a whole and its binding Ct have the
same functional role.”38
Thus, the objective is to find some kind of justification for an object to be the repre-
sentation of an active assembly of neurons. Here are the conditions for the object Ct in
(3.2.2) to represent the inner structure of the pattern P t:39
Definition 16 (Representation). The necessary and sufficient conditions for Ct being
the representation for a pattern P t are
(i) the collective link (ct) := (cti, c
t
j) to the binding C
t coherently takes into account the
distinguished links40 (dt) = dti,j between the components of the pattern P
t,
(ii) the binding Ct via st and the pattern P t via (st) = (sti, s
t
j) perform an equivalent
function with respect to N t.
N
The representation for a pattern P t is defined to be unique meaning that there is no
other cat-neuron having a function equivalent to P t. On the contrary, the binding Ct
could represent more than one pattern having the same functional role which will be the
basis for the irreducibility of higher-order cat-neurons in MENS.
Now this definition of a representation is quite similar to a well-known construction in
category theory.41 In MENS, it is claimed that the representation Ct together with the
collective link (ct) is indeed a colimit, which is actually the motivation for applying the
algebraic framework.
37Cf. [4, 135], notations modified.
38Cf. [4, 134].
39Cf. [3, 57].
40which impose restrictions or boundary conditions on the objects in P t
41Cf. [3, 57].
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Definition 17 (Colimit). In a category42 C, the colimit of a morphism v : A → B is
a triple (Q, q1, q2), with for any (Z, z1, z2), there is a unique morphism u : Q → Z, such
that the following diagram commutes:
Z
Q
u
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
A
q1
AA✄✄✄✄✄✄✄✄
z1
DD
v
// B
q2
]]❀❀❀❀❀❀❀❀
z2
[[ (3.2.3)
N
To identify whether the diagrams (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) are equivalent, the commutativity
of the triangles and the uniqueness in (3.2.2) has to be proven. In MENS, cat-neurons
being a colimit are said to satisfy the conditions for being a representation of a pattern
P t:43
Conjecture 4 (Cat-neuron). If a pattern P t admits a representation Ct, it is its colimit
and is called the cat-neuron of P t. 
With the new objects and their activation links, the category of physical neurons N t
can be extended:44
Conjecture 5 (category Kt). Cat-neurons and their activation links build a category
Kt, with N t being a subcategory. 
And also the patterns are no longer restricted to the physical basis:45
Definition 18 (Pattern). A pattern P t is a finite diagram in Kt. N
These are the necessary concepts to introduce higher-level cat-neurons that bind so-
called homologous patterns, and now we have to investigate whether the higher-level
categories actually do have ontological counterparts.
3.2.3 Representism, or something near enough
We come back to the kind of representation one might have in mind and which puts us up
to perceive a colimit construction here: why are we not content with diagram (3.2.1) and
still seeking (3.2.2)? There can be manifold reasons for setting up something to represent
and something representing. In MENS, it is intended to capture
(i) the same internal organization or structure of the pattern P t,
(ii) the same functional role of the pattern P t,
42Cf. [71, 108].
43Cf. [3].
44Cf. [3].
45Cf. [3].
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(iii) the same internal organization or structure of patterns P t and Qt,
(iv) the same functional role of patterns P t and Qt.
Thus, the old distinction is made between form and function but without consequences
in this case. If an object shows the same structure as the corresponding pattern, they
admit the same
”
functional role“. We recognize and remember that one can go without
functions but still describe and predict the
”
same“ behavior of the
”
constituents“, and
also that the entire structure of a real pattern can’t be represented by an object. There
is always some remainder neglected assumed to be not necessary for the same to follow.
And that share is sufficient that results in a similar enough follow up, just as definition
(def 16) says, if one substitutes ‘a diagram and an object to have the same function for’
by ‘a diagram and an object to be a similar sufficient condition for’. That transition is
key to showing that the hierarchy problem and the emergence problem aren’t problems
any more.
But first, we want to explicitly define the binding problem, which is said to be solved
by the colimit construction (3.2.2):46
Definition 19 (Binding Problem). The problem of yielding an object which binds
the pattern P t into a single object having the same coherent functional role is called the
binding problem. N
Replacing ‘functional role’ while keeping the colimit’s ‘sufficient condition’ for
”
near
enough sameness“ in the transition from epistemology towards ontology gives us:
Definition 20 (Binding Problem*). The problem of yielding an object which binds
the pattern P t into a single object being the same coherent sufficient condition is called
the binding problem. N
We now want to examine whether the binding problem in the ontological reading (def
20) can be
”
realized“, in the best sense of the word. To accomplish the task, we first
have to translate the problem into the physical realm, which means we have to give the
building blocks both a spacial and a temporal location.
The Physical View
For a pattern to be a condition for a (cat)neuron to be activated takes some time, hence
the configuration category at time t Kt is meant to include all transitions necessary to
give the involved objects the status of being activated. However, for EV “it is a structural
or relational concept, not a spatio-temporal one (nearer to Leibniz than to Newton).”47
But that confession becomes troublesome in two respects: firstly, as already indicated,
the
”
intended“ boundary between epistemics and ontology, or modeling and reality, is not
so clearly drawn. In MENS, in reference to Kim48, it is assumed that the systems “make
mental causation possible while preserving the physical closure of the world.”49 After all
in the framework, it often seems that the objects and arrows were located in space and
time, saying, for example:
46Cf. [3, 59].
47Cf. [3, 151].
48Cf. [44]: multiple realization.
49Cf. [4, 172].
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A mental object modeled by such a cat-neuron “supervenes” on physical
brain processes via the stepwise construction of a ramification from the neuron
level up; later it will cause physical brain states through the unfolding of this
ramification down to the neuron level, leading to a synchronous hyper-assembly
of neurons.50
Secondly, on the other hand, it might be the case that the concept of an evolutive
system based on configurations of objects and their links “in the neighbourhood of t” is
not appropriate to capture the behavior of natural systems, where the spatio-temporal
location of the objects is not seen to be the delicate part:
The problem is more difficult for the links which must represent the interac-
tions between these components (e.g. attachment of a protein to a receptor).
Since these interactions are not instantaneous; what we should represent are
the interactions around t. If the time scale T is continuous, the links represent
not just events occurring at t, but, in the terminology of Whitehead (1925),
“germs” of interactions in small intervals of time around t.51
In the following, we make the process explicit and execute an unfolding of the
”
realizing“
patterns and first concentrate on the change in perspective of the binding problem from
the epistemic ‘having a function’ to the more ontological ‘being a sufficient condition’.
Still supporting the coherence condition (commuting triangles), the diagram in (def 20)
then unfolds in time given the interval ∆t = t4 − t1 =: t1,4:
Ct3
st3,4

✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
N t1i
c
t1,3
i
55❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦
d
t1,2
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
s
t1,4
i
$$
N t2j
c
t2,3
j
EE✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡
s
t2,4
j ))❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙
N t4
(3.2.4)
A condition for the above diagram to still obey the colimit-construction is that the arrows
follow the time arrow. So imagining a coordinate system, the y-axis in the diagram could
be regarded as referring to the spacial position of the objects, whereas the x-axis refers
to the arrow of time. The pattern P t1,2 := (N t1i , N
t2
j , d
t1,2
i,j ) and the object C
t3 having the
same functional role, i.e. now being the same sufficient condition for the object in the
spacio-temporal coordinate system N t4 to be
”
activated“, yields a decomposed physical
system now following spatio-temporal relations.
50Cf. [4, 172].
51Cf. [3, 151].
44
3.2 The Binding Problem
Since the neuronal diagram in the category of neurons N t1+∆t
N t1i
d
t1,2
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
s
t1,4
i
""
N t2j
s
t2,4
j ((◗
◗◗◗
◗◗◗
◗◗◗
◗◗
N t4
(3.2.5)
is supposed to refer to physical52 entities that can activate a mental object which “later
will cause physical brain states”, we have to ask:
(i) How can the mental object, say Ct3 along with the
”
activations“ c
t1,3
i , c
t2,3
j , and
st3,4 ,
Ct3
st3,4

✴
✴
✴
✴
✴
✴
✴
✴ct1,3
i
66❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
c
t2,3
j
CC✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟
(3.2.6)
be located in space and time?
(ii) How can the sufficient53 conditions P t1,2 and Ct3 along with the activation links for
the neuron N t4 to be in a certain way active be identical?
Given the object N t4 in (3.2.5) is activated by the pattern P t1,2 via the synapses s
t1,4
i
and s
t2,4
j . C
t3 being activated via the collective link (c
t1,3
i , c
t2,3
j ) is then said also to be a
sufficient condition for synchronously activating N t4 in the same way. This is provided
by the commuting triangles s
t1,4
i = c
t1,3
i s
t3,4 and s
t2,4
j = c
t2,3
j s
t3,4 . In order for N t4 not
to be doubly activated in the same way by N t2j , for example (activation meaning N
t2
j
being a sufficient condition for N t4 to exist in the way it does for which N t2j is a sufficient
condition), the sufficient condition coming from N t2j via C
t3 (c
t2,3
j s
t3,4) is not the same
as directly from N t2j (s
t2,4
j ) by computation or logical relation (s
t2,4
j = c
t2,3
j s
t3,4) but by
physical existence. The necessitating conditions have to be identical in space and time at
least when they execute the activation of N t4 . Thus, both ways of activating N t cannot
52Cf. (3.2.1).
53Cf. sufficient but not necessary conditions in [47, 62]: “[I]t is an insufficient but non-redundant part
of an unnecessary but sufficient condition: it will be convenient to call this (using the first letters of the
italicized words) an inus condition.” Also compare (def 28).
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be executed synchronously, but rather in sequence, as shown in diagram (3.2.7):
Ct3 Ct7
st7,8

✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
N t1i
d
t1,2
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
s
t1,4
i
$$
N t5i
d
t5,6
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
c
t5,7
i
55❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦
N t2j
s
t2,4
j ))❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙❙❙
❙ N
t6
j
c
t6,7
j
EE✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡
N t4 N t8
(3.2.7)
Either the pattern actives N t4 or its representation, which renders the colimit con-
struction inappropriate. The representation doesn’t exist in the same way as the physical
diagram (3.2.5) does; it has no place in space and time. What then is the colimit, the
cat-neuron, a representation for? Does it have to be brought into existence in the same
way the neurons obtain their presence? These questions shall prepare for the investigation
on the existence of mental objects in DUCKs, where the mental is to be treated as a more
or less physical object in space and time, and we will see how far we can go.
What have we gained so far? Firstly, a cat-neuron to fulfill the same functional role as
a pattern seems highly intuitive, at first glance. But as we have seen, the cat-neuron is
only capable of doing the same that the neural network does anyway. And we intended to
clarify this misunderstanding of functions being not just conceptual by setting the focus
on their sufficiency in conditionalizing activity, which is done by localizing the conditions
in space and time.54 Secondly, we wanted to introduce the framework of category theory
as a powerful tool to analyze what is possible and what is not, or at least to see what
strikes us as odd. One example will be the problem of overdetermination, which has
been formulated and resolved in terms of category theoretical composition. Commuting
diagrams show how sufficient conditions are to be split, and we have to deal with the
question of whether there is a counterpart for composition in nature.
The above considerations on representation apply to any objects and morphisms in a
category theoretical framework using the colimit construction and are of course not re-
stricted to neural networks. Furthermore, the framework appears to be an appropriate
means for defining representation, and hence in the following, we stay with the construc-
tion set and make the claim:
Conjecture 6 (Representation). Representations do not exist in space and time. 
This already gives us an indication of how the mental will be treated, but before we turn
our attention to this part of the psychophysical, we still want to labor on the concept of
the ‘coherent sameness’ in (def 20). As we have seen, particular conditions (and they are
always particular) are unique in the sense that any two conditions cannot be conditions
54Later on we will call those conditions ‘necessary conditions for change’ and see that giving them a
location in space and time can be helpful in defining the conditions for the objects’ changing. There is
still no distinction being made here between ‘being a condition’ and ‘having something as condition’: cf.
(con 11).
46
3.2 The Binding Problem
for the same, but for a similar. This is a motivation to modify the definition of the binding
problem again:
Definition 21 (Binding Problem**). The problem of yielding an object which binds
the pattern P t into a single object being a sufficient condition for a similar successor is
called the binding problem. N
This binding object then, say Ct3 in diagram (3.2.4), and
”
its“ pattern P t1,255 are able
to activate the successor N t4 . However, there are three sufficient conditions for N t4 to be
activated:
(i) the pattern P t1,2 ,
(ii) the object Ct3 ,
(iii) both simultaneously.
Now in all three cases, the activation is just similar, and the coherence condition, i.e.
the commutativity of the triangles, does not apply. If the object Ct3 was to bind the
pattern P t1,2 , then in the sense that P t1,2 and Ct3 activate N t4 such that if one of the
both conditions was omitted the activation would be similar enough such that it would
be a similar sufficient condition again for some successor, possibly resulting in a cascade
of similar sufficient conditions. But one has to be cautious, even though the problem of
overdetermination does not appear any longer, the object Ct3 has to be correlated to the
pattern P t1,2 in the above manner having similarity as a criterion, otherwise it wouldn’t
count as a similar enough representation of the pattern. Of course one could argue: what’s
the matter with being a representation? The object Ct3 is only to be activated such that
it happens that (and this is not functionalism) Ct3 could similarly activate N t4 while the
pattern being omitted wouldn’t make a big enough difference for the future.
And one could play around with the diagram to see what else could be achieved. For
example, the object Ct3 might be activated by the pattern in such a way that Ct3 activat-
ing N t4 is not at all similar to P t1,2 activating N t4 but nevertheless results in something
else such that... Or the synapse st3,4 could be so weak that it doesn’t exist, rendering
Ct3 an epiphenomenon as far as this pattern is concerned. One could also set Ct at the
beginning of the concatenation of activations, Ct1 , and turn the collective link around,
rendering it no longer a collective link.
Before we come back to the similarity condition, we should replace the ‘binding into’ in
(def 21) less metaphorically by ‘being a sufficient condition for’ yielding the final definition
that could have a counterpart in nature:
Definition 22 (Binding Problem***). The problem of yielding an object which is a
sufficient condition for the pattern P t to activate being a sufficient condition for a similar
successor is called the binding problem. N
55If the links are apparent from the context, they won’t be mentioned in the following.
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The ‘being a sufficient condition for some similar’ can be proceeded in different ways,
for example in diagram (3.2.7), N t4 and N t8 are the similar successors, or:
Qt1 Qt5
(qt5,7 )
))❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚
Ct3
st3,4

✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
Ct7
st7,8

✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
N t1i
c
t1,3
i
55❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦
d
t1,2
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
N t5i
N t2j
c
t2,3
j
EE✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡
N t6j
N t4 N t8
(3.2.8)
with Qt5 being another pattern and (qt5,7) its collective link and N t4 and N t8 being sim-
ilar again.
Before we define the critical similarity-condition in (chap 3.3), there is still something
to say about the colimit construction in the binding problem, which is crucial for ongoing
considerations. It is important to see what can be saved for the alternative approach
to patterns capturing, to some extent, the identity now being replaced by some kind of
measure of similarity. We ask what is so special about colimits that they are recognized
in this context? It is that the pattern and the alleged colimit often happen to activate
similarly and, at least at the beginning, close to simultaneously.56 And that representa-
tion need not be a single object but can also stand for another pattern being a sufficient
condition for similar activation.
It was said that “the colimit is a solution of the binding problem”, and “the binding
link cti [...] in some way identifies the component N
t
i to a ”
piece“ of Ct.”57 It is given an
example: “A molecule integrates the pattern formed by its spatial configuration, with its
atoms and the chemical bonds between them.”58 And that is exactly what we considered
in the response to Baas’ hyperstructures. The “pieces” of the molecule are the atoms
themselves, there being no extra higher-order object which “involves both local and global
properties”59 where the former was due to “structure” and the latter due to “function”.
We now want to reflect upon the properties, that they are “locally on the structure”
and “globally on the function”. Therefore, we again consider the colimit construction,
more precisely the reason it appears so attractive.
56Cf. [58] which presents ‘similarity’ as a powerful means to capture model-world relations.
57Cf. [3, 59].
58Cf. [3, 59].
59Cf. [3, 60].
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Local and global properties of a colimit
“[T]he organization of the pattern is made more robust and efficient [...].”60 And the
reason is that it admits a colimit. But what is the
”
mechanism“ or behavior behind
that effectiveness? First, one has to ask what it is more effective for? The only thing
the pattern does is activate an object N t, and Ct, but the latter only if it admits a
colimit, which renders the pattern, i.e. the components and their distinguished links, most
efficient. Now effectiveness is a matter of natural selection, but what has the evolutionary
process been selecting for while both the pattern and its colimit simply do the same,
namely activating N t identically. There must be some mechanism to identify identical
synchronous activation, whatever the colimit constitutes. And after all, the colimit can’t
be selected for, since it doesn’t exist before. So, what is it that happens to be most
effective? It is said to be
(i) the functional role of the constituents of the pattern, e.g. the neuron N ti , that
contribute to Ct,
(ii) the local property of the colimit of being integrative of e.g. the activating neuron
N ti , and
(iii) the global, “universal” property “that the colimit is the object which best implements
the operative functions of the pattern.”61
We already mentioned that ‘having the function to’ is to be substituted by ‘being
sufficient to’. And with it, we reformulate the natural efficiency problem, which doesn’t
only reside in the capability of the pattern and its colimit to activate an object N t but
also in the object N t itself to have it be
”
best“ activated. The efficiency lies in the most
effortless sufficiency of the activation of the overall diagram (3.2.4):
Conjecture 7 (Efficiency). In natural selection, the efficiency of a diagram is driven
by its minimal sufficiency over time to activate similarly. 
And efficiency in function, i.e. “best” or “robust”, is no longer a property of something,
but rather is the fact of minimal sufficiency of a diagram over a relevant time span in
activating similarly.
Hypothesis on the genesis of an efficient diagram
As shown, one reason that colimits, i.e. objects that behave like a colimit, don’t exist in
nature is that they can’t be selected for. But in terms of efficiency and similarity, it could
happen that different conditions for being activated, or rather for being what it is, can
be driven. Finally, we want to delineate a possible evolutionary process and start with a
60Cf. [3, 60].
61Cf. [3, 60].
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diagram similar to (3.2.4):
N t3m
d
t3,4
m,n

✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
N t1i
d
t1,3
i,m
55❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦❦
d
t1,2
i,j
##❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
d
t1,4
i,n
$$
N t2j
d
t2,3
j,m
EE✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡✡
d
t2,4
j,n ))❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙
N t4n
(3.2.9)
No neuron is standing out; each one only activating or being activated via the distin-
guished links. But that is not the whole story. They are in temporal order (N t1i , N
t2
j ,
N t3m , N
t4
n ), which is a necessary condition to separate the neurons due to perceived func-
tions. Take the last activated neuron N t4n . If it was the object, the successors would
depend on, in terms of efficiency, the sub-pattern (N t1i , N
t2
j , N
t3
m ), including their distin-
guished link, the synapses, would evolve with the pattern’s sufficient condition be minimal
in the end. And that could happen in the following way. The distinguished link d
t3,4
m,n
and the anticipated collective link (d
t1,4
i,n , d
t2,4
j,n ) both activate neuron N
t4
n such that each of
them is sufficient to reach the neuron’s threshold for transmitting nerve impulses. If that
happened to be the case, it would no longer be necessary for the pattern (N t1i , N
t2
j ) to be
active in order for N t4n to be activated. Neuron N
t3
m , being activated second to last, could
activate N t4n on its own. This then is the first step for N
t3
m to be regarded a representation
of the pattern (N t1i , N
t2
j ), or something near enough. But of course that would only make
sense if there were more than one pattern being involved, e.g. (N t1i , N
t2
j ) and (N
t1
k , N
t2
l )
both being able to activate N t4n in a similar enough way:
62
N t2l
d
t2,3
l,m

✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹✹
✹
N t1k
d
t1,3
k,m ))❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙❙❙
❙❙
d
t1,2
k,l
;;①①①①①①①
N t3m
d
t3,4
m,n

✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
✲✲
N t1i
N t2j
N t4n
(3.2.10)
62In these diagrams, the links depict active synaptic paths, and thus, they have to be made invisible
to show when they are inactive.
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It could happen due to some mechanism that even some single “grandmother” neu-
ron N t3m could activate some successor, here N
t4
n , in a similar way as the whole pattern
(N t1i , N
t2
j ) would do. This kind of ”
backup“ neuron N t3m could of course also be a more
complicated pattern.
In MES, it is said that both patterns (N t1i , N
t2
j ) and (N
t1
k , N
t2
l ) are “homologous”,
meaning that they are represented by the same colimit. But as we have seen, N t3m isn’t
such an object, i.e. both patterns are not homologous but similar. This crucial concept
of multiplicity will be discussed in the next chapter, in order to substantiate that there
are no levels one has to fall back on.
3.3 The Hierarchy Problem
Before we investigate the hierarchy problem, we will have a look at the category of neurons
N t and the category of colimits K¯t again, which together make up the category Kt. It is
said:
The global property shows that the existence of a colimit imposes constraints
on all the objects of the category, not only on the components of the pattern.
It explains that the existence of a colimit depends in an essential way on the
given category Kt in which the pattern is considered.63
That is the universal property of colimits, i.e. each link from the constituents of a colimit
basis, a pattern, to any object of the category Kt binds to one and only one link from
the colimit to the object, yielding a commutative triangle.64 As shown, however, that
condition doesn’t satisfy the real circumstances of general neural networks, the synapses
being highly restricted. It is right that the category essentially determines the possibility
of the existence of colimits, and here, in the naturalistic view, they are excluded, as we
have seen.
However, the idea of colimits having multifold patterns subverting reductionism is in-
teresting and deserves a continuation of the inspection of the modeling of mental repre-
sentation, which MES finally targets.
In the following, in MES, the notion of ‘evolving systems’ is used more loosely than in
dynamical systems theory which is characterized by treating all constituents as if they
were on equal footing. Here, systems are constituted of lower levels that are subordinate
to higher levels, and we are now to define the hierarchy of levels of increasing complexity
by linking objects that are “complex”. The failure of reductionism, from the point of view
of MES, needs some preparation, which will at first relate to diagrams like (3.2.2), which
are conceptual without taking space and time into account.
We start with a diagram showing a pattern and its binding colimit and first add some
non-complex object At. That object can be seen as anything that is able to activate or
change with no further specification.65 For that situation, MES gives a definition and
calls gti a P
t-factor of gt:66
63Cf. [3, 60].
64Cf. [3, 57].
65Later on we will refrain from any concept of activity and only refer to existence and change.
66Cf. [3, 74,75].
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Definition 23 (P t-Factor). A link gt from At to the colimit P̂ t of the pattern P t is
said to be mediated by P t if it is of the form gtic
t
i for at least one component N
t
i of P
t
and one link gti from A
t to N ti , where c
t
i is the binding link to the colimit associated to
the index i. In this case, gti is called a P
t-factor of gt:
At
gt
//
gti

✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
✴✴
gtj
$$❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏ P̂
t
N ti
cti
GG✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎
dti,j
// N tj
ctj
WW✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴
(3.3.1)
N
Thus, an arbitrary object At activates the colimit P̂ t with restrictions given by the
above commutativity. As we said, identically “mediated activation” isn’t possible, but
that shouldn’t prevent us from acknowledging the intuition’s merits for the domain uni-
fying constructions in (chap 4). We fall into line with the composition conception but not
into the trap of spotting something ontological in it. When a more exact consideration is
needed, it will be provided, even though the diagrams could appear a little convoluted.
And that is probably one reason why time and space isn’t separated here. Another is of
course the idea of functionality, which again rests on the first, the great complexity of the
processes.
The reason for defining a P t-factor will become obvious soon. We want to gain inter-
acting patterns in order to define interacting colimits, and At will then be part of such
a pattern. Fleshing out the composition conception, if At via gt admits a P t-factor gti ,
and the object N ti is connected with N
t
j by a distinguished link d
t
i,j , g
t yields another
P t-factor with67
(gtid
t
i,j)c
t
j = g
t
i(d
t
i,jc
t
j) = g
t
ic
t
i = g
t (3.3.2)
which says the information transmitted by gt is also transmitted by gtic
t
i and transitively
transmitted by gtid
t
i,jc
t
j . The commutativity of the diagrams yields the following proposi-
tion:68
Proposition 1. If gt admits a P t-factor gti , it also admits as a P
t-factor any link corre-
lated with gti by a zigzag of distinguished links of P
t. ♦
3.3.1 Interacting Cat-neurons
In order to define the interrelation between
”
higher-order“ objects that are colimits, we
first have to approach their patterns’ exchange. Diagram (3.3.1) already illustrated two
interrelating patterns: (N ti , N
t
j ) and (A
t). In the following, we want to consider the more
67Cf. [3, 75].
68Cf. [3, 76].
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general case with two patterns P t1 = (N
t
i , N
t
j ) and P
t
2 = (N
t
m, N
t
n):
N tm
dtm,n
//
dtm,i

✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
dtm,j
%%❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑ N
t
n
dtn,j

✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
✵✵
dtn,i
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
✍✍
N ti
dti,j
// N tj
(3.3.3)
In the first step of introducing interacting cat-neurons, these two patterns are connected
by a so-called cluster:69
Definition 24 (Cluster). Given two patterns P t1 and P
t
2 in a category, a cluster from
P t2 to P
t
1 is a maximal set G
t
2,1 of links between components of these patterns satisfying
the following conditions [cf. (3.3.3)]:
(i) For each index k of P t2 , the component N
t
k of P
t
2 has at least one link to a compo-
nent of P t1 ; and if there are several such links, they are correlated by a zigzag of
distinguished links of P t1 .
(ii) The composite of a link of the cluster with a distinguished link of P t1 , or of a
distinguished link of P t2 with a link of the cluster, also belongs to the cluster.
N
Thus, a cluster can be thought of as a maximal set of restrictions on the constituents
of the pattern P1 by the pattern P2. Combining the interacting patterns with their
representational colimits yields the following diagram:
P̂ t2
gt2,1
// P̂ t1
N tm
ctm,2
GG✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍
gtm,1
66❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧ dtm,n
//
gtm,i
33
gtm,j
88N
t
n
gtn,1
;;✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈
ctn,2
WW✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴
gtn,i
''
gtn,j
&&
N ti
cti,1
GG✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎ dti,j
// N tj
ctj,1
WW✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴✴
(3.3.4)
with P̂ t2 denoting the colimit of the pattern P
t
2 , and P̂
t
1 of P
t
1 , respectively. The purpose
seems to be clear. We wish to connect the interrelations between the patterns with
the interrelation between their colimits, fusing the levels, which consist of the physical
69Cf. [3, 81].
53
3 Memory Evolutive Neural Systems
neural network and its representation. This way of merging the colimit constructions is
achieved by a “simple” link: “A simple link from P̂ t2 to P̂
t
1 is a link which is mediated by
decompositions P t2 of P̂
t
2 and P
t
1 of P̂
t
1 .”
70 We call the link gt2,1 the binding of the cluster
Gt2,1, and the links constituting the cluster the factors from P
t
2 to P
t
1 . A more compact
definition of simple links between colimits is:71
Definition 25 (Simple Link). If P̂ t2 is the colimit of P
t
2 and P̂
t
1 the colimit of P
t
1 , a
link from P t2 to P
t
1 is called a (P
t
2 , P
t
1)-simple link if it binds a cluster from P
t
2 to P
t
1 .
Otherwise, it is said to be (P t2 , P
t
1)-complex :
P̂ t2
gt2,1
(P t2 ,P
t
1)−simple
// P̂ t1
P t2
Ct2
OO
Gt2,1
// P t1
Ct1
OO
(3.3.5)
with Ct1 and C
t
2 being the collective links
72. N
It can be shown that the simple link gt2,1 is unique:
73
Proposition 2. Let Gt2,1 be a cluster from a pattern P
t
2 to P
t
1 . If P
t
2 has a colimit P̂
t
2 in
the category Kt and P t1 a colimit P̂
t
1 , there exists a unique link g
t
2,1 from P̂
t
2 to P̂
t
1 binding
the cluster, in the sense that the links of the cluster are P t1-factors of the composites of a
binding link to P̂ t2 with g
t
2,1 [cf. (3.3.4)]. ♦
The commuting square (3.3.5) is a shortcut of diagram (3.3.4), in which all pathways
are said to commute. But as we have seen, these kinds of diagrams are confusing. Firstly,
time and space have to be taken into account, and secondly, there is no material basis
for composition. The entities in the diagrams ought to be physical, or something close to
that, e.g. neurons, but not conceptual. In short, still ignoring the spatial relation, when
we tilt the whole diagram to the right such that all arrows point conformal to the flow of
time, the slimmed down diagram might look like
P̂ t32
g
t3,6
2,1
// P̂ t61
N t1m
d
t1,2
m,n
// N t2n
c
t2,3
n,2
FF✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍ gt2,4
n,i
// N t4i
d
t4,5
i,j
// N t5j
c
t5,6
j,1
FF✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍✍
(3.3.6)
70Cf. [3, 83].
71Cf. [3, 84].
72Cf. (def 16).
73Cf. [3, 84].
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both pathways transporting the same
”
information“ from N t1m to P̂
t6
1 .
74
Concerning the second objection, the two paths obviously do not result in the same
”
difference making“, regardless which material object is referred to, as has been pointed
out.
We now approach the second core concept of Memory Evolutive Systems: multiplicity.
Along with the colimit construction set, the means is then provided to discuss emergence
in the complexification process promoted in the categorical framework.
3.3.2 Multiplicity
According to MES, “the notion of a simple link per se has no meaning; it is necessary
to indicate with respect to which decompositions it is considered.”75 Thus, the binding
gt2,1 of the cluster in diagram (3.3.5) is not isomorphic to G
t
2,1, and that is a consider-
ation that directly leads us to the conception of multiple realizability (MR) or multiplicity.
But before we can discuss the principle of MR, there is another decisive step to take,
i.e. the composition of clusters resulting in the composition of simple links. It can be
proved that two adjacent clusters can be composed such that (def 24) is satisfied:76
P̂ t4
gt4,1
(P t4 ,P
t
1)−simple
%%gt4,2
(P t4 ,P
t
2)−simple
// P̂ t2
gt2,1
(P t2 ,P
t
1 )−simple
// P̂ t1
P t4
Gt4,1
99
Ct4
OO
Gt4,2
// P t2
Ct2
OO
Gt2,1
// P t1
Ct1
OO
(3.3.7)
But patterns are in general non-connected and hence don’t compose. We now examine
the case where they are non-connected but admit the same cat-neuron. The concept of
multiple patterns adopting “the same functional role” is the second reason why colimits
appear so attractive. They render composed bindings of clusters complex. We first reca-
pitulate the findings and then discuss them.
The multiplicity principle is often mentioned in the same breath with robustness and
adaptivity.77 This seems to be a core concept of organisms: If something happens not to
be perfectly adequate for a system to maintain its structure in the long run, it doesn’t
74That is due to the definition of a colimit (def 17) and the proposition (prop 2).
75Cf. [3, 85].
76Cf. [3, 82], [3, 85].
77Cf. [59], [45], [36].
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necessarily imply its exitus. There is some kind of redundancy78 that protects life from
catastrophic consequences. Moreover, some capacities, such as the consolidation of mem-
ory, are highly dependent on
”
sufficient vagueness“. Indeed, the behavior of a system
to allow small variances near attractors, like stabile fixed points, to converge to similar
outcomes is adapted within the natural selection process. Similar enough input is then
not followed by an identical output, i.e. colimit. There is only the imperative for similar
enough output, and that is similar enough that it doesn’t imply the organism’s death—or
the fall of its sexual performance. Before we proceed with a similarity measure, we still
stay with identity, i.e. different decompositions admitting the same colimit, and refer to
the following definition:79
Definition 26 (Complex Switch). Two decompositions P t2 and P
t
3 of an object
80 P̂ t2;3
are said to be connected if there is a cluster from P t2 to P
t
3 , or a cluster from P
t
3 to P
t
2 ,
which binds into an isomorphism. If P̂ t2;3 admits at least two decompositions P
t
2 and P
t
3 ,
which are not connected, we say that P̂ t2;3 is a multifold object, and the passage between
P t2 and P
t
3 is called a complex switch:
P̂ t2;3
P t3
Ct3
>>⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦⑦
ks
complex switch
+3 P t2
Ct2
``❅❅❅❅❅❅❅❅❅❅❅
(3.3.8)
N
Those decompositions are particularly emphasized:
Definition 27 (Homologous). Two patterns P t2 and P
t
3 admitting colimits P̂
t
2 and P̂
t
3
are said to be homologous iff P̂ t2 = P̂
t
2;3 = P̂
t
3 . N
The interchangeability of the two patterns P t2 and P
t
3 delineates a global property, since
the complex switch cannot be observed at the level of the homologous patterns P t2 and
P t3 in the category of neural systems N
t but only at the level of the binding. The colimit
P̂ t2;3 is said to be a multifold component of MENS and its binding homologous patterns an
emergent property of P̂ t2;3.
81 The redundancy then follows from the random fluctuation
at the micro-level:
Switching between such non-connected decompositions can be seen as a ran-
dom fluctuation in the internal organization of P̂ t2;3 which does not modify
its functionality on a higher level, where the fluctuation is not observable:
different micro-states lead to the same macro-equilibrium.82
It is even “a ‘global’ property of the category and not a ‘local’ property of the patterns”:83
78Cf. [33], [49].
79Cf. [3, 90].
80In the notation, P̂ t2;3 says that the colimit posses at least the two decompositions P
t
2 and P
t
3 .
81Cf. [4, 136].
82Cf. [3, 90], notation adjusted.
83Cf. [3, 90], italics included.
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Definition 28 (Multiplicity). The category Kt satisfies the multiplicity principle if it
admits at least two patterns which are homologous but not connected. N
These are the prerequisites for the emergence conjecture that has already been touched
upon. Looking at the level of bindings, one couldn’t determine which decomposition has
realized the colimit, and therefore, reduction has to fail.
Referring to the complex switch, one has to note that figure (3.3.8) is strictly speaking
not one diagram but two showing the equivalence of the alternatives in activation. This
ambiguity can be considered one of the major merits of MENS, and since it is indeed
crucial for further constructions, it will be subject to more in-depth examination.
In MENS, the next step towards the formation of a psychophysical algebra is to combine
the foregoing definitions, that is to compose complex switches with simple links yielding
complex links:
Definition 29 (Complex Link). A (P t4 , P
t
1)-complex link is defined as the composite of
a path of simple links binding clusters between non-connected patterns, the intermediate
objects being multifold, so that the link is not (P t4 , P
t
1)-simple.
P̂ t4
gt4,2;3
(P t4 ,P
t
2;3)−simple
//
gt4,2;3g
t
2;3,1
(P t4 ,P
t
1 )−complex
''
P̂ t2;3
gt2;3,1
(P t2;3,P
t
1)−simple
// P̂ t1
P t4
Ct4
OO
Gt4,3
// P t3
Ct3
AA☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎☎
ks
complex switch
+3 P t2
Ct2
]]✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
Gt2,1
// P t1
Ct1
OO
(3.3.9)
N
It follows that the composite of complex links can only be simple or complex.
Since the simple links are in 1-1 correspondence to their clusters, all properties at level
L1, i.e. the category Kt1, could be reduced to the lower level L0, i.e. the categoryK
t
0 = N
t,
if no homologous pattern was involved. The complex link would just turn into a simple
link being the binding of the compositions of the corresponding clusters, that is diagram
(3.3.7) for P t2 . But with the complex switch, the complex link “conveys more ‘global’
information”:
[I]t ‘emerges’ at the level of cat-neurons, but it does not appear ‘ex machina’,
it just actualizes at the higher level a global property of the lower level.84
Summing up, the global property of level L1 consists of the cat-neurons binding ho-
mologous patterns of level L0, which is the principle of multiplicity. This construction set
can be applied to any higher level, resulting in a hierarchy of higher level cat-neurons.
84Cf. [4, 139].
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3.3.3 The Hierarchy of Categories
So far it’s all about colimits admitting patterns that are homologous or not. On this
ground, we now want to build a categorical hierarchy, or hierarchical category:85
Definition 30 (Hierarchical Category). A hierarchical category is a category Kt, the
objects of which are partitioned into a finite sequence of levels 0, 1, ..., N , so that any
object At of the level n+ 1 is the colimit in Kt of at least one pattern P t included in the
levels < n+ 1 (i.e. each component N ti of P
t is of a level lower or the same as n). N
For the complexification process, the basic objects and morphisms have to be chosen
somehow, without loss of generality. Here we start with the level L0 of neurons and
activation links constituting patterns and clusters: (0P ti ). The objects of the neuron level
bind into cat-neurons (1P̂ tj ) with their simple and complex links yielding level L1. In
an iterating construction process, they again raise patterns binding, for example, into a
cat-neuron 2P̂ t at level L2:
2P̂ t
(1P̂ tj )
1Ct
OO
(0P ti )
(0Cti )
OO
(3.3.10)
Since (3.3.10) includes the multiplicity principle, it is not, strictly speaking, a diagram in
the category theoretical sense but a class of diagrams. They are called ramifications, and
the various realizations micro-components, i.e. objects and links of lower levels building
the highest-level colimits:86
Definition 31 (Ramification). We define a ramification of length k of an object P̂ t of
a category by recurrence as follows:
(i) A ramification of length 1 is a pattern P t admitting P̂ t for a colimit (thus, it reduces
to a decomposition of P̂ t).
(ii) A ramification of length k of P̂ t consists of a pattern P t having P̂ t for colimit and,
for each one of the components P ti of P
t, of a ramification Rti of length k− 1 of P
t
i .
In this case, we also say that P̂ t is a k-iterated colimit of the ramification (P t, (Rti)).
N
Thus, a ramification (P t, (Rti)) of a colimit P̂
t is a set of families of decompositions
sufficient to bind into P̂ t admitting as many ramifications as multifold realizations can be
specified. In (3.3.9) for instance, the possible two ramifications of length 2 for a further
85Cf. [3, 95].
86Cf. [3, 100].
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cat-neuron 2P̂ t, being the binding of the cat-neurons at level L1, would be
2P̂ t
1P̂ t4
1ct4
>>⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥
g4,2
(P t4 ,P
t
2 )−simple
// 1P̂ t2
1ct2
OO
g2,1
(P t2 ,P
t
1)−simple
// 1P̂ t1
1ct1
``❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆
0P t4
0Ct4
OO
Gt4,2
// 0P t2
0Ct2
OO
Gt2,1
// 0P t1
0Ct1
OO
2P̂ t
1P̂ t4
1ct4
>>⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥⑥
g4,3
(P t4 ,P
t
3 )−simple
// 1P̂ t3
1ct3
OO
g3,1
(P t3 ,P
t
1 )−simple
// 1P̂ t1
1ct1
``❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆❆
0P t4
0Ct4
OO
Gt4,3
// 0P t3
0Ct3
OO
Gt3,1
// 0P t1
0Ct1
OO
(3.3.11)
These elaborated concepts yield the toolbox for further considerations concerning the
complexification process running into the paradigm of reductionism. The question is
what are the conditions that levels can be jumped over in a certain ramification? The
distinguished links in the decomposition of the colimit have to be simple links binding
the clusters between the objects of lowest level, the atoms:
If some of the distinguished links of P t are complex, the reduction fails and
P̂ t really has emergent properties.87
3.3.4 Reductionism
It is said that Descartes’ conducting from simple to complex “is the stance modern science
has adopted through the paradigm of reductionism, which tries to reduce the study of
an object to that of its lower level elementary components.”88 In the hierarchical hyper-
structure context (chap 2), those elements are subject to an observer Obs, or an observer
function Ω, that assigns to an aggregation of lower-order structures a new structure by
interaction due to new bonds89. We have discussed an artificial life paradigm to see how
emergence could show up in the natural evolution of higher-order structures, the micel-
lars for example. The new bonds and properties are to be registered.90 Now, Ehresmann
and Vanbremeersch also ask whether organisms are nothing but the constituents: “For
example, molecular biology would like to reduce the study of a living organism, or at least
of a cell, to the level of its molecular organization.”91
However, in the category theoretical framework, the observer doesn’t explicitly appear,
and we will see how the emergent properties nevertheless make an appearance. As regards
the bonds, they are already introduced as emergent in the beginning, since they are new,
along with the colimit Ct, say a cat-neuron in MENS, which represents a pattern P t in
the way that each collective link from P t to an arbitrary neuron N t binds into that bond
87Cf. [3, 103].
88Cf. [3, 102].
89Cf. (def 8) in the hyperstructure context.
90Cf. (1.2.11).
91Cf. [3, 102].
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st from Cti to N
t.92
A number of obstacles to reductionism can be seen stemming from the representative
construction based on colimits, e.g. cat-neurons, that span the hierarchical category of
order N : NKt. In MES, the doubts don’t arise so much from the question of whether
those complex objects do physically exist, but how they and their “global” properties can
emerge due to composition, how the complex objects can be built bottom up from level
L0, which is the neural network in MENS:
Reductionism Problem: can a complex object P̂ t be reconstructed from atomic
components up in only one step, as the colimit of a (perhaps large) pattern
included in level L0?
93
EV mainly enter two reasons for the possible failure of reductionism.94 Firstly, a
complex object cannot be reduced to lower level objects alone, say the ultimate (atomic)
neurons at level L0, for their constraints, the distinguished links, must also be taken
into account for their “synergistic action”. This situation has been already tackled in
the hyperstructure context (chap 2), where Rasmussen et al. in (fig 1.6) deny mere
superposition of the first-order interactions. But only being reducible to diagrams rather
than solely to the objects, the neurons, shouldn’t be an extra barrier. Of course in praxi,
it is hard to know which links are necessary to have all constraints covered, but the same
holds for the objects being linked, i.e. the entire pattern. Thus, the additional synapses
are not the problem; rather, the colimit construction of the cat-neuron itself is, and that,
not to forget, includes the binding links cti and c
t
j as well, and also the binding link s
t to
the neuron N t. Thus in (3.2.2), one had to reduce the diagram of the colimit construction
(Ct, cti, c
t
j , s
t) to the diagram of the physical neural network (N ti , N
t
j , N
t, dti,j , s
t
i, s
t
j). And
that is not reducible, or trivially by definition reducible, since the new bonds and the new
objects at the higher level L1 and the bonds between the two levels L0 and L1 are merely
postulated in such a way that the diagram commutes, e.g. stj = c
t
js
t.95
Secondly, the alleged existence of homologous patterns disables reductionism at least
to the atomic level, and this again is, as we will see, a homemade obstacle involving the
mistaken intuition of multiple realization in terms of “knowledge”:
The knowledge of one of its decompositions P does not determine its other
decompositions, and this will have important consequences [...].96
Thus, there is knowledge that cannot be deduced or predicted by watching an actual
ramification, and the severe consequences are the failure of reductionism.
However, the above reductionism problem is very well posed if the focus is on epistemic
representation. Of course, if one wants to reconstruct a colimit from the atoms at level
L0
97, the existence of colimits has to be presupposed, and also the basic patterns at that
level being sufficiently interconnected to yield the highest-level colimit. The reduction
92Cf. (3.2.2).
93Cf. [3, 103].
94Cf. [3, 102,103].
95The real problems start to surface when the colimit object is not seen to be a mere model for
cognition but to exist, for example, as a mental object, say the experiencing of some cognition.
96Cf. [3, 103].
97which in MENS are the biological neurons
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theorem then states which inter-level conditions have to be met such that reduction
succeeds:98
Theorem 1 (Reduction Theorem). Let 2P̂ t be the 2-iterated colimit of a ramification
(1P t, (0P ti )). If each distinguished link d
t from 1P̂ ti to
1P̂ tj in
1P t is (1P̂ ti ,
1P̂ tj )-simple,
then 2P̂ t is also the colimit of the following pattern 0Rt: its components are those of the
various 0P ti and its distinguished links are those of the patterns
0P ti , as well as the links
of the clusters Gtd that the distinguished links d
t of 1P t bind. Moreover, 0Rt and 1P t are
connected by the cluster generated by the binding links of the various 0kP
t
i to
1P̂ ti . On the
other hand, if certain distinguished links of 1P t are complex links, 2P̂ t may not have any
such decomposition.
In the following example, the L1 diagram can be jumped over, meaning that the L2
colimit reduces to the micro-components and their distinguished links at L0 (right dia-
gram):
2P̂ t
1P̂ ti
1cti
CC✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟ 1dti,j
// 1P̂ tj
1ctj
[[✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽✽
0
kP
t
i
0ctk,i
II✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓ 0dtk,l
//
0gtk,m
44
0gtk,n
;;
0
l P
t
i
0ctl,i
UU✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰
0gtl,m
''
0gtl,n
$$
0
mP
t
j
0ctm,j
II✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓ 0dtm,n
// 0
nP
t
j
0ctn,j
UU✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰
2P̂ t
0
kP
t
i
0ctk
GG✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎✎ 0dtk,l
//
0gtk,m
44
0gtk,n
;;
0
l P
t
i
0ctl
LL✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙✙
0gtl,m
((
0gtl,n
$$
0
mP
t
j
0ctm
RR✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫✫
0dtm,n
// 0
nP
t
j
0ctn
WW✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵✵
(3.3.12)
With the reduction theorem, an intuitively and rigorously formulated criterion of an
object’s complexity is now available. If it is not the case that all levels of the hierarchy
have to be taken into account to yield the same colimit, the complexity of a higher level
object n+1P̂ isn’t really represented by n but can be reduced in the sense above. To
approach this issue adequately, some measure for complexity has to be defined:99
Definition 32 (Complexity order). The complexity order of an object n+1P̂ t of level
n + 1 is defined as the smallest m such that there exists a pattern mP t whose colimit is
n+1P̂ t and which is included in the levels ≤ m. And n+1P̂ t is said to be q-reducible for
any q equal to or higher than its order.100 N
98Cf. [3, 104].
99Cf. [3, 105].
100Cf. Baas: higher-order structure with the complexity order of a colimit.
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This suggests a definitional follow-up:101
Definition 33 (m-simple Link). A link is m-simple iff it binds a cluster between
patterns included in the levels ≤ m. N
With the links between the objects of the levels ≤ m being m-simple, the following
theorem follows:102
Theorem 2 (Reducibility). An object n+1P̂ t of the level n+1 can be (n− 1)-reducible
if it admits a decomposition nP t of which all the distinguished links are (n−1)-simple. If
not, n+1P̂ t is generally not (n−1)-reducible. This result extends to lower levels, allowing
a reduction to these lower levels.
This program for checking for reducibility focuses on simple links, i.e. links that bind
clusters between patterns. If distinguished links between their bindings, i.e. the colimits,
do not bind clusters, they are not simple but complex. Simple links cannot bind clusters
if they don’t exist, which is the case if the patterns are non-connected. According to
theorem (2), if a distinguished link between colimits is not simple, it cannot be reduced.
Thus, reductionism or reducibility is a matter of homologous patterns existing. If the
patterns are not disjunctive, i.e. at least one object along with others admits more than
one colimit, again by definition no cluster is possible. These two cases are taken into
account in the following definition:103
Definition 34 (n-Multifold). We say that a hierarchical category satisfies the multi-
plicity principle if, for each n:
(i) there are objects of level n+ 1 which are n-multifold in the sense that they are the
colimit of at least two non-connected patterns included in levels less than or equal
to n.
(ii) an object of level n can belong to several patterns having different colimits at the
level n+ 1.
N
3.4 The Emergence Problem
Thus, the
”
mechanism“ of emergentism is the complexification process of binding objects,
and for reducibility to hold, the complexity has to be of order 0.104 And that means
all links are 0-simple. Then with multiple patterns being involved, which is said to be
ubiquitous at least for living matter, the evolutionary emergence process is defined:105
Theorem 3 (Emergence Process). The root of emergence is the existence of multifold
objects (modeled by the multiplicity principle). If it is satisfied, the emerging objects and
links are explicitly constructed through sequences of complexification processes.
101Cf. [3, 106].
102Cf. [3, 106].
103Cf. [3, 108].
104Cf. (def 32).
105Cf. [3, 139].
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Summing up and setting our stance for emergentism, our claim is that this theorem,
which is more of a definition, does not hold for three reasons: (i) the category is not
valid, (ii) cat-neurons as colimits do not physically exist, and (iii) homologous patterns
do not physically exist. So far, there is nothing to be ontologically reduced in nature—it
is all about epistemic emergence and functional roles providing a highly sophisticated and
elaborated model for complexification and cognition.
The view that a cat-neuron could admit multiple decompositions, i.e. homologous
patterns of (cat-)neurons, will be called homo-emergence, or homergence for short:
Definition 35 (Homergence). Homergence is the assumption that a colimit qN̂ at level
Lq is the binding of homologous objects or patterns at level Lq−1. N
In contrast to homergence, we will opt for co-emergence, or comergence, as the inter-
esting part:
Definition 36 (Comergence). Comergence is the assumption that a colimit exists. N
Since homergence is set as the key precondition for Memory Evolutive Systems to evolve,
in chapter (chap 4) the following have to be inspected carefully: first, category theoretical
consistency and, second, its plausibility concerning its correspondence to existents and
phenomena in nature. Thus, it will be all about the question: Is it thinkable to find
some kind of physical composition that is in correspondence with the category theoretical
counterpart.
Degeneracy and Redundancy
The complexification processes, in biological systems for example, satisfying the multi-
plicity principle is seen as a problem “of an epistemological nature”.106 We now have
to discuss whether or not this is true, i.e. whether there are not additional ontological
claims being made that are not warrantable. And we have to be cautious not to be inap-
propriately strict in rendering multifold patterns problematic. We talk about equivalent
but non-identical structures in biology as a paradigm for functional roles systems to be
built on, with ‘equivalent’ meaning only that, i.e. performing the same function.
Multiplicity, in biology better known as degeneracy, is said to be ubiquitous in natural
selection. “[D]egeneracy is not a property simply selected by evolution, but rather is a
prerequisite for and an inescapable product of the process of natural selection itself.”107
Degeneracy is not to be equated with functional redundancy, since two types can be
differentiated, which perform a function being specified by identity and similarity:
Degeneracy is the ability of elements that are structurally different to per-
form the same function or yield the same output. Unlike redundancy, which
occurs when the same function is performed by identical elements, degeneracy,
which involves structurally different elements, may yield the same or different
functions depending on the context in which it is expressed.108
106Cf. [3, 109].
107Cf. [49, 13763].
108Cf. [49, 13763].
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The criterion is always behavior, the output of some behavior, the conceived function of
some behavior to be fulfilled finally resulting in motion. It is crucial to notice that those
“identical elements” are of course not identical in existence but fairly identical in struc-
ture, e.g. two molecules being indistinguishable (from a distance) while the “structurally
different elements” also appear not alike from afar.
This same is said to hold for the function of neural networks: “[...] many different
patterns of neural architecture are functionally equivalent, i.e., functional neuroanatomy
is highly degenerate”, and “[t]he pattern of connectivity [...] depends on the presence of
a large number of different, alternative reentrant circuits that dynamically yield a similar
output, i.e., such circuits are degenerate.”109 Thus, it’s not as much about function as
behavior, e.g. motor neuron activation resulting in muscular contractions sufficiently
similar to be effective for what the process is or will be selected.
Mental Object
To sum up what has been achieved so far in MENS, the iterating construction process
of hierarchical categories, or their objects, the cat-neurons, is considered to “generate an
expanding algebra of mental objects.”110 It is built on the (q-)reducibility of represen-
tations of perceptual or cognitive processes. And the fact that a mental object is not
generally 0-reducible, meaning reducible down to the neuron level, is adopted due only
to the assumption that the multiplicity principle holds, which again is considered the
“source of emergence”.111
The essence of the analysis so far is that no clear line between the epistemological and
the ontological has been drawn. Thus, before one can venture on to the mental object, one
should first be clear about the basic building blocks and their interrelations. In MENS,
the mental objects, that are complex cat-neurons, are seen both to comprise “formal
units”112 as some sort of “representation” and to be physically activatable “through the
unfolding of one of their hyper-assemblies down to the neuronal level”.113
In the next chapter, the notion of ‘mental objects’ will be maintained, which describes
it fairly precisely as what it then is treated as: point-like. The non-local “holistic new
property”114, that emerges at levels defined by emerging cat-neurons, will turn, in the
ontological view, into a local property itself, or quality particular as we call it, and as a
result, we refrain from thinking in properties at all. Therefore, of course, we have to build
a new ontology that will be grounded on, of course, cognition, since that is what we do:
pointer-wise cognizing which is pointing at the existent. This
”
content-driven“ stating the
existent thus becomes, as a proposition, the existent, i.e. that which is all that is necessary
to propose. With the transition from MENS to DUCKs, we will have finally unified the
epistemological and the ontological leaving “emergentist reductionism”115, respectively
“emergentist monism”116 behind, only stating the dependencies.
109Cf. [49, 13765,13766], italics added.
110Cf. [3, 145].
111Cf. [3, 145].
112Cf. [3, 287].
113Cf. [3, 349].
114Cf. [3, 138].
115Cf. [3, 138].
116Cf. [3, 302].
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What are the categorical kinds that in some way unify which domains? This is a question
that should be answered by doing, meaning by unifying the domains by using categorical
kinds—in principle. The objective here is not to detect the mechanisms of or behind
certain behaviors but to give them an ontological grounding.
MES is concerned with those mechanisms, and it is useful in some way but inconsistent.
The question is, could it be made consistent without loosing its value? And again, what
is it good for if it is inconsistent? There will be concepts that won’t be so easily made
accessible with DUCKs. And that is one reason why the following work will focus on a
more fundamental basis, which is more minimally ontological, i.e. consistent and coherent
with fundamental theories of nature.
In this chapter the objective is to elaborate a minimalist ontology—DUCKs—which can
be compared and contrasted with a physical theory on primitives that can be considered
sufficiently serious and fundamental. This theory will be shown to be Bohmian mechan-
ics, and we will see whether something is missing that would prevent encompassing all
phenomena.
4.1 The Minimalist Ontology
What is a minimalist ontology? An ontology should be the ontology, since that which
is existent shouldn’t depend on any ontology other than itself. At the very least, the
ontologies shouldn’t interfere with each other as long as they are about the existent. And
that is the salient point: is it possible to think the existent? And with that, the case
is brought to its point: thinking the albeit minimalist ontology is epistemic and thus
obviously depends on the cognizer stating his ontology.
The question then would be, are there at least invariances in cognizing the existent, and
if so, do they correspond to invariances in nature, i.e. are there objective correlates? But
this seems to be an inadmissible question, since cognizing is natural, i.e. within nature.
Thus, there must be some natural cognizing the natural, and hence, it is to define and
describe the process of (natural) cognizing.
An often profitable procedure for tracking down the unknown is calling for necessary
and sufficient conditions. A necessary condition for all observations or cognitions is, as
shown in (chap 2), the process of composing interrelating parts into emergent wholes due
to some criterion. Thus, pattern formation, e.g. the evolution of hyperstructures, sug-
gests that there are indeed by definition parts that form observed patterns. It seems to
be true that there isn’t just one
”
thing“ but several, and that they are localized in space
and time. Whatever those constituents constitute, they are at least distinguishables, in
the minimalist view non-universal, non-instantiable
”
properties“, or rather quality partic-
ulars, since they are not seen to be properties of something but properties in their own
right. We refer to Lewis’ view on Humean supervenience but without endorsing Humean
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supervenience, just challenging his word: “[T]he world is a vast mosaic of local matters
of particular fact [...] And at those points we have local qualities [...]”1
In metaphysics, the combination of ‘qualities’ and ‘particulars’ is not well received. The
former count as abstract individuals, i.e. qualities to be instantiated, while the latter is
a concrete individual being spatially and temporally located. But a quality particular is
meant to be exactly that: (i) some individual quality having, i.e. being at, a spacetime
position, and (ii) something that is not just distinguishable by its location. In short,
universals are not seen to require discussion here, although they are intrinsically given
due to the alleged quality particulars’ interdependency regarding change.
In the following, these entities, which will compose and be decomposed to, are more
neutrally called objects, still playing a hunch for a looming depuration of some embosomed
heirlooms of traditional intuitional thinking.
The Objects
Definition 37 (Object). An object jO
t
x(j,t) at an instance of time t and a spatial location
x(j, t) is a fundamental quality particular.2 N
So far, there is no need to introduce more classes to sort the objects into, although,
as it will turn out, we will have to admit at least a dualism of quality particulars.3
Furthermore, in the ontological minimalist view, the observer should not mistakenly bind
these real objects and arrive at the result of having them
”
composed“ to real, so-called
ordinary objects4. These compounds or hyperstructures or colimits, that are actually
concepts, appear only because of attributed properties by the linguistic usage of ‘having
them’. But as we will see soon, the retention of the thinking of ordinary objects possessing
properties is a major fallacy in the transition from the epistemic to the ontological—to
be and not to have makes the turn towards the realm of the existent.
‘Having’ signifies that the ordinary object O˜ serves as some kind of carrier for prop-
erties: O˜tj = O˜
t
j(j1o
t, ..., jno
t, xtj) with the properties jio
t having no location in space but
the object O˜tj , namely x
t
j . Instead, in the case of ‘being’, the ordinary object would be
identified with a set: O¯tj = {j1O
t
x(j1,t)
, ..., jnO
t
x(jn,t)
} with the quality particulars jiO
t
x(ji,t)
being located in space and time. But we have to be cautious for these second case ordi-
nary objects O¯tj are also not real, but the ensembles are just necessary conditions for the
observer to classify. Defining O¯tj is nonetheless meant to be a supporting intermediate
step on the way to the diagrammatic formulation of the observational process we are
striving for. Besides the objects, it is also crucial to take their interrelations into account,
moving away from elements towards diagrams.
Definition 38 (Ordinary Object). An ordinary object O¯tj at an instance of time t is an as-
semblage O¯tj = {j1O
t
x(j1,t)
, ..., jiO
t
x(ji,t)
, ..., jnO
t
x(jn,t)
} of objects jiO
t
x(ji,t)
being compiled
by some observer to be classified as a whole due to some criterion. N
1Cf. [25, x] and (chap 4.1.2).
2For the sake of simplicity in the notation, the spacial location of the object could be replaced by its
indexical signature j: Ot
j
:= jOtx(j,t).
3Cf. (con 8).
4Cf. [48] and [2].
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This preliminary definition of ordinary objects is of course too vague to be operational,
because the vital components ‘observer’, ‘whole’, and ‘criterion’ lack clarification. Ac-
tually, in the following, one of the objectives is to answer the question of how to treat
these definitional determinants. At this stage, we still rely on so-called folk intuitions,
and certainly, we will do some work to find more rigorous definitions, or to resist them.
The idea of detecting properties and considering them as belonging together without
taking an additional carrier into account is not so strange; rather, it is another powerful
intuition. For example, the positron, the antiparticle of the electron that was first detected
in a cloud chamber5 by Carl Anderson in 1933, is, in the traditional view, a point-like
particle having properties that are located at the very same spatio-temporal position.
In the experiment, the “positron’s mass and charge” are deduced from the curvature of
the trajectory in the chamber filled with supersaturated vapor. However, with definition
(def 38), the positron, an ordinary object, would e.g. be the mass and the charge, O¯tj =
[β+]
t
j = {j1O
t
x(j1,t)
, j2O
t
x(j2,t)
} = {jmtx(j,t), jq
t
x(j,t)} with [β
+]
t
j just being the designator
for the particular set.
A water molecule [H2O]
t
j could serve as an example for a non point-like ordinary object
being a spatially distributed assemblage of objects.6 If one was to fall just short of arguing
about identity with the positron, one now probably would abstain from denying that such
a molecule is not identical with the objects: for example, in addition to the constituents, it
is a polar molecule with an electrical dipole moment qualifying for intermolecular hydrogen
bonds. But that is a misconception—dipoles and hydrogen bonds are just theoretical
terms of a certain domain of description following the observer’s criterion for classifying
near-enough invariances of the dynamics, i.e. time transition rules for predicting the
object’s future behavior.
Obviously, it could turn out in an experiment that an object jiO
t
x(ji,t)
shows itself not
to be fundamental but rather an assemblage of objects. But that is unproblematic, since
in the conception of ordinary objects, zooming in is not only explicitly allowed but called
for or just necessary to go further if the scope of application of a theory is left, especially
with regard to the objects’ bonds, i.e. the underlying criterion for their gathering to
ordinary objects. Losing their bonds and changing over to other ordinary objects will be
key in the description of the dynamics of objects, and the way they lose their bonds will
give some indication of the ordinary objects’ importance for the minimalist ontology.
And of course we go on to ask: could there still be more than the objects themselves,
some kind of natural law that
”
externally“ interrelates the objects? The interrelations
could also be
”
intrinsically“ given by the objects, and the whole at some instance of time
t would then solely consist of the objects at t with their spacial arrangement. Trying
to define the whole then, it could be the objects, the quality particulars, that are the
building blocks of the universe, and it will be interesting to see whether and, if so, to
what extent the observer jibs at his integration into the ordinary. To venture a guess, it
won’t be the observing but the experiencing of the observation or registration that will
be troublesome. But we will see.7
5Cf. [13].
6Cf. the computer simulation in (chap 2.2.1).
7Later on, we will take the experience attending the observation—or the cognition, as the observa-
tional process will be also called—for existent, more precisely also for some kind of quality particular,
67
4 Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds
In the following, we will be concerned with the existents, which are for now the quality
particulars at an instance of time t, and define:
Definition 39 (Universe-instance). A universe-instance at an instance of time t is the
set of all objects Ut = {jOtx(j,t) | j ∈ I}, I ⊂ N being an index set. N
And assuming there is change, the whole evolving in time, i.e. there is a subsequent
whole that replaces the former, we consolidate the instances:
Definition 40 (Universe). The universe is the set of all universe-instances U = {Ut | t ∈
T}, T ⊂ N being an index set, with a strict total order <t defining the direction of time
t: (U, <t). N
So far, these are just definitions, and there is no claim being made that our universe
is so. However, in (chap 4), an experimental metaphysics will be presented to evaluate
whether there is some connection to reality. Moreover, the definition (def 39) simply says
that there are objects jO
t
x(j,t) around at time t, and with (def 40) at t
′ with t < t′ there
again are objects jO
t′
x(j,t′) around, i.e. a temporal concatenation of conjunctions.
We are now interested in how one would introduce regularity, law-like behavior, to the
quality particulars.
The Interrelations
Having declared the objects, which altogether constitute the universe, the remainder—
if there is any—hinges on the question regarding the conditions for their existence and
change. In the following, we are not interested in
”
interactions“, which were substantial
in the context of hyperstructures8 and Memory Evolutive Systems9, but rather condi-
tionalized interrelations. What are the conditions for an object jO
t
x(j,t) to exist, and if it
changes, what are the conditions for the quality particular to change? The first that can
be thought of is that those conditions be necessary or not necessary. The existence of
jO
t
x(j,t) to be necessary, trivially means that it is not possible for jO
t
x(j,t) at the instance
of time t not to exist. And what should prevent jO
t
x(j,t) from existing? Obviously, that
it was necessitated, i.e. it is necessary, not to exist.
In this deterministic setting, all objects had been put in place at some instance of time
t∗, that is at t∗ every object is a necessary condition for the universe-instance to be Ut
∗
.
Thus, for instance, for the object Ot
∗
j to exist, it is necessary for the object O
t∗
i to exist:
Ot
∗
i
∆t
∗
i,j

Ot
∗
j
(4.1.1)
and see if we can get anywhere with it.
8Cf. (chap 2).
9Cf. (chap 3).
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with ∆t
∗
i,j denoting ‘the existence of the object O
t∗
i is necessary for the existence of the
object Ot
∗
j ’. This is trivially true, since every object existing at t
∗ is necessary for every
object to exist at t∗. And whatever happened before Ut
∗
cannot be worrisome, especially
because, for our purposes, it is dispensable to hypothesize about a very first beginning or
whether or not some different universe-instance, say U˜t
∗
∈ U˜, could have been
”
instanti-
ated“ instead. Given Ut
∗
with an arbitrary t∗ as initiation, it follows that the existence
of Ot
∗
i and O
t∗
j are mutually ontologically necessary for their existence, with ∆
t∗
i,j being a
symmetric relation, and that is true for all i, j ∈ I.10
And that should be true for any instance of time t with t∗ < t:
Oti
∆ti,j

Otj
(4.1.2)
Thus, given Ut, all objects are again mutually ontologically necessary for their existence.
One can gather a first good impression of what lies ahead. Does the above interrelation
∆t
∗
i,j come within the limits of ontology or epistemology? Given U
t∗ , is the fact ‘Ot
∗
i to
exist is necessary for Ot
∗
j to exist’ meant to be ontologically or epistemically true? One
should reformulate to ‘knowing Ot
∗
i to exist is sufficient for knowing O
t∗
j to exist’ and ask
again: what could ontologically be sufficient for the mere existence of the objects without
any observer stating the sufficiency?11
And the same holds for ‘Ot
∗
i to exist is necessary for O
t∗
j to exist’. It is again obvious
that, given Ut
∗
, if Ot
∗
i didn’t exist, the object O
t∗
j also wouldn’t exist. It is just that,
at an instance of time t∗, all existing quality particulars exist, and that should be true
without an observer paying attention.
This effort is made, because later on, the existence of an object will be necessary for
another object to exist in a certain unique way, and these are the preparations for a
follow-up definition of necessarily executed conditionalizing.
We now give the necessitation a definition and shift a tighter discussion to (chap 4),
where we hope to gain some insight into Ut
∗
, still without knowing the objects:
Definition 41 (Intradet). The intra-time determination (intradet)
∆ti,j : iO
t
x(i,t) → jO
t
x(j,t) (4.1.3)
10For an observer, the object Ot
∗
i
would also be epistemically sufficient for Ot
∗
j
to exist.
11In (chap 4.2), we will see that there is good reason to state that there is no sufficiency for objects
at all but the whole universe. If we know Ot
∗
i we certainly know O
t∗
j , and this seems to be possible with
only both objects existing at t∗. But of course in reality, there is no way to know Ot
∗
i
, thus to know Ot
∗
i
would be sufficient to know Ot
∗
j
; Ut
∗
is nevertheless, without further specification, ontologically true.
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states the existence of the object Oti with position x(i, t) being necessary for the existence
of the object Otj with position x(j, t).
12
N
Now an actual and undeniable existence of Ut is admittedly of poor potency concern-
ing considerations of relations within the universe-instance. They are logical rather than
metaphysical, and not at all nomological. Finding a more sophisticated structure in a
universe-instance will be approached next. And a very crucial question will be, can there
be structure just taking one instance of time into account? The answer will be given by
the definition of structure itself.
A first step to looking at sequences of universe-instances is to determine the conditions
for these to follow from prior ones. The transition between universe-instances would then
state the existence of an object Oti ∈ U
t being necessary for the existence of an object
Ot
′
j ∈ U
t′ with t < t′:
Definition 42 (Interdet). The inter-time determination (interdet)
∆t,t
′
i,j : iO
t
x(i,t) → jO
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.4)
states the existence of the object Oti with position x(i, t) being necessary for the existence
of the object Ot
′
j with position x(j, t
′). N
And again, it holds for any two objects Oti ∈ U
t and Ot
′
j ∈ U
t′ that they are mutually
necessary to exist. In the case of the objects living in the same (actual) universe-instance
where there is no change, mutual necessity is unproblematic, even somehow trivial at first
sight, as mentioned. Here, we have to be cautious stating conditions of existence, since
in (def 42) at most one universe-instance can be real. Be Ut0 the actual universe-instance
at t = t0 with objects that are being existing just now. Then O
t0
i with t0 < t
′ cannot
be ontologically necessary for Ot
′
j to exist, for the latter is a future object and therefore
doesn’t exist yet. ‘The object Ot0i exists’ is an ontological statement, and ‘the object O
t0
i
is necessary for some later instance of time t′ for ...’ is just an epistemic, though true, in
our reconstruction. Thus, if one only drew the existent, the picture would be
Ot0i (4.1.5)
and if one presumed it an actual precursor for say Ot
′
j
Ot0i
∆
t0
i,j

Ot0j
(4.1.6)
12It’s not that the emphasis is put on the object at the position but on the object together with the
position, which is the object and the position.
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which is quite similar to (4.1.2). And mounting Ot
′
j again would result in the diagram
Ot0i
∆
t0
i,j

∆
t0,t
′
i,j
&&
Ot0j
∆
t0,t
′
j,j
// Ot
′
j
(4.1.7)
where the dashed arrows signify the non-existent part of the triangle, including Ot
′
j .
Now what is gained by integrating a precursor, or a successor, taking only all at t0 to
exist? The picture is reminiscent of a commutative diagram, and the transition ∆t0,t
′
i,j can
be seen as being factorized by the
”
existent“13 part ∆t0i,j and the future resultant ∆
t0,t
′
j,j :
∆t0,t
′
i,j = ∆
t0
i,j∆
t0,t
′
j,j (4.1.8)
That kind of composing arrow will be key for further considerations, and also one reason
for changing from the set-theoretic to the category-theoretic description language. But
does it make sense here just having those intradet and interdet on hand? The truth value
of ‘the existence of Ot0i at t0 is necessary for O
t′
j at t
′ to exist’ is the same as ‘the existence
of Ot0i at t0 is necessary for O
t0
j at t0 to exist’ ”
followed by“ ‘the existence of Ot0j is at
t0 necessary for O
t′
j at t
′ to exist’. But what could that ominous ‘followed by’ stand for
other than mere conjunction with temporal order, there being a logical prior, which is
in accordance with the arrows’ directions? With the direction of time, we would gain
temporal logics:
∆t0,t
′
i,j = ∆
t0
i,j ∧
< ∆t0,t
′
j,j (4.1.9)
with ‘∧<’ meaning simply ‘and then’ (t0 < t′).14 In (chap 4), we will discuss whether
there can be more logics than just conjunctive concatenation in nature using category
theoretical
”
concepts“, which is actually what this language has been chosen for.
So far, there is no law involved besides basic determination due to necessity by existence,
and we have to ask whether we can think of some refinement of the arrows that describes
necessity conditions, including some kind of connectivity and continuity between certain
objects resulting in change? We can achieve that by introducing a second sort of object
travelling through space and time that is, alongside the introduced existents, a further
condition for change.
13It will become explicit; those arrows don’t exist in the same manner as one would regard the corre-
sponding objects to exist.
14There could be two sorts of conditionalizing existence at a new position here: time-delayed and non
time-delayed.
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4.1.1 Condition for Change
Let us first consider an easy change, some lonely object at time t about to move in space:
jO
t
x(j,t)
∆t,t
′
j,j
//
jO
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.10)
i.e. the object jO
t
x(j,t) at temporal location t and spacial location x(j, t) existing being
necessary for the object jO
t′
x(j,t′) at temporal location t
′ and spacial location x(j, t′) to
exist. So far it’s mere existence that is the necessary condition for a later object to exist.
But there is also change, and what has been changed, or rather what has changed, is
at least the spatio-temporal coordinates of the object jO
t: x(j, t) , x(j, t′). And we
must ask for the condition that must be met for the spacial position to change. There
must be some condition for change at time t that is in addition to the existence of the
quality particular necessary for the object’s new position x(j, t′), a condition that is to be
postulated for the apparent change. And that condition for change seems to be tightly
connected to the quality particular jO
t
x(j,t), saying it has the same position x(j, t). Thus,
there must be some spatially located condition for change that happens to travel along
with the object or just to be at its position at a minimum of one instance of time.
And obviously, there must be a condition for the condition for change; in particular,
there are conditions for change that eventually change. But since they can be integrated
into the existences and positions of the conditions for change and objects, there is no need
for higher resolution here. Actually, it could be that the quality just consists of providing
for the conditions for change to move.
Thus, the ongoing considerations will be about objects of course, but especially about
necessary conditions for existence and (their) change, and the objective is now to find
a criterion to differentiate between ontological necessary conditions (for existence) and
nomological necessary conditions (for change).
The Minimal Epistemic
Conditions here are not put to use as a handy academic tool in the struggle to define
notions in as precise a way as possible. Rather, they are at the core of metaphysical
considerations concerning necessity of existence and change. Little can be said about
necessary conditions. Those are, or more precisely, this is a fundamental concept, or
rather a fundamental that is hard to couch in other terms. If one wishes to eliminate the
notions ‘necessary’ and ‘condition’ in ‘necessary condition’, one seems to be forced to fall
back on counterfactual thinking, which is very inconvenient, since in the deterministic
setting, everything is factual, and a non-factual to be followed by another non-factual
is intuitionally not more enlightening than stating the state of affairs directly. But in
order to get ‘necessary conditions’ on the right path, we permit possible-worlds thinking
as auxiliary, not without reserving that they not be possible.
First, since all that can be done is making statements, we consider the relata to be
statements Ai with value to be true and then to be statements about existents with value
to be truly existent. The result is that these meditations may appear a little convoluted.
One might think why not start straightaway with existent objects, but one also might
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wish to get the transition between the epistemic and ontological, assuming there is any
here, to refer only to necessary conditions that will in addition necessarily be met, i.e.
necessarily necessary conditions.
Definition 43 (Necessarily Necessary Condition). Ai being true is a necessarily necessary
condition (NNC) for Aj to be true iff Aj being true is necessarily a sufficient condition
for Ai to be true, and Aj is necessarily true:
Ai
NNC // Aj :⇔ (Aj ⇒ Ai) ∧ Aj (4.1.11)
N
Thus, here we restrict ourselves to propositions that are necessarily true, i.e. it is
not possible that they are not true. This restriction is due to considerations about ex-
perimental metaphysics we contemplate in (chap 4). For the sake of convenience, we
immediately skip the modal operators again but bear in mind that we have an attitude
towards contingency, defining:
Definition 44 (Necessary Condition). Ai being true is a necessary condition (NC) for
Aj to be true iff Aj being true is a sufficient condition for Ai to be true, and Aj is true:
Ai
NC // Aj :⇔ (Aj ⇒ Ai) ∧Aj (4.1.12)
N
There are still three remarks to be made: firstly, a conditioned proposition being true,
here Aj , is certainly sufficient for the conditioning, here Ai, to be true and thus, strictly
speaking, there is no need to apply the material conditional. One could just state instead:
‘Ai is a necessary condition for Aj , and Aj is true’, or just ‘Ai necessitates Aj , and Ai is
true’ following our default that all propositions are made to be true. With that, we can
still shorten the definition to ‘Ai necessitates Aj ’ and just make a notation of it. Secondly,
one might be misled to think that the arrow is the necessary condition in (4.1.12), in the
sense of being necessary to make the following be true, but ‘to be necessary for ... to be
true’ doesn’t contain any activity. It is just about statements, and it is a statement of Ai
being true and Ai being true to be a NC, or more explicitly, a NC for Aj to be true.
15
And thirdly, one could ask again why not start straightaway with the antecedent Aj in
(4.1.12)? The reason is that, in the end, we are aiming for a transition of determination as
transportation of necessary conditions or, more precisely, necessary conditions for change
referring to the sender-receiver principle, which is close to the concept of causation.16
Now we want to go for the transition from general true statements to certain true
statements, namely true statements on existence, or existents. Therefore, we build the
following attributive succession:17
15We will later see that the arrows are mere epistemic, and hence, although true, there is no counterpart
in the realm of spatio-temporal existence.
16Cf. Aronson’s, resp. Fair’s transference theory and Dowe’s quantity conservation theory: [41], [20],
[66], and [65].
17The index is shifted to the left just to clear space for further specifications.
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iA : ‘this exists’ (pointing at something),
iA : ‘iA exists’ (iA being the pointed at),
iA
t
x(i,t) : ‘iA exists at time t and position x(i, t)’ (iA
t
x(i,t) being the pointed at).
Thus, we identify the epistemically true statement on existence with the ontologically
adopted fact of existents iA
t
x(i,t). Then, if iA
t
x(i,t) and jA
t
x(j,t) are true statements on
existents located in space and time, i.e. they are ontologically true, the NC will turn into
an ontological necessary condition.18
Definition 45 (Ontological Necessary Condition). iA
t
x(i,t) being existent at time t and
position x(i, t) is an ontological necessary condition (oNC) for jA
t′
x(j,t′) to be existent at
time t′ and position x(j, t′) iff jA
t′
x(j,t′) being existent at time t
′ and position x(j, t′) is
sufficient for iA
t
x(i,t) to be existent at time t and position x(i, t), and jA
t′
x(j,t′) is existent:
iA
t
x(i,t)
oNC //
jA
t′
x(j,t′) :⇔ (jA
t′
x(j,t′) ⇒ iA
t
x(i,t)) ∧ jA
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.13)
N
Here, it must be mentioned that existence is claimed to be restricted to presence, i.e.
there is an instance of time t0 which shall signify the existent, and obviously, just that
can ontologically be true, which carries this signifier. Thus, e.g. for t = t0 < t
′ (4.1.13)
should be read as follows: iA
t0
x(i,t0)
is (now) an oNC for the future existent jA
t′
x(j,t′). Or
for t < t′ = t0, one would say: iA
t
x(i,t) has been an oNC for the (now) existing jA
t0
x(j,t0)
.
And then one could ask, what is so ontological about the necessary condition where future
or past (non)-existences are being involved? Isn’t it that just t = t′ = t0 could qualify to
be oNCs? It is inevitable that we encounter epistemic necessary conditions again, which
we wanted to avoid. But it shows to be safe, even if t > t′, since every ontological fact is
an ontological necessary condition for every ontological fact.
Now here is the question we already announced: in addition to the defined necessity
of existence, is there the need to capture so-called lawful behavior, e.g. physical deter-
mination? There is indeed the wish to capture change, or more precisely, the necessity
of change, of becoming. Mere ontological necessary conditions (oNCs) are too meager to
fruitfully interrelate true statements of existence, i.e. existents.
Instead of ruminating on the debate on (natural) laws19, we immediately introduce the
idea of nomological in contrast to ontological necessity:
Definition 46 (Nomological Necessary Condition). iA
t
x(i,t) being existent at time t and
position x(i, t) is a nomological necessary condition (nNC) for jA
t′
x(j,t′) to be existent at
time t′ and position x(j, t′):
iA
t
x(i,t)
nNC //
jA
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.14)
iff
18Strictly speaking, it is a necessarily ontological necessary condition (NoNC).
19We will actually do it while seeking for physical permission in (chap 4).
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(i) t < t′ (directedness of time),
(ii) ∃k such that x(k, t) = x(i, t) and x(k, t′) = x(j, t′):
kA
t
x(i,t)
oNC //
kA
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.15)
(iii) iA
t
x(i,t) is the source of (for) kA
t
x(k,t) and jA
t′
x(j,t′) the sink of (for) kA
t′
x(k,t′).
N
Remarks again: (i) For a necessary condition to not just be ontological but nomological,
a directed ordering is included, which is in accord with the experience of the directedness of
flow of time. (ii) There is some existent that departs from the position of the existent that
is said to be a nomological necessary condition and arrives at the position of a subsequent
existent. With that one might think, all said, it is needed. But needed for what? For
moving through space and time? That is not satisfying since it is not clear why one should
tag those existents that just show a passage through the other two existents. Or to refer to
(4.1.14), what could be the reason to distinguish those existents that are passed through
or reached by the very same existent? If one wishes to classify the existents, it is to find
some special behavior of the existents, giving rise to at least stating an elementary law.
The first that could come to mind would just be to specifically relate those existents that
pass through the same location in space and time: x(i, t′) = x(j, t′). It is, if not again
an experience, at least a matter of intuition due to experience that existents that are at
distinct position at the same instance of time could also be nomologically necessary, in
addition to ontologically, for change of position, for example. Thus, it’s now about change
and its conditions, and it’s our task to find some criterion, which should be satisfied for
a condition to count as nomological rather than just ontological, and here, it is existents
changing their position from one existent to the other. But as we notice, in (def 46 (ii))
there is no talk of change, only of positions being doubly occupied. One now could claim
that some existent finding itself at some spacial location already taken, or
”
critically
near enough“, could be sufficient, besides the directedness of time, to fulfill nomological
necessity. But one could imagine an existent passing through or sufficiently by another
existent without a change due to, i.e. in a certain way followed by, the passage. Thus,
(i) and (ii) couldn’t be sufficient, and we need at least a third. In (iii) then, one could
concentrate on either change or passage: the condition for existents passing by sufficiently
resulting in certain change or change at all. In the above definition, we shift our attention
to the prior to change claiming the nomological invariance of there being no change
without passing, such that the existent kA
t
x(k,t) stems from a location where the existent
iA
t
x(i,t) happens to be, which is called its source, and goes in or into the existent jA
t′
x(j,t′),
called its sink. Of course, now the obligation to provide is to that duality, in particular
whether being the sink for kA
t′
x(j,t′) is a necessary condition for jA
t′
x(j,t′) to change in a
certain way. Here are two possible objections. Firstly, it could be argued that there was
still only conditionalized existence at certain spacial and temporal locations, i.e. moving
followed by moving. It is correct that the definition only includes existent ontological
necessary conditions20 with time directedness, but the invariance doesn’t just consist of
the persistence of the existent, instead in addition, there is the claim of departure and
20Cf. (4.1.15).
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arrival to be met while watching the happening, or at least we set it as a definition. And
that is obviously a more sophisticated law.21
And secondly, one could remark that there is still counterfactual thinking involved
while stating conditionalized existence: if the necessary condition wasn’t met, the future
existence would be different. Why not be content with the following: it is that, and
then it is that, and then it is that, ..., i.e. the (temporal) concatenation of conjunctions
already mentioned? But that is exactly how the ontological necessary conditions are de-
fined. They always hold.22 The point is somewhat different. If there is no counterfactual
possible, how can one epistemically separate the change? Given oNC and nNC are true,
one will not be able to state more than ‘the existent iA
t
x(i,t) is an nNC for the existent
jA
t′
x(j,t′) with change in position, which in a certain way iA
t
x(i,t) has been necessary for’.
In short, one might think this is a case for Hume, except that he is against necessity: the
actual necessary change is a change for which there has been a fulfilled condition, that’s all.
This is another crucial point: why was the definition (def 46) of nomological necessary
conditions restricted to t < t′? The answer is that it seems to be imperative to avoid
action at a distance. This is a valid point, and it will be one of the most striking issues
here. We prepare for that by giving a kind of nomological necessary conditioning for
t = t′, which will be taken up again:
Definition 47 (Non-time delayed nomological necessary condition). iA
t
x(i,t) being ex-
istent at time t and position x(i, t) is a non-time delayed or instantaneous nomological
necessary condition (inNC) for jA
t
x(j,t) to be existent at time t and position x(j, t):
iA
t
x(i,t)
inNC //
jA
t
x(j,t) (4.1.16)
iff ∃t† < t such that
iA
t†
x(i,t†)
nNC //
jA
t
x(j,t) (4.1.17)
N
The situation described is better conceived if one focusses on the present: t = t0. Then
the definition just says that the present existent iA
t0
x(i,t0)
had been an existent before,
iA
t†
x(i,t†), as a source for the present sink jA
t0
x(j,t0)
. This simple conception will be of ma-
jor interest in (chap 4.2), where we want to follow the imperative of proper metaphysics.
We are getting closer to our ontology. Mere existence didn’t satisfy, and the crucial idea
was at least to couple existents. Some existents belong together due to some criterion,
and we had to find the criterion. And we found that in general there are at least two
classes of conditionalized existents. This is the conjecture:
Conjecture 8 (Duality of Existence). There are at least two kinds of existents:
(i) There are existents that are sources and sinks.
21That is all a law can contribute, i.e. classifying sequences of invariant happenings. And the invariance
with the oNCs was just persistence in existence, which couldn’t be sparser.
22Cf. (def 45).
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(ii) There are existents that have existents as sources and sinks.

Now, it is to find invariances that are consistent within the theory and also match nature
or experimental metaphysics. And the conception of sources and sinks is ubiquitous in
the description of flow out of or into a given point. Powerful tools from vector analysis,
such as divergence, curl, and gradient of a vector field, can now be introduced, and
it will actually be done intrinsically in (chap 4.2), investigating a grounding physical
theory called Bohmian mechanics, but the geometrical implications are not the point
here. Instead, the conditionalizing has to be assigned a location in space along with the
direction of time, and we define a source to be a place, where something becomes visible
by means of some criterion or observational skill, and a sink to be another place where
it vanishes again but without great emphasis on the disappearance but rather on that
something’s arrival being followed by the sink’s certain change:
Conjecture 9 (Change of Sinks). Certain existents of sort (ii) in (con 8) arriving at sinks
are followed by changes of the sinks, which the existents are uniquely necessary for. 
We further prepare for our minimal ontology combining the written-out diagram (4.1.14)
iA
t
x(i,t)
oNC

oNC //
nNC
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
iA
t′
x(i,t′)
oNC

jA
t
x(j,t) oNC
//
jA
t′
x(j,t′)
(4.1.18)
with (4.1.15), yielding
iA
t
x(i,t) : kA
t
x(i,t)
oNC

oNC //
nNC
''❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
❖❖❖
iA
t′
x(i,t′)
oNC

jA
t
x(j,t) oNC
//
jA
t′
x(j,t′) : kA
t′
x(j,t′)
(4.1.19)
or, in short, again
iA
t
x(i,t) : kA
t
x(i,t)
nNC //
jA
t′
x(j,t′) : kA
t′
x(j,t′) (4.1.20)
saying ‘the existent iA
t
x(i,t) (via) being a source for the existent kA
t
x(i,t) is a nomological
necessary condition for the existent jA
t′
x(j,t′) (via) being a sink for the existent kA
t′
x(j,t′)’
resulting in the sink’s change. Two remarks need to be noted: firstly, the first colon
signifies ‘being a source of’, whereas the second signifies ‘being a sink of’, and in both,
the parenthetical ‘via’ simply suggests there is some additional lawlike behavior only in
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the manner of how the source/sink consideration has been introduced, and we continue
to refrain from keeping any activity or even causation in mind. Adding some
”
causal
power“ here would indeed not be enlightening. In the following, the inconvenient usage
of sources and sinks will be abbreviated by ‘having’ with (4.1.20), then saying: ‘the exis-
tent iA
t
x(i,t) having kA
t
x(i,t) is a nomological necessary condition for the existent jA
t′
x(j,t′)
having kA
t′
x(j,t′)’. This connects to the second remark. The above ‘resulting in the sink’s
change’ referring to (4.1.20) seems to be somewhat superfluous, since ‘being a sink’ is only
introduced to
”
capture“ the change which kA
t′
x(j,t′) is necessary for. Both perspectives, the
arrival of the existent and the resultant change, are equivalent in respect to nomological
necessary conditioning. But since we first want to take account of the natural intuition
to focus on transmission and change, and not so much on transmission and sources and
sinks, we concentrate on the perspective of an existent iA
t
x(i,t) being a nomological neces-
sary condition for change of (the sink) jA
t′
x(j,t′). In the following, it is more about change
and not so much about sinks.
Nonetheless, there is the misleading intuition of something having or possessing some-
thing, and in order to direct the convenient, but false, friend onto the right path, we make
it explicit and define:
Definition 48 (Having (:)). Having (:) is an abbreviation for ‘being a source for’ and
‘being a sink for’. N
After these preparations, we now conjecture that the existents behave in the following
way:
Conjecture 10 (Continuity). All nomological necessary conditions are instantaneous
nomological necessary conditions:
iA
t
x(i,t)
inNC

oNC //
nNC
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
iA
t′
x(i,t′)
inNC

jA
t
x(j,t) oNC
//
jA
t′
x(j,t′)
(4.1.21)

It says that, given some existent is a nNC, it is also a inNC, albeit not for the same
universe-instance. In the example above, iA
t
x(i,t) is an nNC for jA
t′
x(j,t′) and an inNC for
its precursor jA
t
x(j,t).
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The diagram in (con 10) can be expanded to
iA
t
x(i,t)
inNC

oNC //
nNC
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
iA
t′
x(i,t′)
inNC

jA
t
x(j,t) oNC
//
jA
t′
x(j,t′)
lA
t
x(l,t)
inNC
OO
oNC
//
nNC
::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉
lA
t′
x(l,t′)
inNC
OO
(4.1.22)
where iA
t
x(i,t) and lA
t
x(l,t) are nNCs for the same existent jA
t′
x(j,t′).
Maybe the ground is now prepared to ask whether the conceptual framework of true
statements that we introduced on spatio-temporal existents behaving in the defined and
conjectured way can be applied to the existents themselves, i.e. our quality particulars
that are sources and sinks, or have sources and sinks. In a second step, we present
a physical theory that explicitly relies on a “primitive ontology”, face to face with the
objects that will be called domain unifying categorical kinds.
The Minimal Ontological
Referring to the final remarks of (chap 4.1.1), these considerations of general necessity of
existents suggest there are at least two kinds of existents, which are our quality particulars
and describe conditionalized change in space and time:
Conjecture 11 (Ontological Duality). There are at least two kinds of quality particulars:
(i) There are quality particulars that are sources and sinks. They are still called objects
iO
t
x(i,t).
(ii) There are quality particulars that have the objects as sources and sinks. They are
called necessary conditions for change (NCCs): k
t
x(i,t).

The reason the quality particulars in (ii) are called ‘necessary conditions for change’ is
obvious: the name reflects the aim. The NNCs are certain quality particulars that move
in space and time, and what makes them special is that they are necessary conditions for
change. Now, where we have identified the source and sink, we go for the interrelations
that are the determinations defined in (def 41) and (def 42). We assume that the natural
deterministic relations between the quality particulars behave in the same way as in
diagram (4.1.22):
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Conjecture 12 (Dets are NCs). Intra-time and inter-time determinants are necessary
conditions, i.e. the ontological diagram on the left is isomorphic to the epistemic diagram
on the right:
iO
t
x(i,t)
∆ti,j

∆t,t
′
i,i
//
∆t,t
′
i,j
$$
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
iO
t′
x(i,t′)
∆t
′
i,j

jO
t
x(j,t)
∆t,t
′
j,j
//
jO
t′
x(j,t′)
lO
t
x(l,t)
∆tl,j
OO
∆t,t
′
l,l
//
∆t,t
′
l,j
::
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
:z
lO
t′
x(l,t′)
∆t
′
l,j
OO

iA
t
x(i,t)
inNC

oNC //
nNC
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
iA
t′
x(i,t′)
inNC

jA
t
x(j,t) oNC
//
jA
t′
x(j,t′)
lA
t
x(l,t)
inNC
OO
oNC
//
nNC
::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉
lA
t′
x(l,t′)
inNC
OO
(4.1.23)

Here, we must direct our attention to the fact that there is a tension in the emphasis
on the elements of the two diagrams in (4.1.23). On the right, the focus is on the object
being a necessary condition, where on the left, the arrows are more decorated: the whole
process, which is the determination, is represented by the mapping itself, e.g. ∆t,t
′
i,i :
iO
t
x(i,t)
∆t,t
′
i,i
//
iO
t′
x(i,t′) (4.1.24)
And there is indeed a reason why we don’t just note
iO
t
x(i,t)
∆ //
iO
t′
x(i,t′) (4.1.25)
in correspondence to
iA
t
x(i,t)
oNC //
iA
t′
x(i,t′) (4.1.26)
Firstly, we want to refer to processes that are mapped to processes, and secondly, a
crucial new notion will be introduced: the composition of processes. Thus, later on we
want to deal with the relations in order to apply category theory as a not yet very well
established language to refer to a more sophisticated ontology. Whether or not it works
out will be evaluated by looking for something that comes in addition to the existent, e.g.
natural laws. With that, not only objects and NCCs would be necessary but also some
”
entity“ that
”
operates“ on these.23
At least, the indices of the determinations can be simplified by reducing the redundancy
that doesn’t help to keep track of the existent.
23Cf. the universal wave function: (chap 4.2.1).
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We now combine the principle of having (def 48) with conjecture (con 12) and yield
the continuous diagram
iO
t
x(i,t) : k
t
x(i,t)
∆ti,j

∆t,t
′
i //
∆t,t
′
i,j
(((h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
iO
t′
x(i,t′)
∆t
′
i,j

jO
t
x(j,t)
∆t,t
′
j
//
jO
t′
x(j,t′) : k
t′
x(j,t′) ∧ r
t′
x(j,t′)
lO
t
x(l,t) : r
t
x(l,t)
∆tl,j
OO
∆t,t
′
l
//
∆t,t
′
l,j
666v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
6v
lO
t′
x(l,t′)
∆t
′
l,j
OO
(4.1.27)
and emphasize for a corresponding physical theory the two interesting parts:
1. The object iO
t
x(i,t) having the necessary condition for change k
t
x(i,t) and the object
lO
t
x(l,t) having the necessary condition for change r
t
x(l,t) time-delayed determine
the object jO
t′
x(j,t′) having the necessary conditions for change k
t′
x(j,t′) and r
t′
x(j,t′).
2. The object iO
t
x(i,t) having the necessary condition for change k
t
x(i,t) and the object
lO
t
x(l,t) having the necessary condition for change r
t
x(l,t) non-time-delayed deter-
mine the object jO
t
x(j,t).
With the principally denotable and traceable existents of the objects, i.e. the qual-
ity particulars, the ground is now prepared to apply an experimental metaphysics that
intrinsically includes
”
the pointing at“, i.e. the observation.24
4.1.2 Guided Matter Point Theory
DUCKs intends to provide an (onto)logical grounding of existents and change of existents
and its necessity. In order to give it a serious basis, it has to show its consistency with
a well-established, fundamental physical theory. Since our ontology developed so far is
about existents and their change in position, it stands to reason to look for the physical
theory that best allows for one-to-one correspondences, and of course, we will have to
ask whether this
”
best“ is good enough. This procedure could be termed an experimental
metaphysics approach, with the emphasis on ‘metaphysics’ to be confirmed.
Since the task is to describe the behavior of the existents, one has to deal with natural
laws. In the nomological reading, these are said not to move the entities, but what
could do so, anyway? ‘Moving’ here is meant to be causal, transitive, i.e. having an
24Neither the experiencing of the pointer or of some pointing is included and is not necessary to register
experimental outcomes: cf. [68] for the metaphysical foundations of physics. One goal on the way for a
unifying theory to embrace more than these objects is to uncover the necessary conditions for change.
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object to be moved. But actually there is no need to assume causality to state a law.
Rather, it is necessity to be referred to. And of course, there are advocates who even deny
this evaporated connectivity, one of whom is David Hume, who is fond of bookkeeping.25
According to him, laws are merely descriptive, and what then can be more rigorous than
just stating what has happened? Despite the problem of induction, one wants to look for
laws that also state future happenings, and that can be done just by assuming necessity.
Regarding arrangements of particles or quality particulars without necessity, there is
another proponent that is often started with on the perception of existents and change of
existents and all other depending on it:
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of necessary
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of
local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is
no part of the thesis that these local matters are mental.) We have geometry: a
system of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe
points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields,
maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural
intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all.
There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All
else supervenes on that.26
Two contentious points are addressed, one of which is having such a bad reputation in
the matter of matter points that, in the citation, it is often not even mentioned in its
parenthesis: the mental supervening on all there is—the arrangement of qualities. The
second one is Humeanism, and we begin with that since the other will take a bit more work.
One could be satisfied with the end of all days’ bookkeeping, i.e. contenting oneself
with the registration of the happenings. That alone is what the Humeans admit to be ob-
jectively true—and deny any causal force and also non-causal necessity or determination.
But what about similar repetitions, called ‘structures’? If there were no conditionalized
arising, i.e. natural laws, what then placed the particles in those structures? Humeanism
appears to be all too sceptical to be satisfying. It is not that we crave for laws but for
structure, if not ontological structure then still structure to be perceived or experienced by
some observer or cognizer. Now if we seek a physical theory that is against subsystems—
and they are necessary to approach structures—but endorses necessity in terms of deter-
mination, one could think that a guided matter point theory isn’t the right one to spend
time on. Actually, far from it, as we will see—it shows features we endorse, and that it is
not structural is not a flaw but an imperative in matching our considerations. We make
no bones about our desire to rediscover the elements of DUCKs in a sophisticated enough
scientific theory. And of course, we ask whether Bohmian mechanics, a theory of guided
matter points, became such a sufficiently recognized theory in the scientific community
by then because it offered attractive promises—determinism, localizability, and even non-
locality. And that matches quite well with what we find attractive, too: (i) nomological
inter-time determination as necessity, (ii) change only in the arrangement of the existents.
25Cf. [24, VII] and [34]: Hume on Causation, and [52] for circularity.
26Cf. [25, x].
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Humeanism states the contingency of the arrangements: it is metaphysically possi-
ble to hold some entities fixed and change the others. If this is a claim, Humeanism
is false, or it is just a definition, for it cannot be assumed to be true, first lacking ev-
idence and second itself imposing denied necessity—the necessity of no necessity is not
contingency. Moreover, there is the imagination that “[i]t is a contingent matter of fact
that the distribution of the fundamental physical properties throughout space-time in the
actual universe manifests certain regularities.”27 Those regularities are meant to be only
conceived as Hume states that the “repetitions” (due to regularities)
has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces:
that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power and ne-
cessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are
internally felt by the soul, and not perceived externally in bodies[.]28
That means that there is no physical regularity inducing regularity in mind—the mental
not supervening on the physical. Before we proceed further in that direction, we first, as
mentioned above, try a metaphysical grounding on Bohmian mechanics (BM). Therefore,
below is a brief introduction to non-relativistic BM without spin to ascertain first whether
Humeanism can be satisfactory, second whether dispositionalism can do better, and third
whether DUCKs can assist in this battle.
4.2 Bohmian Mechanics
For some, there is the ultimate wish not to let one’s sight or even mind be clouded but
to have good visibility, i.e. to have a theory that provides an
”
explanation“ of vision of
the existent. Heisenberg’s sentiment on those reactionary:
They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose
smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, in-
dependently of whether or not we observe them. This, however, is impossible
or at least not entirely possible[.]29
Yes, not entirely possible—as we will see, there is indeed good reason that stones and
trees do not exist, but their subjectivity is not the reason why one might be better off
not believing in the objective world of at least the constituents, the smallest parts.
There are mayor inconsistencies that have to be overcome in handling the small. Proba-
bly the most prominent and far-reaching is themeasurement problem in orthodox quantum
mechanics, which is expressed in the following trilemma concerning the completeness of
the wave function:
The following three claims are mutually inconsistent.
1. The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-function speci-
fies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.
27Cf. [51, 781].
28Cf. [23, 166].
29Cf. [83, 129].
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2. The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equa-
tion (e.g. the Schro¨dinger’s equation).
3. Measurements [...] have determinate outcomes [.]30
There are several quantum theories focussing on one of the claims to be suspended
to resolve the measurement problem. The orthodox Copenhagen QT denies the second
while voting for an observer bringing about the knowledge about the actual outcome of a
measurement which is done by
”
epistemically“ reducing the state, i.e. collapsing the wave
function, whereby the sole reign of mathematics comes to an abrupt end.31 Another way
to abrogate the unrestricted unitary operator necessary for a continuous time evolution of
the wave function is to add a non-linear term in the Schro¨dinger’s equation to provide an
intrinsic
”
mechanism“ for the collapse of the wave function making an
”
active“ observer
unnecessary and the outcome ontological, i.e. the GRW equation, now allowing objective
discontinuous and indeterministic quantum behavior due to spontaneous wave function
collapse.32
The third claim has been questioned by bringing forward the concept of the relativity
of states: “Deductions are drawn about the state of the observer relative to the state of
the object system”33, saying the observer and the measuring apparatus and the measured
are constituent subsystems composing a whole, i.e. a system. This means that all of the
subsystems are not in a single well-defined state, and the observer is not independent of
but correlated to the remainder:
[A]ll measurements and observation processes are to be regarded simply as
interactions between the physical systems involved—interactions which produce
strong correlations.34
Thus the observer does not have determinate knowledge of the outcomes. This theory
has been further developed into The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechan-
ics35, which states again a realistic view—at a measurement outcome the world splitting
into as many worlds as superpositioned states existing, including states of the observer.36
This approach is called a ‘no-collapse’ interpretation, because the state reduction of the
whole system is not determinate in a single universe—the world splits or the observer is
indecisive. But this is not the only possible denial of collapse, there is a second one, and
that doubts the first claim—the wave function being complete.
A lot has been written on that issue. Actually, from the very beginning, complete-
ness of the future orthodox quantum mechanics appeared suspicious for some, and among
those were, after all, most of the founders.37 We follow Bohm’s proposal from A Sug-
gested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of ‘Hidden’ Variables38 admitting
30Cf. [78, 7].
31Here, we already sense a looming conflict between the epistemic and the ontological realm. Does
the observer play an active role, and what is ‘activity’? Cf. (chap 9.1) in [19] regarding pointer positions
and their detection.
32Cf. [10] and [84] for an overview.
33Cf. [35, 455].
34Cf. [35, 455].
35Cf. [74].
36Cf. [53] for the many minds interpretation.
37Cf. [5].
38Cf. [15] and [16].
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quantum particles and their having positions at any time—the hidden parameters39 that
come in addition to the wave function. The idea of there being point-like particles be-
ing guided by a wave, the so-called pilot wave, which is nothing but the solution of the
Schro¨dinger’s equation itself, i.e. the wave function, was already introduced at the 5th
Solvay conference in Brussels in 1927 by de Broglie40 and then fell off the radar and had
to be rediscovered—or better, discovered once again.41
After having introduced the basic specifications of BM, we will go on to one of the
probably most puzzling questions of all the quantum theories—the
”
role“ of the wave
function, which is indeed key for our ontology and the real reason why we attend to this
theory seeking an empirical grounding of DUCKs. In BM, the situation is clear and for
our purposes comes in quite handy: the wave function makes the particles move, and the
attracting feature here is that the moving of one particle—or its changing as we want
it—is
”
mediated“, i.e. has been made necessary, as we take it, by all the other parti-
cles. What this mediation looks like will first be outlined in the following by introducing
three more or less convincing
”
physico-mathematical“ intuitions and then an intuition
that keeps complexity low by trying to excerpt the underlying ontology by taking the
mathematics serious by leaving it behind.
This is then non-relativistic BM for N particles. The physical reality is seen to be
describable by the pair (ψ,Q(t)) of the wave function and the configuration of the actual
positions of all particles in the universe at an instance of time t: Q(t) = (Q1(t), ..., QN (t))
with
Qi : R→ R
3
t 7→ Qi(t)
(4.2.1)
being the trajectories of the particles in three-dimensional space.42
The
”
law of motion“, i.e. the necessitating of change of the particles’ positions, is
mathematically represented by the wave function ψ with
ψ : R3N × R→ Ck
(q, t) 7→ ψ(q, t)
(4.2.2)
which is a mapping of the generic configuration space variable q = (q1, ..., qN ) onto a
complex number having k complex components. ψ is said to “guide” the particles in
physical space, which is nothing but determining the particles’ velocities vψ1 , ..., v
ψ
N in
R
3.43 But how is it done? The wave function defines a velocity vector field vψ ≡ vψ(q)
on the configuration space R3N with vψi ≡ v
ψ
i (q1, ..., qN ) ∈ R
3 being the velocity of the
i-th particle in physical space:44
dQi
dt
= vψi (Q1, ..., QN ) (4.2.3)
39Another deterministic view on hidden parameters obeying Bell’s theorem is proposed by G. t’Hooft:
a cellular automaton interpretation of moving in space following moving in Conway’s game of life. Cf. [81].
40Cf. [26].
41Cf. [30] for an anthology of the very beginning of pilot wave mechanics and also of its disregard.
42Cf. [18, 29].
43Cf. [19, 144]. Is velocity a second categorical property in addition to position? We will come to that
later. So far, velocity is just a mathematical way of describing change of position.
44Cf. [15] and [16].
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with Q1, ..., QN being the particles’ actual positions.
In addition to the wave function ψ specifying the vector field vψi it solves, as in orthodox
quantum mechanics, the Schro¨dinger’s equation (SE)45
i~
∂ψ
∂t
(q, t) = −
N∑
i=1
~
2
2mi
∆iψ(q, t) + V (q)ψ(q, t) = Hψ(q, t) (4.2.4)
with the Laplace operator ∆i = ∂
2/∂x2i +∂
2/∂y2i +∂
2/∂z2i and the so-called potential V
46
both providing further specifications of the universe that are necessary to determine ψ.47
The form of the SE is, as with (4.2.3), a first-order differential equation that determines
the time evolution of Qi(t) given the wave function ψ:
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(
ψ∗∂iψ
ψ∗ψ
)
(Q1, ..., QN), i = 1, ..., N (4.2.6)
with ∂i = (∂/∂xi, ∂/∂yi, ∂/∂zi) and mi being the so-called mass of the i-th particle.
That is the physical theory. Now one could think that the considerations here are
all about physics, but strictly speaking, it is just logics on moving entities, or more
specifically, on changing parameters. That m1, ...,mN are called ‘masses’ is
[...] because in certain physical situations the particles will move along New-
tonian trajectories and then these masses are Newtonian masses, and there is
no point in inventing new names here.48
Now we want to sketch the three ways that yield the pilot equation (4.2.6) for the
particles’ trajectories.
Hamilton-Jacobi Continuation
Louis de Broglie was the first to suggest a deterministic quantum theory, the first who was
fond of the idea of piloting the particles on a trajectory, consequently calling his account
Pilot Wave Theory.49 But unfortunately, he and his theory weren’t well received in those
days in Brussels, and so the deterministic theory of quantum objects got a second try in
1952 by David Bohm.50 Unaffected by de Broglie’s forgotten studies, he was looking for
some kind of continuation—at least, it came to that—of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of
45Cf. [19, 146].
46For example, a static electromagnetic interaction with the particles Qi ”
having“ a charge ei the
Coulomb potential
V (q1, ..., qN ) =
∑
i<k
eiek
‖qi − qk‖
(4.2.5)
has to be filled in the Schro¨dinger’s equation.
47The Laplace operator includes a metrics, i.e. specifications on the spacial geometry.
48Cf. [19, 144]. Of course one could also doubt ‘mass’ in Newtonian mechanics to be more than sources
and targets for the conditions for the particles moving.
49Cf. [26].
50Cf. [30] for a further analysis of the perspectives on the early quantum physics and the discord that
has been set out of the gate.
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classical mechanics to be a limes contained in the new theory.
In short, given the Schro¨dinger’s equation for one particle51
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
~
2
2m
∇2ψ + V (x)ψ (4.2.7)
with the solution
ψ(x, t) = ReiS/~ (4.2.8)
where R(x, t) and S(x, t) are real-valued numbers, the SE splits into
∂R
∂t
= −
1
2m
[R∇2S + 2∇R · ∇S] (4.2.9)
∂S
∂t
= −
[
(∇S)2
2m
+ V (x) −
~
2
2m
∇2R
R
]
(4.2.10)
With these equations, two substantially different approximations can be made that
combine the classical world with the quantum world:52
(i) ~→ 0:
This is the so-called classical limit. Substituting ρ(x, t) = R2(x, t) yields
∂ρ
∂t
+∇
[
ρ
∇S
m
]
= 0 (4.2.11)
∂S
∂t
+
(∇S)2
2m
+ V (x) = 0 (4.2.12)
where the first equation is gained using the derivative ∂ρ∂t = 2R
∂R
∂t . It is the sort of
a continuity equation with the interpretation of ∇S(x)m being the velocity vector and
ρ∇Sm the mean current of particles if an ensemble of particles is being considered.
ρ(x, t) then is the probability density for the particles, and (4.2.11) describes the
conservation of probability.
The second equation—having executed the limes—is just the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tion for the momentum p = ∇S. But that isn’t really the interesting part here for
this approach is also excepted by the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory
restricting itself to probability distributions.
(ii) Not ~→ 0:
In the second approximation, in which ~ does not converge to zero, the difference
between the classical and the
”
non-classical“ Hamilton-Jacobian resides in the extra
”
potential“
U(x) = −
~
2
2m
∇2R
R
(4.2.13)
51Cf. [15, 169].
52Cf. [15, 170].
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This term will again effectively vanish, and it does so if it is negligible in comparison
with (∇S)
2
2m , which happens if the change in the amplitude R is much smaller than
in the phase S. If it can not be ignored, we “[...] assume that each particle is acted
on, not only by a ‘classical’ potential, V (x) but also by a ‘quantum-mechanical’
potential[.]”53
The very next step then to yield a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics
would be to conserve the definition of the Hamilton-Jacobian velocity of the particle:
Then Eq. [(4.2.10) with ρ(x, t) = R2(x, t)] can still be regarded as the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation for our ensemble of particles, ∇S(x)/m can still be
regarded as the particle velocity, and Eq. [(4.2.11)] can still be regarded as de-
scribing conservation of probability in our ensemble. Thus, it would seem that
we have here the nucleus of an alternative interpretation for Schroedinger’s
equation.54
Still advancing the classical analogue, Newton’s law of motion is now applied:
m
d2x
dt2
= −∇
[
V (x) −
~
2
2m
∇2R
R
]
(4.2.14)
But this very last step has been subject to yet unsolved controversy from the beginning,
for there seems to be no need to introduce a second derivative, i.e. an acceleration due
to a force. The first-order derivative
dQ
dt
=
∇S(x, t)
m
|x=Q (4.2.15)
suffices since S is already determined by the SE and the initial conditions for the particle
positions.
The discussion of the merit of a “quantum force” evolved into group formation with
protagonists differering on believing in motion being causally brought about by a force or
nomologically by only the wave function itself. This will be debated in detail after having
shortly shown a modification of the idea of conserving probability from quantum hydro-
dynamics again yielding the Bohmian law of motion (4.2.15) but now without referring
to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and the controversial “quantum force”(4.2.13).
Conserved Quantity
This approach exploits an analogy between Schro¨dinger’s quantum theory and hydrody-
namics by using the intuition that probability of position could, like mass, be considered
a conserved
”
quantity“ while moving in space. The procedure is to compare the hydro-
dynamical continuity equation
∂ρm
∂t
+∇jm = 0 (4.2.16)
that equates the time derivative of the mass density ρm with the negative of the diver-
gence of the mass current jm with the continuity equation which can be derived from the
53Cf. [15, 170].
54Cf. [15, 170].
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Schro¨dinger’s equation relating the probability density ρ = |ψ|2 to the probability current
j.55 Then thinking of the probability density as referring to real positions of the parti-
cles, consequently applying fluid mechanics again (j = ρv = ρdQ/dt), and using polar
coordinates in ψ immediately yields the law of motion for the particle positions (4.2.15),
which is also known as the guidance equation of Bohmian mechanics.56
Minimality, Simplicity, and Symmetry
The last approach to the trajectory theory of quantum mechanics relies on “first princi-
ples”.57 Du¨rr and Teufel also have a high opinion of perceptions—stating in their textbook
Bohmian mechanics:
Moving particles agree with our experience of the microscopic world. In a
double slit experiment, a particle is sent onto a double slit and later caught on
a screen. We see the spot on the screen (where the particle hits the screen),
and since the particle came from somewhere else it had to move.58
And the most natural way to theoretically catch the particles’ moving is by referring the
change of the actual configuration space vector Q(t) to a vector field on R3N determined
by the wave function ψ:
dQ
dt
= vψ(Q, t) (4.2.17)
Now having found the equation of motion for the particle, the system’s specification
(ψ,Q(t)) would be complete.
In short, the minimal simplicity of vψ demands:59
(1) Physical equivalence of ψ and cψ.
Since a nonzero constant multiple of the WF ψ solves the same SE, the velocity vector
field vψ should be a homogeneous function of degree 0:
vcψ = vψ (4.2.18)
(2) Galilean invariance.
Galilean invariance (esp. invariance under rotation) holds for the gradient of a scalar
function:
vψ ∝ ∇ψ (4.2.19)
with (4.2.18) yielding
vψ = α
∇ψ
ψ
(4.2.20)
with α being a constant scalar in the simplest case.
55Cf. [27, 323].
56Cf. [28, 40 ff.].
57Cf. [19, 147].
58Cf. [19, 147].
59Cf. [19, 147,148] and [18, 29 ff.].
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(3) Time-reversal invariance.
Setting for the complex conjugate of the wave function ψ(q, t) 7→ ψ∗(q,−t) for t 7→ −t
demands for the equation of motion (4.2.17):
vψ
∗
= −vψ (4.2.21)
yielding for the imaginary part in (4.2.20)
vψ = α Im
∇ψ
ψ
(4.2.22)
(4) Galilean invariance under boosts.
Searching for vψ under the transformation vψ 7→ vψ+u then determines the constant
α:
vψ =
~
m
Im
∇ψ
ψ
(4.2.23)
Finally, these considerations on simplicity and symmetry result in the guiding equation
(4.2.6) for a system of N particles.
Before we turn to our original question on primitive ontology, we should summarize the
results. This is Bohmian mechanics, i.e. the physical theory we refer to:
A system is described by
(ψ,Q) (4.2.24)
with the wave function ψ being a solution of
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
N∑
i=1
~
2
2mi
∆iψ + V ψ (4.2.25)
and the positions Qi of the primitives obeying
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(
∇iψ
ψ
)
(Q1, ..., QN) (4.2.26)
So far, the obvious existent is that which moves with Qi(t), the matter points as point
particles. And we wonder whether, at those positions, there might be more than just
these particles, perhaps there
”
is“ the wave function. What that could mean has been a
significant point of contention in the debate about wave function ontology.
Closely connected with the interpretation of ψ is the discussion on quantum behavior
being mechanical or non-mechanical. Bohm emphasizes the indivisibility of the universe,
which was simply the opposite of the classical view:
The entire universe must, on a very accurate level, be regarded as a single
indivisible unit in which separate parts appear as idealizations permissible only
on a classical level of accuracy of description. This means that the view of
the world as being analogous to a huge machine, the predominant view from
the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, is now shown to be only approximately
correct. The underlying structure of matter, however, is not mechanical.60
60Cf. [14, 167].
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And he does not feel at all flattered by Du¨rr et al. assigning his name to their theory
of guided matter points:
It should be noted that the views expressed in our book differ very substan-
tially from those of Du¨rr et al. (1992) who have developed an alternative
theory. It was very unfortunately that they chose the term ‘Bohmian mechan-
ics’ to describe their work. When Bohm first saw the term he remarked, “Why
do they call it ‘Bohmian mechanics’? Have they not understood a thing that
I have written?” He was referring not only to our article Bohm and Hiley
(1987), but also to a footnote in his book Quantum Theory in which he writes,
“This means that the term ‘quantum mechanics’ is a misnomer. It should, per-
haps, be called ‘quantum nonmechanics’” (Bohm 1951). It would have been
far better if Du¨rr et al. (1992) had chosen the term ‘Bell mechanics’. That
would have reflected the actual situation far more accurately.61
But this appears to be possibly a misunderstanding. Both
”
schools“ refer to the same
thing—the trajectory view of moving particles, and they mainly differ in the way the
change in position is brought about. Bohm advocates a causal view by referring to a
quantum potential yielding a quantum force while Du¨rr holds that referring to the classical
view of the Hamilton-Jacobi description is not necessary and nomological considerations
on the underlying logics of spatio-temporal postulates can do as well. And one could ask,
what is more mechanical: referring to a quantum force or calling the theory a mechanics?
The crucial point here seems to be that there are localized particles, and they behave
deterministically, and that is which both are interested in. Thus, being causal but non-
mechanical versus being non-causal but mechanical is not the point. There are particles
and something drives them, and the driving being causal or nomological. That is the
actual point of discord, and we will see how far it goes.
4.2.1 Wave Function Ontology
Wave function ontology is of major interest to us, since we assume an at least dyadic ontol-
ogy. We have ascertained two kinds of entities: the objects being the sources and targets
and the NCCs having them as sources and targets. And to say it straight away—we have
a suspect for the role of the wave function, and with that comes its ontological status.
And naturally, it comes with Bohm, but in the interpretation of the
”
nomological school“.
In order to understand the wave function, we investigate what is embraced or contained
by it. In particular, we have to look at the different kinds of wave functions referring to
the different quantum theories.
The Universal Wave Function
There are three possible attitudes towards the wave function. The wave function is62
(1) everything, as with orthodox quantum mechanics with the observer being included,63
61Cf. [21, 117].
62Cf. [18, 264].
63Cf. e.g. [35, 457]: The observers “are considered as purely physical systems and are treated within
the theory.”
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(2) something, as with Bohmian mechanics, with the observer being also included by
assuming subsystems as such,
(3) nothing.64
The game becomes evident: play both ends against the middle. It is indeed an epistemic
endeavor with Bohm leaving a good impression: the road is seeking the wave function,
which is intrinsically Bohmian.
In orthodox quantum mechanics, there are wave functions of systems, and they are con-
sidered epistemic by the proponents. That is the traditional view of quantum mechanics—
it’s all about measurement outcomes. But if one was all too meticulous, one would have
opposed that saying epistemic is not ontological. That means there must be something
behind the wave function of a system, call it X . Thus, saying the wave function is only
epistemic admits something hidden, some hidden variable, rendering orthodox quantum
mechanics no longer merely epistemic.65
In BM, however, there is only one wave function and only one system—the universe.
All other kinds of wave functions must be stated in terms of this universal wave function
Ψ—and the “hidden” Q, the actual universal configuration, as will be shown. These
so-called conditional wave functions are approximations and rule epistemically suitably
decoupled systems, which then are called subsystems. But regarding part-whole relations,
in BM objectively without there being an additional
”
collapsing“ observer at place, there
is just one thing that rules, and that is the total system (Ψ, Q):
The behavior of the parts of a big system are already determined by the
behavior of the whole. And what you have for the whole is the wave function
Ψ of the universe, together with its configuration Q.66
Thus, the question is raised how concrete subsystems can at least be defined. We take
a subsystem to be identically equal to the conditional wave function ψ(x) and the con-
figuration X : (ψ(x), X).
How to make BM work, i.e. how to decouple the subsystem suitably from its envi-
ronment such that BM could have been found anyway, is shown elsewhere in detail67,
and also how the typical collapse behavior of these subsystems in orthodox quantum me-
chanics can be reproduced without collapse.68 Here, it is only relevant that there is no
external observer needed for state reduction and trajectile behavior of one world, i.e. the
deterministic observer is itself decoupled along with the measured and the measuring ap-
paratus, if all together suitably, a subsystem of the universe, and there is no measurement
problem any more.
For this strong claim, we need to show how the splitting of the universe into subsystems
is done in principle.69 The configuration of the universe is to be divided into the above
64Even if there was nothing, one would take the moderate line that it is at least epistemic, because
there should be something that makes us believe.
65Cf. [18, 263].
66Cf. [18, 264].
67Cf. e.g. [18, 37 ff.] and [19, 216 ff.].
68Cf. e.g. (chap 2) in [18] and (chap 11) in [19].
69Cf. [18, 264,265].
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x-subsystem’s actual configuration X and the environment Y :
Q = (Qsys, Qenv) = (X,Y ) (4.2.27)
For the conditional wave function of the subsystem, the universal wave function Ψ(q) =
Ψ(x, y) must be freed from the complement’s generic variable since ψ(x) is just a function
on its configuration space. But it would be false to neglect its environment’s presence Y
so that:
ψ(x) = Ψ(x, Y ) (4.2.28)
Now we have to be cautious, since there are two equations involved in the Bohmian
subsystem’s time evolution. Its pilot equation appears to be quite evident:70
dQ
dt
= vΨ(X,Y ) =⇒
dX
dt
= vψ(X) (4.2.29)
for ψ(x) = Ψ(x, Y ).
But for the conditional wave function, it is not so clear at first sight that it is Bohmian,
since it must obey the Schro¨dinger’s equation, which says that Ψ in (4.2.28) has to be
time dependent. And also the universe’s particles do not stand still in general, so we gain
the following time dependence:
ψt(x) = Ψt(x, Yt) (4.2.30)
with Qt = (Xt, Yt).
That the conditional wave function obeys the Schro¨dinger’s equation such that all stan-
dard quantum measurement outcomes are reproduced can be found elsewhere71—and is
not our issue. It is just that the subsystem’s, or system’s wave function in the orthodox
reading, can be asymptotically derived from the universal wave function. And we then
ask: what does the universal wave function stand for?
In BM, the necessity of subsystems to emerge from the universe should give us a hint
as to what to think of the universal wave function. According to Bohm, who puts for-
ward a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics72, it is
”
mediating“ a quantum force73
actively guiding the particles in three-dimensional space. According to the second, anti-
causal school, “it’s really more in the nature of a law than a concrete physical reality.”74
This “nature of a law” is not meant to be a natural law but a means of description via
mathematical, logical formalism. And we endorse, as we will see, their nomological and
passive stance, i.e. the function of the wave function being a function.
What could the arguments be for the view that the WF is only nomological? It is said
that a lack of “back action” of the particles’ position on the WF could violate causality.
Following the guidance equation (4.2.17), it is Q = Q(ψ) but not ψ = ψ(Q), the WF
70Cf. [18, 265].
71Cf. e.g. [18, 23 ff].
72Cf. [15, 175]: “Our interpretation of the quantum theory describes all processes as basically causal
and continuous.”
73Cf. (4.2.14).
74Cf. [18, 266].
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simply obeying the Schro¨dinger’s equation. This is a major point, since as we will soon
see, it does not—in the ontological reading, the universal WF being time independent.
But nevertheless, it still holds that there is no “back action”, and one wonders why. It
is that ψ = ψ(q), i.e. a function of the generic configuration space variable, which means
that the universe has to be tautological over time, saying at any instance of time t the
actual configuration Q(t) must be irrelevant for the WF, as long as the initial setup had
determined Ψ such that Q(t) couldn’t have been otherwise. And this is a matter of big
bang and flooding the becoming universe with the necessary conditions for the particles’
change, which we called ‘continuation’.
Another line of argumentation is finding the WF
”
strange“, meaning it is a field on
configurations space q(t) = (q1(t), ..., qN (t)) guiding the particles in physical space. It
makes it especially strange where, as shown above, the nonzero multiple of a solution of
SE yields the same velocity vector field in R3. What kind of thing other than a law could
it be if a system’s behavior can just be described by an equivalence class of fields?75
But there are also reasons not to believe in the WF’s nomology, and their power de-
pends on whether the WF is thought to be a natural law or just to show the nature or
characteristics of a law. In the epistemic view, one can “prepare” a system by postulating
a certain Hamiltonian and solving the corresponding SE. The resulting WF then is man-
made and in this sense artificial and as noted does not exist, neither as some physical
reality nor as a natural law. It is an approximation and as such changes in time, which
shouldn’t be the case if it was a real natural law. But in fact, this isn’t a proper objection
since ontologically the conditional wave functions do not interest us. All that counts is
Ψ, the universal wave function, and that should be time independent, and it is. The
subsystems are defined in terms of the one and only
”
existent“ WF, which should not
bother us further.
One could take the view that now entering into the business of canonical quantum
cosmology by applying the Wheeler-De Witt equation76
H Ψ = 0 (4.2.31)
is overdoing things. It is not. Rather, this is key for our investigation.
The point is that the generalized Hamiltonian does not involve a time evolution, and
with the time derivative being substituted by 0, it follows that the solutions, the
”
laws“,
are time-independent. The next thing then would be to make the law unique which could
be indeed done.77 This is the problem of time in quantum cosmology, but not a problem
in Bohmian mechanics. It is
[...] what the doctor ordered because laws are not supposed to change with
time, so we don’t want the fundamental wave function to change with time.
It’s good that it doesn’t change with time.78
Nevertheless, two questions remain:
75Cf. [18, 266].
76Cf. [73].
77Cf. [7].
78Cf. [18, 269].
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1. How can a non-changing Ψ determine the velocity vector field on configuration space
such that the configuration Q(t) changes?
2. How can the conditional wave function of a subsystem be defined in terms of the
universal wave function?
The answer to the first question is: it cannot, at least alone. There must be change
elsewhere, and that is the configuration Q(t) itself. And that also answers the question
at the beginning: Ψ is not everything but something.
The answer to the second question is: it cannot; it is just a limit, i.e. it describes an
asymptotic behavior. The wave function ψt(x) enlarged towards the totality is stationary
and does not solve the Schro¨dinger’s equation. Thus the SE is just phenomenal, and so
is ψt(x).
So far, we have learned our law, the universal wave function, firstly does not change with
time, secondly is unique, and thirdly is something. Given our domain unifying goal, we are
interested in having the observer as a subsystem in the sense of (ψ(xobs), Xobs) included
in the universe without remainder, which would render (Ψ, Q) everything. The whole
would be the parts and nothing but the parts, ruling out emergentism and reductionism.
There would be pure identity if there wasn’t some experiencing cognizer—not experiencing
wouldn’t be enough. But before we leave the realm of Bohmian mechanics, we should first
continue with BM—which is honest matter—to ground our logically abduced ontological
theory DUCKs.
4.2.2 The Transition
“You start with just ψ, you end with just Q.”79 That is the result of
”
eliminating“ the
WF by making it universal, i.e. time-independent and unique—a law. Thus, the question
of ontology not only refers to introducing particles, that which is to be moved, but also
to exercising a transition from the prepared approximate to the observer-absent exactly.
And the question now is what is the ontological difference between ψ and Ψ other than
the latter being complete, i.e. everything having been taken into account that determines
the universal WF, and that is the whole configuration Q?
Goldstein and Zangh`ı in Quantum Physics Without Quantum Philosophy ask
Why should the law of motion governing the behavior of the constituents of
the universe be of such a form that there is a wave function in terms of which
the motion can be compactly expressed?80
and answer
We should read off from the state of the primitive ontology, whatever it
may be, what the relevant wave function is. There should be some algorithm
connecting the state of the primitive ontology, for Bohmian mechanics the
relevant configuration Q(t) over, say, some suitable time interval, with the
relevant wave function.81
79Cf. [18, 271].
80Cf. [18, 271].
81Cf. [18, 271].
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An algorithm connecting Q(t) with Ψ over some suitable time interval—that is doubted
to exist since one “wouldn’t expect there to be an algorithm for theory formation” for
“specifying the wave function amounts to specifying the theory.”82 That there is a theory,
call it Ψ, including a theory for building, i.e. epistemically preparing a subsystem, call
it (ψobs, Xobs) or (ψalg, Xalg)
83, such that Ψ is being built is precisely the problem we
are concerned with in DUCKs, wishing to integrate the mental into a unifying theory,
although it not necessarily being nomologically necessary for theory formation. We keep
these
”
mind games“ for more detailed elaboration later.
Here, we ask what if one took Ψ to be only quasi-nomological or quasi-material, there
being again some hidden variable now reflecting the necessary conditions for change the
particles mutually impose? And what if those conditions had a position? With that
one would have “exclusively local beables”—the particles being the source and target for
their necessarily conditioned change by some additional kind of “primitive ontology”. And
those primitives again move.
The goal then is to find an interpretation of Ψ, the universal wave function, to impose
its condition for change on the particles in R3, which is first and foremost the attempt
to ontologically connect the configuration space to physical space and, best, to eliminate
configuration space as a necessary ingredient of quantum mechanics. Actually, this has
been the desire of wave function theory from the outset. Those endorsing particles being
guided by waves—satisfying particle/wave dualism—thought or at least hoped that one
could have all of the physical entities living in 3- or 4-space.84 The guiding wave function
being defined on configuration space seemed to be inherited only by Schro¨dinger’s time
evolution of ψ. There ought to be N (local) particles being guided by their allocated local
wave functions, which makes N pairs of corresponding local entities.85
But it turned out that those pairs failed to describe the intrinsic quantum mechanical
phenomenon of entanglement. The “non-local beable”86 ψ in R3N could not be trans-
formed into N local beables in R3 without loosing the nature’s feature of non-locality.
How it could be achieved to at least leave configuration space behind is shown by Norsen
in a self-declared “un-serious toy model” of two spinless, non-relativistic particles moving
in one spatial dimension—The Theory of (Exclusively) Local Beables (TELB)87:
it contains N particles and N pilot-wave fields on physical space, but includes
also a number of additional fields (also on physical space) which capture what
is described in ordinary QM as ‘entanglement’ between particles.88
More precisely, the number of additional fields shows to be infinite to exactly reproduce
Schro¨dinger’s wave function, and Norsen asks what the more fundamental description is—
82Cf. [18, 272].
83’alg’ for ‘algorithm’
84Cf. [22, 83]: Einstein for instance thought that “Schro¨dinger’s works are wonderful—but even so one
nevertheless hardly comes closer to a real understanding. The field in a many-dimensional coordinate
space does not smell like something real.”
85Cf. [30, 62]: “[D]e Broglie asserts that configuration space is ‘purely abstract’, and that a wave
propagating in this space cannot be a physical wave: instead, the physical picture of the system must
involve N waves propagating in 3-space.”
86Cf. [72].
87Cf. [79, 1879,1880]: Adding the two missing dimensions is just a computational extra effort, spin
and relativistic generalizations to be more serious endeavors as with
”
ordinary“ BM.
88Cf. [79, 1878].
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maybe the ordinary wave function appears to be just an approximation of a TELB. And
this question precisely matches our discussion of how to valuate the (background) ontology
of scientific theories, here quantum mechanics. He goes on:
Unfortunately, [...] the most dominant approach to trying to uncover the
reality behind quantum mechanics, is to let the theory itself tell us—as people
sometimes say, to simply ‘read the correct ontology off’ from the equations of
the theory.89
With that, he alludes to the ‘many world’ or ‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum
Mechanics90 , which indeed seems a little obsessed over completeness of wave function
ontology. But is it so unfortunate to look at the equations and look for possible corre-
spondences in reality if they are available? Of course, Norsen appreciated the founders’
having directed their attention to sense data of, for example, the “smallness of the scin-
tillation on the screen” of a double slit experiment proposing the existence of waves and
particles91, calling the view of the latter being “some kind of mere epiphenomenon [...]
a bizarre suggestion”92. And then he tries this transformation of the resulting non-local
wave function being defined on configuration space to a number of local wave functions
on physical space. Thus, what he does is, first, retroduction:
[O]ne tries to work out the correct ontology, the correct slate of beables,
first—by making abductive inferences from the qualitative behaviors observed in
certain key experiments—and then one worries about how to formulate/infer
the mathematical laws governing the behavior of those beables.93
Given that abductive reasoning worked in that way, i.e. starting from a set of obser-
vations yielding at “the correct slate of beables” and then giving their time evolution a
mathematical law, Norsen adopts orthodox Bohmian mechanics. And then second, he
accomplishes his reconstruction of a system, here consisting of N = 2 particles in 1-
dimensional physical space with their generic configuration (x1, x2), the potential energy
V (x1, x2, t) at time t due to “some kind of contact interaction”
94, the system’s wave func-
tion Ψ(x1, x2, t), and—with BM—the actual configuration X = (X1(t), X2(t)) yielding
the conditional wave functions for the two particles95
ψ1(x, t) = Ψ(x, x2, t)|x2=X2(t) (4.2.32)
and
ψ2(x, t) = Ψ(x, x1, t)|x1=X1(t) (4.2.33)
The non-local system (Ψ, X) then would be transformed into the local beables (ψ1, X1)
and (ψ2, X2), i.e. the particle i being guided by the local wave function ψi(x, t) with the
position’s time evolution
dXi(t)
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(
∂ψi(x, t)/∂x
ψi(x, t)
)∣∣∣∣
x=Xi(t)
, i = 1, 2 (4.2.34)
89Cf. [79, 1881].
90Cf. [35].
91Cf. [72].
92Cf. [79, 1879].
93Cf. [79, 1882].
94Cf. [79, 1867].
95Cf. [79, 1866].
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But that is shown not to work. The time evolution of the conditional wave function
for particle 1, for example, is not of the form
i~
∂ψ1(x, t)
∂t
= −
~
2
2m1
∂2ψ1(x, t)
∂x2
+ V (x,X2(t), t)ψ1(x, t) (4.2.35)
but there are additional x2-derivatives of Ψ(x, x2, t)|x2=X2(t) that appear and have to
appear to obtain determinate behavior for the initial particle positions and conditional
wave functions.96 The point is, the particle’s locality is exclusively given by its local
position in physical space and its local conditional wave function, but the dynamics is
manifestly non-local:
In the end, we have a (countable) infinity of fields associated with each par-
ticle: a conditional wave function which (directly) determines the particle’s
velocity at each instant, and then a hierarchy of additional fields which influ-
ence the conditional wave function (and one another)[.]97
This kind of new local beable or field hierarchically conditioning fields Norsen calls
“non-local causation”, non-locality now being defined by an infinity of local fields. One
could reply that this then is not a TELB, since, although all beables are now local, the
dynamics, i.e. the conditional wave functions’ time evolution, is not. Nevertheless, the
goal is achieved, and one could gain new insights if one was to investigate non-locality.
Before we discuss the possible connection to the DUCKs’ continuity, we now quickly
go into a bottom-up approach, leaving ordinary pilot wave theory behind and following
Norsen starting from scratch.
His ingredients are again two moving points assigned by something existing—particles—
in 1-dimensional space without spin and relativistic complications and their dynamics,
which is given by the two associated pilot wave fields and again an infinite set of what he
calls “entanglement fields”, all local and no configuration space from the beginning.98 Of
course, one is tempted to ask why use such strange things like pilot wave and entangle-
ment fields and not ordinary classical fields, especially where “pilot wave and entanglement
fields are invisible”. Certainly, classical fields are invisible, too; they just manifest with
test particles. Nevertheless, there is the abduction again, the observations forced to in-
troduce an appropriate construct, and entanglement is an obvious observation, and thus
the opposite approach of forgetting about ordinary wave functions but still adopting the
equations of motion, i.e. the beables’ time evolution, probably could yield new insights.
The three equations for particle 1 (same as for particle 2), now without conditional
wave functions, are
”
again“99
dX1(t)
dt
=
~
m1
Im
(
∂ψ1(x, t)/∂x
ψ1(x, t)
)∣∣∣∣
x=X1(t)
(4.2.36)
96Cf. [79, 1867,1868]: The initial particle positions and conditional wave functions can be identical
still the dynamics of the particles differing. This is when the
”
system’s“ wave function does not factorize,
meaning the two particles are entangled.
97Cf. [79, 1871].
98Cf. [79, 1872].
99Cf. [79, 1872].
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i~
∂ψ1(x, t)
∂t
=−
~
2
2m1
∂2ψ1(x, t)
∂x2
+ V (x,X2(t), t)ψ1(x, t)
−
~
2
2m2
ψ′′1 (x, t) + i~
dX2(t)
dt
ψ′1(x, t)
(4.2.37)
i~
∂ψ
(n)
1 (x, t)
∂t
=−
~
2
2m1
∂2ψ
(n)
1 (x, t)
∂x2
−
~
2
2m1
ψ
(n+2)
1 (x, t)
+ i~
dX2(t)
dt
ψ1(x, t)
(n+1) + Pn
(4.2.38)
with the potential being involved in
Pn ≡
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
∂iV
∂xi2
(x,X2(t), t)ψ
(n−i)
1 (x, t) (4.2.39)
The pilot wave field ψ1(x, t), entangle fields ψ
(n)
1 (x, t), and potential V (x,X2(t), t) prop-
erly chosen determine the future particle’s position X1(t) effectively the way BM does.
With that, we have local beables only, which now allows us to return to the key problem
of back action, or the action-reaction principle, in more detail:
In the “dualist” version of the Bohm theory, reality is attributed both to the
particle trajectories and to the wave funtion, the latter being treated as a real
“ψ-field” which causally acts on the particle, “informing” it as to where to go.
But the particle does not react back on the wave function. So, they do not
satisfy the AR principle between them.100
Back Action
As said, it is often interposed that there is action or at least influence of the wave function
on the particles resulting in change but not the opposite direction, and sometimes this
fact is put forward to identify particles as non-existent. But maybe the wave function
is the mere epiphenomenal part. On the way to finding the real things behind the wave
function, with TELB one might have moved one step further. Now every particle Xi(t)
is directed by its associated pilot wave field ψi(x, t). But this field’s evolution is not
just determined by the usual Schro¨dinger’s equation but also by the
”
entanglement fields“
ψ′i(x, t) and ψ
′′
i (x, t)
101, which in turn obey equation (4.2.38), including the other particle’s
instantaneous position and motion and the potential field, where one particle moves as a
function of the actual position of the second particle.102
Thus, TELB being equivalent to BM indeed suggests that there is back action, i.e. full
interaction between particles:
100Cf. [40, 358].
101Cf. (4.2.37).
102Cf. (4.2.39).
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(1) The pilot wave fields depend on the other particles’ actual positions.103
(2) The particles’ actual positions are influenced by the other particles’ actual posi-
tions.104
Now of course with that, we don’t know what “action” is conceived of. So far, it
is just a logico-mathematical description of beables necessitating beables, and since the
necessitation is being executed, the theory has to be furnished with a time direction or
flow.105
But that is exactly what we were aiming for. The non-locality of BM crumbling into
infinite locality of TELB admit, though both being mathematically equivalent theories,
completely different interpretations as regards ontology and causation. Norsen’s lesson
from that is
[I]t seems quite naive to think that one is going to learn anything useful about
external reality by staring at some one particular mathematical formulation of
a theory[.]106
Here, staring at the two formulations could strengthen the view that the wave function
ψ should be treated more as nomological rather than ontological. Nonetheless, pessimism
is not indicated: if one was to seek ontology, one way to find it rich would be to make use of
the combination of time-honored concepts, here the mathematically precise non-locality
of the conditional wave function and the intuition of localized particles, and give the
necessary conditions for the particles’ change a position, too. And that is what the con-
ditional, and finally the universal, wave function had hoped to capture: local conditioning.
In the case of TELB, at the spatio-temporal position X1(t), there are two pieces of
information about the second particle:
(1) The spatio-temporal position of the second particle X2(t).
(2) The way the second particle’s spatio-temporal position X2(t) determines the first
particle’s change in spatio-temporal position.
The question is how can this kind of non-local determination be possible, or now prac-
tically, how can it be achieved—by local beables? Therefore, we field our continuity
NEXUS (4.1.21) from (con 10) with the propositions of actual position already inserted:
X2(t
∗)
inNC

oNC //
nNC
$$■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
X2(t)
inNC

X1(t
∗)
oNC
// X1(t)
(4.2.40)
Of course, this is not exactly what we introduced as a proposition of existence, a
spacial location to exist in space, but in BM, the coordinates are seen to refer to prim-
itives, the particles. Nevertheless, it is an instructive inception to integrate the BM’s
103Cf. (4.2.37).
104Cf. (4.2.36).
105Actually, we will see that time flow is inherited by the fact of non-locality.
106Cf. [79, 1881].
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or—equivalently—TELB’s ingredients, and we come back to that issue soon.
Then also propositionalizing the mathematics, the second particle’s actual position
X2(t) is an instantaneous necessary condition for particle 1 at time t to exist at spacial
location X1(t) and to change (location). But this is not the only necessary condition. In
our NEXUS, there are two more. X1(t) is then necessitated due to
(1)
X2(t)
inNC // X1(t) (4.2.41)
(2)
X1(t
∗)
oNC // X1(t) (4.2.42)
(3)
X2(t
∗)
nNC // X1(t) (4.2.43)
And the question is how do these determinations correlate?
TELB (and also BM) refers to (1): X2(t) is an instantaneous necessary condition for
X1(t). And it is so by ”
instantaneous influence“ of the second particle’s position on
the structure of the associated wave function ψ1(x, t) given by its ”
equation of motion“
(4.2.37). In ψ1(x, t), as in the time evolution (4.2.38) of the entanglement fields ψ
(n)
1 (x, t),
there is the actual position X2(t) involved in the potential V (x,X2(t), t) and the velocity
dX2(t)/dt of the second particle at the same time t. With (4.2.36), it holds that (4.2.41).
The necessary conditions at time t∗ in (2) and (3) are not explicitly involved in X1(t).
But in the derivative (4.2.36), there is a prior position necessary, say w.l.o.g. at t∗,
if only in its limit limt∗→tX1(t
∗) = X1(t), where for every real ǫ > 0, there exists
a real σ > 0 such that for all real t∗, 0 < |t∗ − t| < σ implies |X1(t∗) − X1(t)| <
ǫ which mathematically states the continuity conjecture. With that, (2) and (3), the
NEXUS (4.2.40) is thus implicitly given in (4.2.36). But still, how can it be executed—
the instantaneous “incredible fine-tuning of initial conditions”107 at an instance of time
t?
The answer is (3): the proposition ‘X2(t
∗) is a nomological necessary condition for
X1(t)’ is equivalent to ‘the successor of X2(t
∗) at time t will be an instantaneous neces-
sary condition for X1(t)’.
The underlying ontology of the logico-mathematical model NEXUS (4.2.40) is then
107Cf. [79, 1873].
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2m
t∗
x(2,t∗)
∆t
∗
2,1

∆t
∗,t
2 //
∆t
∗,t
2,1
$$$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
$d
2m
t
x(2,t)
∆t2,1

1m
t∗
x(1,t∗)
∆t
∗,t
1
//
1m
t
x(1,t)
(4.2.44)
saying the successor of the quality particular 1m
t∗
x(1,t∗) at location x(1, t
∗) ≡ X1(t∗)
will find at location x(1, t) the k-th (necessarily) necessary condition for change (NCC)
t∗
k2

t
x(1,t) having 2m
t∗
x(2,t∗) as source. Our convention of naming by indexing the quality
particulars obtains108
2O
t∗
x(2,t∗) : k2
t∗
x(2,t∗)
∆t
∗
2,1

∆t
∗,t
2 //
∆t
∗,t
2,1
(((h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
(h
2O
t
x(2,t)
∆t2,1

1O
t∗
x(1,t∗)
∆t
∗,t
1
//
1O
t
x(1,t) :
t∗
k2

t
x(1,t)
(4.2.45)
Now for a
”
system“ consisting of two quality particulars only—and the NCCs being
enroute—the situation seems to be almost easy. Still, where is the ontology? All the
arrows are just epistemic. Without them and with only the NCC that comes on top at
time t, the NEXUS appears quite
”
liberal“:
2O
t∗
x(2,t∗) : k2
t∗
x(2,t∗) 2O
t
x(2,t)
1O
t∗
x(1,t∗) 1O
t
x(1,t) :
t∗
k2

t
x(1,t)
(4.2.46)
Or, even worse, when presentism is taken seriously, i.e. no t∗ being involved
2O
t
x(2,t)
1O
t
x(1,t) :
t∗
k2

t
x(1,t)
(4.2.47)
108Assigning the particulars a ‘mass’ isn’t relevant here.
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And again, this is an easy toy system of two quality particulars mutually intradet-
ting, meaning there is just one source to be mutually
”
taken into account“109. The
two-directional situation then is this
2O
t
x(2,t) :
t∗
l1

t
x(2,t)
1O
t
x(1,t) :
t∗
k2

t
x(1,t)
(4.2.48)
And that is the situation the observer has to capture by calculating
X2(t)
inNC

X1(t)
inNC
OO
(4.2.49)
with the mathematics given in (4.2.36) and (4.2.37). The task would be to predict the be-
havior of X1(t) and X2(t) without knowing about the NCCs—especially, where and when
they were
”
emitted“. And that is the
”
functional role“ of the associated wave functions
ψ1 and ψ2. They provide the two particles with the ”
information“110 of the other’s spa-
cial position, and the
”
effect“ they have is given by the two equations, the Schro¨dinger’s
equation and the guiding equation.
The question now is can the NCCs capture all the conditions for the particles’ change
that are present at the objects’ positions and are implicated in the local associated and
entanglement fields? The particles are guided by their pilot wave fields, and those in-
clude the information of the second particle’s instantaneous position, the “‘conditional
potential’, i.e., the potential field in which, for example, particle 1 moves given the actual
location of particle 2”111 being integrative. Thus, the particles’ positions depend on the
particles’ positions, and the local associated and entanglement fields’ structure of how to
place the necessary conditions for change. This structure emerges due to spatio-temporal
considerations, i.e. derivatives. What we have in the end are positions sufficiently deter-
mining positions in geometrical physical spacetime, and that is what we hoped to capture
with the second sort of beables, the NCCs.
Coming back again to the role of the universal wave function in determining the par-
ticles’ trajectories leads to the reasonable presumption: generalizing TELB to BM yields
DUCKs as the overall theory of conditionalizing112.
109Certainly, the toy model has to be constructed by some observer. But we already neglected the
relations, and referring to Norsen’s two interacting particulars is seen to be just an intermediate state on
the way to the universe.
110Cf. [67]: active information.
111Cf. [79, 1879].
112The focus is traditionally on the particles and their positions with the necessary conditions for change
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4.3 DUCKs and Bohmian Mechanics
In the guidance equation (4.2.3), dQi(t)/dt is strictly speaking the time derivative of
a coordinate that is simply traditionally assigned to a quality that is called the mass
mi. It is a spacial location that is being tagged by a certain quality, thus it is a quality
particular—the position Qi(t) ∈ R3 to be assumed to be ”
filled“ by a quality connected
to mi, and which quality it realy refers to does not matter. But that could correspond to
our object Oti := iO
t
x(i,t) with dx(i, t)/dt if we allowed time derivatives, but of course we
don’t, because we only need change over time. Furthermore, the position Qi(t) is determi-
nately guided by the wave function ψ(q1, ..., qN , t), and it is a solution of the Schro¨dinger’s
equation (4.2.4). As a result, even the
”
free“ particle Qi(t), meaning that there is no ad-
ditional potential (V (q1, ..., qN ) = 0), depends on all the spatially distributed qualities
mj of the universe. And in a way, that makes all ontological intradets between objects
nomological in the pilot equation (4.2.3), which is key for the correspondence between
BM and DUCKs113.
And here then is the ontology of the wave function. Where Q(t) describes the actual
configuration of all particles in the universe at time t, the wave function Ψt assigns to
the generic configuration of all NCCs in the universe at time t. Mathematically speaking,
it integrates all information that can be found at any location in the configuration space
R
3N , and if a particle resides at a certain place in R3, all the information that is needed to
calculate the next particle’s position is given. The universal wave function is then holistic
in the sense that it corresponds to the totality of all necessary conditions for change that
at time t happen to be located at all positions in physical space. The correlation between
BM and DUCKs is then
Conjecture 13 (DUCKs’ BM). DUCKs correlates to BM in
(1) Quality particular:
Oti =̂ mi(t) (4.3.1)
(2) Spatio-temporal position:
x(i, t) =̂ Qi(t) (4.3.2)
(3) Exogenous NCC:
i⊞ˇ
t
x(i,t) =̂ ψ(xi, t) (4.3.3)
with ψ(xi, t) = Ψ(xi, Yt, t) being the conditional wave function.
114

Some remarks on the correlations:
(1) Quality particular:
Concerning the Schro¨dinger’s and pilot equations, it seems that there is no particle or
primitive or beable without there being a correlated
”
mass“ mi. If there was, for exam-
ple, an extra determiner added in the form of a so-called charge, this would be integrated
into the potential V , providing the circumstances the particles find themselves in. Those
departure and arrival. It will have to stand up to further scrutiny whether it would be revealing to invert
the perspective—watching the NCCs collide with the objects (cf. (4.3.7)).
113Cf. (4.2.44).
114Cf. [18, 42, 265] and (chap 4.2.1).
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charges then would again be primitives that happen to be at the same position some
primitive is fixed to correlating to some
”
mass“. As said, an electron ei wouldn’t be a
particle having mass mi and charge qi, but at position x(i, t) = x(j, t), there was the
quality particular Oti and the quality particular O
t
j . Thus, the potential would be given
quality particulars.115
(2) Spatio-temporal position:
The matter point Qi(t) is seen to be located at what is called the mass mi(t) by reason
of its sole appearance in the guiding equation (4.2.3) as some kind of particular quality.
Thus, there is an intuitive connection to ‘matter points’, but we will return to these re-
lations.
(3) Total NCC:
Definition 49 (Total NCC). The total NCC in iO
t
x(i,t) : i⊞
t
x(i,t) is the conjunction of all
endogenous and exogenous necessary conditions for change:
i⊞
t
x(i,t) := i⊞ˆ
t
x(i,t) ∧ i⊞ˇ
t
x(i,t) (4.3.4)
N
Definition 50 (Total Endogenous NCC). The endogenous conditions (endocons) are
necessary conditions for objects to change, which have the quality particular iO
t
x(i,t) as
source:
i⊞ˆ
t
x(i,t) :=
Iˆ∧
kˆi=1
kˆi
ˆ
t
x(i,t) (4.3.5)
N
Definition 51 (Total Exogenous NCC). The exogenous conditions (exocons) are neces-
sary conditions of objects to change, which have the quality particular iO
t
x(i,t) as sink:
i⊞ˇ
t
x(i,t) :=
Iˇ∧
kˇi=1
kˇi
ˇ
t
x(i,t) (4.3.6)
N
Summing up, in Bohmian mechanics, there are (mass) particles (4.3.1), positions (4.3.2)
seen to be marked by the particles, and conditional wave functions (4.3.3) that impose
conditions on how to change. Thus, BM is about marked positions moving in space, and
no activity is involved in the manner of some causal guidance:
The relationship between the wave function and the motion of the particles is
more appropriately conceived as a nomic one, rather than as a causal one in
which one physical entity acts on the other.116
115Cf. (4.2.5).
116Cf. [51, 779].
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And indeed, there is no
”
acting on“ in the equations (4.2.3) and (4.2.4), both just say-
ing what is going to happen. And there is no understanding besides stating the state
of affairs that correspond to the modelling. And what about the law? The nomological
intra-time determination is just another way of describing the happening but with less
provision as far as geometric circumstances are concerned. There is no need for the wave
function to belong to the ontology, but there is one for the conditions for change of the
objects, and those are mathematically described by ψ.
In our experimentally informed intuition, we refer to localizable beables that change and
are the source and targets of the conditions of their change. In this picture, a non-local
beable would be preferably desirable not to come up, and if it came up, one would like
to have it transformed into a local one, hopefully living in physical space as we do. Now
it is a fact that Schro¨dinger came up with his non-local wave function in configuration
space and that it has been adopted in BM. Maybe it was a historical necessitation, but
it also could have been a psychological one, which is of course not a contradiction upon
closer inspection. Norsen’s TELB gave us a good example of how things could become
complicated if one wished to refrain from a second, configurational realm, and he is
probably right in saying:
In fact, we think in fact that if someone gave us a Bohmian kind of theory,
involving a complicated collection of exclusively local beables, and then someone
else pointed out to us that the complicated local beables can be repackaged into
a simple mathematical object of a nonlocal character—like a wave function
on configuration space—our reaction would likely be that we would prefer to
regard the wave function in that simpler though more unfamiliar way, just
because of its mathematical simplicity.117
The wave function does not refer to the positions of the necessitators but of their
”
launching pads“. The reason why this indirect determination nonetheless works is that,
given all information about how the other objects change at the changing object iO
t
x(i,t),
the “repacking” can be reversed. Due to the initial becoming of the universe from a
singularity—the big bang—the exocons kˇiˇ
t
x(i,t) are sufficient to give indication of all
particulars’ actual position and quality at any time t. But it might turn out that the
description in configuration space is indeed the most elegant, i.e. the easiest one and
maybe just one that is convenient for most practical purposes.118
Conjecture 14 (Ockham’s DUCK). The universal wave function is a mathematical
representation of all NCCs. 
Having discussed the
”
role“ of the wave function, one started with the orthodox quan-
tum theory (OQT), which says that ψ is complete in describing a prepared experiment.
As an extension, the orthodox Bohmian mechanics (OBM) then keeps the wave func-
tion as a means to guide added point-like entities, the so-called primitive ontology. In a
second transition, in universal Bohmian mechanics, the system’s wave function may be
abandoned for its being defined in terms of the universal wave function only having nomo-
logical and no ontological, physical status. In a final step of rehabilitation, the physical
reality of the universal wave function Ψ remains with conjecture (con 14)—the necessary
117Cf. [18, 275].
118Cf. [79, 1879,1880].
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conditions for change also being assigned local beable status. Thus, we started with non-
local wave functions and end with extended local beables in a universal Bohmian theory
(UBT*), which corresponds to DUCKs:119
OQT OBM UBT UBT∗
ψ // (ψ,Q) // Q // (Q⊞, Q)
And with it, the focus changes. Quantum theory is no longer about the behavior of wave
functions but about the entities underlying them, and these are all necessary conditions
for change sufficient to describe the perceived quantum phenomena. And if one was to
refer only to the main phenomenon of the invention of Schro¨dinger’s (epistemic) wave
function, the overall transition would finally be
OQT UBT∗∗
ψ // Q⊞
(4.3.7)
Now, all that effort is made to make further considerations tempting for considering
more than there is according to a physical theory with some sophisticated experimental
metaphysics, which is Bohmian mechanics. There are no subsystems, end of story. But
what if there are objects that are emergent by transformation processes of the objects
and NCCs if it holds that nothing evolves out of nothing? Then there has to be some
criterion for the existent to be transformed into some emergent, and that is something
which could be rated a subsystem.
That kind of transformation process is not captured by the Bohmian mechanics. The
physically necessitated spatio-temporal mental object just doesn’t appear in the theory,
and it should if the mental exists. In the following chapter, we will therefore consider
the relations between emergent and non-emergent objects, and that in the language of
category theory.
119Cf. [18, 271].
107
4 Domain Unifying Categorical Kinds
4.4 Aggregations, Systems, and Substrates
An aggregation is commonly seen to be some collection of a number of objects with or
without interrelations, and it is a matter of organization whether aggregations turn into
systems with or without extra-systemic interrelations. If those objects cluster due to
some organization, can they then still be considered aggregations? From the viewpoint of
an agglomerating object, i.e. an object that attaches more or less tightly to some other
object, is it really a matter of organization or even the mode120 of organization that it is
now more than it was before, the parts being more than the sum?
Aggregativity is not definable without taking into account its opposite, i.e. non-aggre-
gativity, which could be viewed as more or less than aggregativity. More would be some
kind of at least new properties coming into existence, suggesting an emergentist approach:
“Emergence can be analyzed as a failure of aggregativity”121, saying that objects just ag-
gregating are in their natural state in some way. But what about less than aggregating?
That would be single objects of whatever kind not even aggregating, i.e. there is no cri-
terion for them to gather. That means that stating some aggregation of objects without
having some criterion of selection in mind is nothing but the single objects themselves.
In short, the ability of some gathering being perceived as an aggregation and also the
principle of aggregation itself—aggregativity—is not possible without some property that
restricts the gathering, and that property is obviously not in the aggregates themselves
but necessary for the restricting criterion, and being necessary for a criterion is in a way
emergent. To the point, the aggregation along with the, let’s call it, non-aggregationplus,
which is also necessary for the criterion, necessitate (together) an emergent something.
And that is what needs to be specified.
Now, as indicated the considerations of existence will take place within the category
U t of the universe-instance at time t with the objects being the quality particulars and
the morphisms the intra-time determinations.
Aggregations
In the following, the objects stay the objects, and whatever mode may have arrived, it is
still said to be an aggregation but now with certain restrictions on them, and obviously
it’s these restrictions that separate them from other objects. Without these still nebulous
constraints, there is just one aggregation at an instance of time t, which is the universe-
instance U t itself. But before these restrictions are explored, a rigorous definition of an
aggregation has to be given in the category theoretical setting.
Definition 52 (Aggregation). An aggregation At in U t with restriction Rt at an instance
of time t is a functor
At : Rt → U t (4.4.1)
N
Thus, an aggregation is a diagram in U t:
At(i, j : i→ j) = At(i, j) : At(i)→ At(j) = ∆ti,j : O
t
i → O
t
j (4.4.2)
120Cf. [12] for modes of organization of systems and their decompositions.
121Cf. [11, 372].
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and the restriction on the diagram in U t is determined by the category Rt. For Rt not
to be arbitrary, there has to be a criterion that allows for the subdiagram At to separate
from the total diagram U t, and then to be called a system.
1st-Order Systems
People say that systems are aggregates with some duty. And if not, they think of systems
as aggregates that perform a function, or, which is pretty much the same, that accom-
plish a task. Though opaque, they have got a point here: systems are aggregates that
show a more or less predictive behavior with some perceived property all constituents
are necessary for. The criterion to define, or better which defines, a system is that it is
necessary and sufficient for some new quality particular to emerge, which naturally leads
to the definition of 1st-order emergence:
Definition 53 (1st-Order Emergence). A 1st-order emergent object is the colimit of an
aggregation 1Stk :
1Stk → U
t, i.e. an object 1Ŝtk ∈ ob(U
t) and a natural isomorphism
U t(1Ŝtk, O
t
l )  [
1Stk,U
t](1Stk, C
t
Ot
l
) (4.4.3)
N
And with it comes the definition of 1st-order systems:
Definition 54 (1st-Order System). A 1st-order system 1Stk :
1Stk → U
t is an aggregation
with restriction 1Stk at an instance of time t for which the colimit
1Ŝtk ∈ ob(U
t) exists. N
The definition of 1st-order emergence is an application of the general concept of colimits,
including the naturality condition of commutative squares of natural transformations.122
The right part of the isomorphic relation in (4.4.3) refers to the totality of cocones to be
taken under an aggregation in the category U t. A cocone here is some vertex Otl together
with a set of injection maps that are the intra-time determinations with the source being
the objects of the 1st-order system 1Sti . In other words, the totality of the cocones is
the set of natural transformations between the functors from the restriction 1Stk to the
universe U t that start at the 1st-order system 1Stk and end at an object O
t
l ∈ ob(U
t) with
CtOt
l
being the constant functor that maps the restriction to Otl . The left part of the
natural isomorphism is the set of morphisms in U t that start at the object 1Ŝtk and end
at some object Otl .
Now, the isomorphic equation (4.4.3) says that, for every cocone of the system 1Stk,
there is a unique intradet, the so-called factor, from the 1st-order emergent object 1Ŝtk
to the cocone’s vertex, the object Otl . That means, all intradets from the components
of the system to Otl factorize, and the corresponding triangles with the intradets of the
universal cocone commute.
In (fig 4.1), a simple situation is depicted with four objects that have to be specified.
In order to make out a meaning of them, morphisms have to be spread. A suggestion
is given in figure (fig 4.2). The aggregation consists of the objects Oti and O
t
j , and in
combination with the intradet ∆ti,j , they yield the 1
st-order system 1Stk. And according
122Cf. [39, 267].
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OtjO
t
i
U t
OtlO
t
k
Figure 4.1: Four objects in U t.
to definition (def 54), there is no system without an emergent object that is necessitated
by the aggregation. And finally for the factor to exist, an additional object with its cocone
is necessary. Thus, a universal cocone to the 1st-order emergent object Otk =
1Ŝtk and an
non-universal one to Otl are entered.
1st-Order Structures
In general, if one aims to define or detect some kind of structure, objects have to be looked
at, and looking at objects is done by looking at their morphisms. It has to be examined
how the intradets interrelate, i.e. how they commute at an instance of time t. Hence,
the recipe for spotting a structure is looking for commutativity, and an suggestion for a
definition would be:
Definition 55 (1st-Order Structure). A 1st-order structure in the category U t is a triple
1Σtk,l = 〈
1Stk,
1Ŝtk, O
t
l 〉 (4.4.4)
The object Otl is called the determinate of the structure
1Σtk,l. N
In this definition, structure should be ontic, and therefore, it is said to be of 1st-order.
Although there is still no cognizer involved, it is required a little more than moving ob-
jects. What is required is moving objects plus something new having come into existence.
The whole plays at an instance of time t, and therefore, so far there is no dynamics being
considered. Structures are not patterns which are identified by having been assigned to a
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OtjO
t
i
U t
Otl
1Ŝtk
1Stk
∆ti,k
∆tj,k
∆ti,j
∆tk,l
∆ti,l ∆tj,l
Figure 4.2: The four objects determining a structure with the system 1Stk, its emergent
object 1Ŝtk, and an arbitrary object O
t
l ∈ ob(U
t).
class or type due to perceived similarity or invariance. 1st-order structures are typically
tokens and therefore ontic, although they almost don’t exist, as far as we know.
But before we finally arrive at that ‘almost’, another major issue needs to be tackled
here, that of multiple realization (MR). In the definition of 1st-order emergence (def 53),
nothing is explicitly said about multiple systems 1Stkr having the same colimit
1Ŝtk.
123
Obviously, with the intra-time determinations in mind, that is impossible. Either it is
not the case that both are necessary, or one is not sufficient. If objects are not necessary,
according to the definition of the intradets, they are not part of the system, and if they
are not sufficient, they don’t shape the system. Thus, trivially there can be only one
system necessitating an emergent object at an instance of time t:
Proposition 3 (Unique Realization). In the category U t, it holds that
(1Ŝtk)  [
1Stk,U
t](1Stk, C
t
Ot
l
)  (1Stk) (4.4.5)
♦
The parlance of ‘unique realization’ is a little unfortunate, since ‘realization’ purports
some kind of activity, but the emergent object just appears to be—under certain condi-
tions.124 The notion is enforced by the entrenched usage of the technical term ‘multiple
realization’. So far, at the ontic 1st-order stage, MR is not possible by definition of
emergent objects.
123The situation is depicted in figure (fig 4.3): two homologous systems 1St
k1
and 1St
k2
having the same
colimit 1Ŝt
k
, meaning, for both it holds that they are necessary and sufficient for the emergent object to
exist. Cf. (def 27).
124There is even nothing anticipatory about it, in contrast to what is claimed in [69] and [38], where
life, when it turns to it, is built on anticipation.
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OtmO
t
n O
t
i O
t
j
U t
Otl
1Stk2
1Stk1
1Ŝtk
Figure 4.3: Two structures 1Σtk1,l = 〈
1Stk1 ,
1Ŝtk, O
t
l 〉 and
1Σtk2,j = 〈
1Stk2 ,
1Ŝtk, O
t
l 〉 with two
homologous 1st-order systems 1Stk1 and
1Stk2 (∆
t
n,l and ∆
t
m,l not drawn).
4.4.1 Emergence
‘Emergence’ is also a theoretical term, and therefore, what is to be understood by it is
a matter of definition. There are several features that can be woven in or rejected, with
the result that more than one definition of emergence is circulating.
A feature that qualifies to be necessary for emergence is said to be
(i) new, i.e. it didn’t exist before its coming into existence,
(ii) novel, i.e. it is of a new fundamental type,
(iii) unpredictable,
(iv) without structure, i.e it is not composed of parts,
(v) irreducible,
(vi) accompanied by new, novel, unpredictable, and irreducible causal powers or laws.
The first distinction that is being made concerns the degree of compatibility with phys-
icalism meaning whether the emergent property of the system can be reduced to the
system’s parts. If the reduction can be accomplished in principle, people speak of weak
emergence, and it becomes strong if the systemic property is irreducible. By introducing
a time evolution and with it the possibility of novelty for a property, a further distinction
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is opened: synchronic versus diachronic emergence. Within a time-slice t, synchronic con-
siderations don’t allow for novelty. Trivially, a time transition is necessary for a property
to be novel. Thus, the case that is most interesting is the systemic property that is novel
and irreducible—strong diachronic emergence. But obviously, when the novel property
has emerged at some instance of time, the situation is synchronic again, and the question
is raised as to whether this new property is novel, meaning of a fundamental new type,
and irreducible. And the question arises: What is a novel systemic property that is not
irreducible? Novelty and irreducibility are, by definition of systems, features of systemic
properties. Better still, every novel property is irreducible and vice versa. Thus, what
remains to be presented is a or the rigorous description of how systemic properties could
come about.
First, it is conventional that the emergence of some irreducible property of a system
seems to be a matter of being composed of properties that don’t show that systemic
property in isolation or other compositions:
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain
wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each
other; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and
C in relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic properties;
that A, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the
relation is not the same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the
whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete
knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in isolation or in other wholes
which are not of the form R(A,B,C).125
In a more contemporary paper, the following definition for an emergent property P of
a whole w is given, using mereological supervenience:
If P is a property of w, then P is emergent if and only if
(i) P supervenes with nomological necessity, but not with logical necessity, on
properties the parts of w have taken separately or in other combinations;
and
(ii) some of the supervenience principles linking properties of the parts of w
with w’s having P are fundamental laws.126
On the way to a revision of the above definition of an emergent property that makes
for the colimit’s interpretation of emergent objects, the somewhat pedestrian restriction
to parts that have their properties “taken separately or in other combinations”127 can be
dropped, since the
”
properties“ in U t can’t be taken separately or in other combinations,
and again, there is no having but being, and not of properties but particular qualities.
A whole or system having a property P is just epistemic talk and could and should
in the first place be replaced by a whole coming up is accompanied by some property
necessitated by the whole—and the worry “for any property P of any whole w, there
125Cf. [17, 61].
126Cf. [8, 16].
127Cf. [42, 223].
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will always be properties of the parts from which P may be deduced”128 is unfounded.129
Thus, the distinction between “taken separately” and “in other combinations” can be
dropped, because, in order to change a combination, the constituents have to change and
if the constituents change, their combination change, too.
A more substantial concern is the question whether determination is a logical or nomo-
logical necessitation? Is the intra-time determination a law or just a logical relation? The
intradet ∆ti,j : O
t
i → O
t
j , meaning ‘the existence of O
t
i is a necessary condition for O
t
j
to exist’, results in the existence of Ot
′
j at an instance of time t < t
′ and states at t the
tendency for change ∆t,t
′
j,j |t : O
t
j → O
t′
j . The necessity condition defined in (chap 4.1) is
not at all lawlike. It just says that it is going to happen without any need for further
assumptions in addition to what is being included in the objects as sources and sinks,
there being no extra existence of something. This is an ontological statement and true
by premise, as discussed in (chap 4). Thus, there are ontological necessities only, and it
is just the question what exactly is necessary for what.
Then as the first step, the above definition adjusted and revised in a clearly and solely
ontological reading would be:
If 1Ŝtk is a property of
1
S
t
k, then
1
Ŝ
t
k is emergent if and only if
(i) 1Ŝtk supervenes with ontological necessity on the properties in
1
S
t
k; and
(ii) some of the supervenience principles linking the properties in 1Stk with
1
Ŝ
t
k are
necessary for partial tendencies for change.
The content stays the same; only the implicated contrafactuals are eliminated—almost,
since supervenience is intrinsically contrafactual: no difference in 1Ŝtk without a difference
in 1Stk. It is more straightforward to say: the system
1Stk is necessary and sufficient for the
single tendencies for change of the emergent object 1Ŝtk, and with that, the superfluous
notion of supervenience can be dropped as well:
If 1Ŝtk is an object necessitated by
1
S
t
k, then
1
Ŝ
t
k is emergent if and only if
(i) 1Ŝtk is determined with ontological necessity by the objects in
1
S
t
k; and
(ii) the determinations linking the objects in 1Stk with
1
Ŝ
t
k are necessitations for
partial tendencies for change.
All three formulations state the same if ontological determination is taken seriously,
and truth be told, the outcome is fairly meager. The comparison of the latter definition
with (def 53) shows the overlay. What is missing here is the relevance of emergent objects
for the
”
outer world“. A description is needed for how the emergent object can be related
to other objects. The most interesting considerations are 1st-order structures, which now
will be discussed: is the above definition of emergence appropriate anyway? Does it
capture the circulating ideas of systems and systems’ properties?
128Cf. [42, 223].
129For reasons of convenience, we are sticking with ‘properties’ but already thinking ‘quality particulars’,
until we have replaced all the troublesome notions.
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1st-Order Emergence
In the colimit definition of emergence, the necessity conditions have to be made up for
and of emergent objects, and then what the intradets perform has to be tested, or to
couch it in correct terms, what they necessitate, i.e. existence only or existence and
tendency for change. To explore the nature of emergent objects, the basic structure
1Σtk,l = 〈
1Stk,
1Ŝtk, O
t
l 〉 depicted in figure (fig 4.2) will be inspected: the system
1Stk, i.e.
its components130 Oti and O
t
j , being necessary for O
t
l to exist and to tend to change.
OtjO
t
i
U t
Otl
1Stk
∆ti,k
∆tj,k
∆ti,j
∆tk,l
∆ti,l ∆tj,l
∆tf,k
1Ŝtk
Otf
Figure 4.4: A structure 1Σtk,l = 〈
1Stk,
1Ŝtk, O
t
l 〉: is
1Ŝtk necessary for the existence of the
object Otl only or also for the
1Ŝtk-related tendency for partial change ∆
t,t′
k,l |t?
In the first instance, five major cases can be identified concerning the kind of existence
of an emergent object:
(i) It does’t exist.
(ii) It exists and imposes no condition for tendency for partial change ∆t,t
′
i,j |t, just for
existence at time t.
(iii) It exists and imposes the same condition for tendency for partial change as an object
in the system does.
(iv) It exists and imposes the same condition for tendency for partial change as all objects
in the system in conjunction do.
(v) It exists and imposes a condition for tendency for partial change in addition to the
conditions for tendency for partial change the objects in the system impose.
To use category theory then in the discussion of emergent objects is not meant to be
metaphorical. Conjectures that are at odds with this formal framework should be put
130The intradets come with the objects.
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to the test as to whether they are to be discarded. Thus, CT is considered more than a
language, it is introduced to correspond to natural, i.e. existent, structures.
With that doing the inspection:
(i) In this case, the state of affairs is simple. In the small section of the universe U t
in figure (fig 4.4), 1Ŝtk doesn’t exist. The objects remaining will just sort out the
conditions between them. The definition of 1st-order emergence (def 53) is perfectly
consistent with the non-existence of emergent objects. There is no structure.
(ii) The emergent object 1Ŝtk exists, but the intradet heading towards O
t
l would just be
the logical necessity condition for existence: ∆tk,l. This would be quite unspectacu-
lar, since every object in U t is necessary for Otl to exist. Moreover, obviously with
logical necessity, 1Ŝtk is also, in conjunction with existence, necessary for the object’s
Otl total tendency for change ∆
t,t′
l |t:
1Ŝtk
∆tk,l
// Otl : ∆
t,t′
l |t (4.4.6)
Since tendency implies existence, the object can be dropped and the emergent object
is necessary for the total tendency for change of Otl :
1Ŝtk
∆tk,l
// ∆t,t
′
l |t (4.4.7)
Equally, for 1Ŝtk to be sufficiently necessitated by the system
1Stk, intradets for exis-
tence and hence for tendency for total change are not enough. Necessity conditions
for tendency for partial change are necessary. The systemic object 1Ŝtk doesn’t exist
without a tendency for total change ∆t,t
′
k |t with the components being sufficient for
the superposed partial tendencies for change ∆t,t
′
i,k |t and ∆
t,t′
j,k |t. Any other object in
U t is necessary for existence and tendency for total change and any tendency for
partial change of 1Ŝtk but not for its own induced tendency for partial change, since
it doesn’t exist. For example, in figure (fig 4.4) the intradet
Otf
∆tf,k
// 1Ŝtk  O
t
f
∆tf,k
// ∆t,t
′
f,k|t (4.4.8)
isn’t assigned. That excludes this object from being a part of the system 1Stk,
although for instance, it certainly holds that
Otf
∆tf,k
// 1Ŝtk : ∆
t,t′
i,k |t (4.4.9)
the object Otf being necessary for the object O
t
i being necessary for the tendency
for partial change ∆t,t
′
i,k |t of the emergent object
1Ŝtk.
Coming back to the colimit discussion, the emergent property would come into
existence necessitated by some aggregation, but without announcing itself to the
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object Otl . That kind of appearance, an allocation which it hardly deserves, is
typically called epiphenomenal: 1Ŝtk doesn’t contribute to the tendency for total
change ∆t,t
′
l |t of the object O
t
l . Now the question arises, whether it is possible
in the colimit definition of emergent objects that 1Ŝtk
131 isn’t necessary for Otl to
partially change with ∆t,t
′
k,l |t, while the system’s objects induce a tendency for partial
change? In short, is it possible that 1Ŝtk is an epiphenomenon for O
t
l , but O
t
i and
Otj are not?
Looking at the commutative diagram ∆ti,l = ∆
t
i,k∆
t
k,l,
1Ŝtk not imposing any ne-
cessity condition on Otl to change, or better yet, in order not to go into rapture of
thinking of any kind of activity, not being necessary for a tendency of partial change
∆t,t
′
k,l |t, entails that O
t
i is, concerning O
t
l , also an epiphenomenon. That means, in
the category theoretical definition of 1st-order emergence (def 53), it is not possible
for the emergent object 1Ŝtk not to contribute a condition of necessity to the object’s
Otl tendency for change with the system
1Stk consisting of non-epiphenomenal ob-
jects. In short, if 1Ŝtk is an epiphenomenon for O
t
l , so is
1Stk. For the constituents
of the system in figure (fig 4.4), it holds that
∆ti,l = ∆
t
i,k∆
t
k,l and ∆
t
j,l = ∆
t
j,k∆
t
k,l (4.4.10)
By definition of systems, ∆ti,k and ∆
t
j,k have to determine partial change, but with
the factor ∆tk,l the non-time-delayed determinations ∆
t
i,l and ∆
t
j,l cannot.
(iii) In this case, 1Ŝtk is no longer an epiphenomenon. Without loss of generality, if
1Ŝtk is
necessary for the same tendency for partial change as the object Oti in figure (fig 4.4)
∆ti,l = ∆
t
i,k∆
t
k,l (4.4.11)
= ∆tk,l (4.4.12)
which is equivalent to
∆t,t
′
k,l |t = ∆
t,t′
i,l |t (4.4.13)
That means, ∆ti,k is the identity on O
t
i : ∆
t
i,k = idOti . And from that follows that
1Ŝtk is not the colimit of
1Stk and therefore not an emergent object.
(iv) Here, the necessity condition for change of the emergent object 1Ŝtk for O
t
l is the
totality of all necessity conditions for change of the objects constituting the system
1Stk:
∆tk,l =
∧
ν∈|ob(1St
k
)|
∆tν,l (4.4.14)
That seems to be a classical case of a blatant category mistake, since in mathematics
the symbol ‘=’ means quantities having the same value, or expressions representing
the same mathematical object. Since quantities have so far not been defined and the
131the total tendency for change ∆t,t
′
i
|t included
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objects are not mathematical, the identity here should be read as ‘is necessary for
the same as’, namely is necessary for the same as the conjunction of all necessities of
the system regarding the determinant in the structure. And the result is the same
tendency for total change as the emergent object is necessary for:
∆t,t
′
k,l |t =
⋃
ν∈|ob(1St
k
)|
∆t,t
′
ν,l |t (4.4.15)
Then 1Ŝtk can be seen as an epiphenomenon again, but this time with necessity of
tendency for partial change. Besides overdeterminating the determinant Otl ,
1Ŝtk is,
as in (ii), perfectly consistent with the colimit definition of emergent objects.
(v) This is key, since it is the only case with the emergent object not being an epiphe-
nomenon. The system 1Stk, i.e. its components O
t
i and O
t
j , and the systemic object
1Ŝtk are necessary for tendency for partial change of the object O
t
l , but they are not
fully congruent, because 1Ŝtk imposes a condition for tendency for partial change of
Otl in addition to the system
1Stk.
Further explorations could be performed, for example, on whether there are additional
”
structures“ or something or some thing that can be thought of 132 to exist in the universe
U t.133 So, the idea or notion of ‘downward’ could be put in perspective.
4.4.2 The Mental
In order to finally arrive at the mental object, in short the mental, it is not necessary to
know exactly what it refers to, as long as it is an object in U t. Stating the mental to be
existent, before we turn to its determination, i.e. mental determination, it is necessary to
reflect on the possible determinants of the mental.
We ask: what is the merit of an emergent object if it isn’t good for downward de-
termination? Which conditions must be met for a relation to be justified as downward
directed? A prerequisite for top-down determination is that there is indeed a top and a
down, that is, some kind of hierarchy of levels must be assumed. The intradet between
two objects with neither being emergent could hardly serve as a candidate. We consider
the two possibilities with the source being emergent and also the determinant (fig 4.5),
or the latter being a constituent of a system (fig 4.6).
We recognize that the circulating notion of ‘downward determination’ doesn’t yield
much in the framework of DUCKs. It is only that the determinant is either emergent or
part of a system, unless it is neither. The special case shown in (fig 4.7) will become clear
having defined 2nd-order systems.134
Mental Objects
Before we finally reach the crucial definition of 2nd-order systems, we want to be clear in
our minds that emergence seems to be more special than is commonly thought. Mental
objects appear to take a prominent position:
132It is still thinking, i.e. 2nd-order dynamics albeit about the existence.
133We keep in mind that there is still no dynamics.
134Cf. (chap 4.4.2).
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OtjO
t
i
Otp O
t
q
1Ŝtk
U t
1Ŝtl
1Stk
1Stl
Figure 4.5: The determinant being an emergent object: 1Ŝtl .
Conjecture 15 (Mental Object). The universe U t is complete with respect to existence.
(i) If a mental object exists, it is an object M tl ∈ ob(U
t).
(ii) If an object Otl ∈ ob(U
t) is a mental object, it is a 1st-order emergent object:
Otl =M
t
l =⇒ O
t
l =
1Ŝtl . (4.4.16)
Its 1st-order system 1Stl =
1M tl is called the substrate, and its colimit colim(
1Stl ) =
colim(1M tl ) =
1M̂ tl its mental object, in short, its mental.

No statement will be made about the existence of the mental. The claim is that, if it
exists, it is an emergent object. And there seem to be no other emergent objects besides
mental objects, but that question has to remain unanswered. It wouldn’t even occur to
us that there are emergent objects at all if first-person perspectives were not experienced.
In the known world, all phenomena can be reduced to the constituents—and their time
evolution—of mere aggregations, except the mental.
Consequently, there are only structures involving mental objects:
Conjecture 16 (1st-Order Structure). A 1st-order structure in the category U t is a triple
1Σtk,l = 〈
1M tk,
1M̂ tk, O
t
l 〉. 
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OtjO
t
i
Otp O
t
q
1Ŝtk
U t
1Ŝtl
1Stk
1Stl
Figure 4.6: The determinant being a constituent of a system: Otp.
The mental is said to be a process.135 That is not quite correct, since processes do not
exist, only their interim stages, which are the (emergent) objects. But, obviously what is
meant is that the mental follows some time evolution, for to come into existence precursors
are necessary. And that is what is done now: the execution of the time separation of the
substrate and its mental.
2nd-Order Systems
What is the connection between what the mind is and what the mind is about? When
a human substrate—or any other 1st-order system—claims some
”
property“ of a system
to be emergent, it just states its own emergent object of its system. And this is what
is called epistemic, i.e. there is no such system or emergent object, which would be the
criterion to define that system. Is there an aggregation at some instance of time t that
is necessary and sufficient for some 1st-order system at t′ > t being accompanied by its
1st-order emergent object, which then is an aggregation that could be called the ‘material
object’ that is perceived with the perception being the
”
representation“ of the
”
thing“
or the
”
content“ of the mental? Again, there must be some sufficiency condition for the
aggregation in U t to result in the mental object at the instance of time t′. And similar
to the definition of 1st-order systems, this is already the needed criterion in a kind of
back-tracing manner, which means that inter-time determination comes into play: an
aggregation in U t interdets a 1st-order system in U t
′
to have a 1st-order emergent object.
135Cf. [29, 252].
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OtjO
t
i
Otp O
t
q
Otr
1Ŝtk
U t
1Ŝtl
1Ŝtv
1Stk
1Stl
1Stv
Figure 4.7: Downward determination: three structures 1Σtk,l = 〈
1Stk,
1Ŝtl ,
1Ŝtl 〉,
1Σtl,k =
〈1Stl ,
1Ŝtl ,
1Ŝtk〉, and
1Σtv,r = 〈
1Stv,
1Ŝtv, O
t
r〉 with the factor ∆
t
v,r being consid-
ered downward directed.
Thus, due to the fact that there is a criterion for a subdiagram in U t, although it doesn’t
have an emergent object, it contributes to an emergent object of a 1st-order system in
U t
′
. Therefore, in the definition of 2nd-order systems, emergent objects are also involved,
even though they occur time delayed, and that serves as the justification to call them a
system, too. Answering the question, the 2nd-order system is not a
”
thing“ that exists at
t and results in its perception at t′, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient to bring
that perception about. This situation is depicted in figure (fig 4.8).
Definition 56 (2nd-Order System). A 2nd-order system 2Stk :
2Stk → U
t is an aggregation
with restriction 2Stk at an instance of time t being nomologically necessary and sufficient
for a 1st-order system 1M t
′
k :
1Mt
′
k → U
t′ at t′ with colim(1M t
′
k ) =
1M̂ t
′
k . N
The 1st-order system 1M t
′
k in (fig 4.8) is the substrate for the mental object
1M̂ t
′
k , being
determined with some time delay by the 2nd-order system 2Stk which is called a selection.
More generally, selections are subdiagrams that are not accompanied by a mental object
at a particular instance of time, but they have been or will be.
Now, it is often claimed that a mental
”
entity“, consciousness as a special case, has
an internal structure in some way. For example, in [56][2] five “central axioms, which
are taken to be immediately evident” are listed, and the second says, “consciousness
is compositional (structured): each experience consists of multiple aspects in various
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U t U t
′
2Stk
1M t
′
k
1M̂ t
′
k
Oti
Ot
′
j
∆t
′
j,k
∆t,t
′
i,k
∆t,t
′
i,j
Figure 4.8: A 2nd-order system 2Stk in U
t which interdets a 1st-order system 1M t
′
k in U
t′
with U t signifying all universe-instances prior to U t
′
and the NCCs simulta-
neously arriving at 1M̂ t
′
k .
combinations. Within the same experience, one can see, for example, left and right, red
and blue, a triangle and a square, a red triangle on the left, a blue square on the right,
and so on.”
It is indeed an intriguing question how this kind of compositionality could be brought
into accordance with the category theoretical formalization of the domains unifying the
logical relations of their entities. What kind of structure could be hiding within the
substrate such that 1M̂ t
′
k could be subdivided into ”
parts“ still being the emergent ob-
ject, i.e. the colimit, of a system? One natural answer would be that there is no hiding
structure but that there is more than one system and thus more than one colimit coming
into existence at the same time t′ and the same place xk.
136 Thus, if there is more than
one mental object, they coexist and somehow overlay the category theoretical object as
introduced in definition (def 38): 1M̂ t
′
k = 〈
1M̂ t
′
k,1,
1M̂ t
′
k,2, ...,
1M̂ t
′
k,n〉.
For further explorations, two definitions for the totality of diagrams are given:
Definition 57 (Total Substrate). The total substrate 1M t
′
k for a mental object
1M̂ t
′
k =
〈1M̂ t
′
k,1,
1M̂ t
′
k,2, ...,
1M̂ t
′
k,n〉 is the aggregation
1M t
′
k =
n⋃
j=1
1M t
′
k,j (4.4.17)
with 1M t
′
k,j :
1Mt
′
k,j → U
t′ and colim(1M t
′
k,j) =
1M̂ t
′
k,j . N
136The mental seen to be describable by a function of spatio-temporal coordinates with some spacetime
metrics.
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Definition 58 (Total Selection). The total selection 2Stk for a mental object
1M̂ t
′
k =
〈1M̂ t
′
k,1,
1M̂ t
′
k,2, ...,
1M̂ t
′
k,n〉 is the aggregation
2Stk =
n⋃
j=1
2Stk,j (4.4.18)
with 2Stk,j :
2Stk,j → U
t and colim(∆t,t
′
(2Stk,j)) =
1M̂ t
′
k,j . N
U t U t
′
2Stk,1
2Stk,2
1M t
′
k,1
1M t
′
k,2
1M̂ t
′
k
Oti
Ot
′
j
∆t
′
i,k
∆t,t
′
i,k
∆t,t
′
i,jO
t
n
Otl O
t′
r∆
t
n,l
∆t,t
′
l,r
Figure 4.9: Two 2nd-order systems 2Stk,1 and
2Stk,2 in U
t which interdet two 1st-order
systems 1M t
′
k,1 and
1M t
′
k,2 in U
t′ .
The question of whether mental objects
”
compose“, or rather their substrates that inter-
depend, can be now formulated more rigorously. In figure (fig 4.9), two sample selections
and substrates are shown, and we have to clarify their common necessity conditions.
There are two possible readings:
(1) Both selections 2Stk,1 and
2Stk,2 interdet the substrates
1M t
′
k,1 and
1M t
′
k,2, which in turn
intradet their corresponding colimits 1M̂ t
′
k,1 and
1M̂ t
′
k,2. Both 1
st-order systems might
have some objects in common (e.g. Ot
′
k ), meaning they are nomologically necessary
for both emergent objects to come about. Thus, given that those two substrates are
not disjoint, their colimits are not independent of one another. In this sense, they are
composed, as suggested in [56]: <redness> and <triangle> yields in a <red triangle>.
And e.g. the mental object <triangle> could itself be composed by colimits in that
way.
(2) The selection 2Stk interdets the substrate
1M t
′
k , which necessitates in turn the mental
object 1M̂ t
′
k , but which is also separable, meaning that the diagram
2Stk is a total
selection consisting of subdiagrams 2Stk,1 and
2Stk,2, interdetting the substrates
1M t
′
k,1
and 1M t
′
k,2 to have colimits
1M̂ t
′
k,1 and
1M̂ t
′
k,2. Hence, it comes out to three colimits in
total versus two in (1), and this kind of
”
composition“ would amount to <redness> and
<triangle>, and <red triangle>.
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Coming back to the assumed structure including the mental, e.g. a certain conscious-
ness, case (1) could hardly be considered to be or to have any such. The total substrate
would just be an aggregation, the overlay of the single substrates and colimits, although
they are not nomologically independent from one another. The red triangle might no
longer be a triangle without the substrate that results in the mental object <redness>.
Case (2) could more easily serve as a structure, since here the substrate is effectively
decomposable.
Now, the question arises whether it is possible in principle to identify the one conception
that is at odds with the real world. To ascertain which one is the right one, one could
examine the assumption that nature behaves in accordance with category theory as its
overall grounding and that mental objects are emergent objects obeying the
”
behavior“
of colimits, or look for some experimental evidence that excludes an alternative.137
137The so-called binding problem is at its core not understood. Different brain areas contributing
to an “integrated” sensation could appear to be the key for experiments to investigate spatio-temporal
dependencies of the mental. Cf. e.g. [77], [82], and [57].
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The current study deals with the existent and its dependencies, and promotes a thinking
or underlying logic of thinking that is introduced as the best to cope with phenomena
that persistently resist its inclusion into the existent. The most prominent, or the only
one we so far surely know of, is the mental. It obviously depends on the known physical,
and it obviously is not the known physical itself, rather it is some emergent.
Building on first principles then, which is the logics of necessary and sufficient conditions
for existence and change of existence and the fact of experiencing itself, this is the attempt
to ascertain the conditions for that which there is more than the fundamental objects
which were said to be quality particulars and their materialized necessary conditions for
change.
But before we came to the minimal ontology, we first looked at the emergence of proto-
micelles in the artificial life debate, in order to see how emergent properties are introduced
in the sciences. They are the result of some observation—and the whole survey then is
on him, the observer, that in a way
”
produces“ the emergent higher-order structures
like the proto-micelles and their emergent properties—manifesting itself as a so-called
hyperstructure necessitated by objects of different orders and their relations.
The next step on the way to a minimal ontology then was the reformulation of the
findings in the language of category theory, which led to the model of Memory Evolutive
Systems with its application on neural networks where the observer becomes a mental
object with the properties of a category theoretical construct which is called the colimit.
As the ontological status of the mental remained unclear, we were seeking a new, exper-
imental metaphysics that rests on findings from the foundational sciences—or is at least
compatible with them: Bohmian mechanics.
The objective then was to integrate the mental into the so-called Bohmian NEXUS
built on the introduced duality of localized primitives, i.e. quality particulars and NCCs,
with the condition that it remains an object that obeys the
”
behavior“ of colimits. And
it of course proved to be difficult, since emergent objects do not appear in Bohmian me-
chanics. Bohmian Mechanics is superpositional where category theory is compositional.
Is it possible that composition has a counterpart in nature and is not just a cognitive,
conceptual tool as in the model of advanced hyperstructures and Memory Evolutive Sys-
tems in the manner of combining rigid arrows saying some arrow following some arrow?
In physics, it is all about being ‘followed by’: if some conditions for some state of affair
are met, a new state of affair is followed. Even transformation processes like annihilation
only describe the constituents under certain conditions. What is happening or about to
happen is never captured. Is it the
”
electrons“ that in the
”
brain“ does the job, or rather
the
”
photons“? It is not that the quality particulars ontologically compose—they keep a
safe standoff. It is the NCCs that overcome the distances.
The most interesting part of the mental is that it exists and it is localized given our
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knowledge of the natural world and action-at-a-distance not to be reanimated. The mental
being at least physically necessitated gave us the obvious next idea to treat it as some
entity in spacetime—a quality particular. It is locally existent, and in order to concentrate
on locality we even made some assiduous efforts to motivate a new interpretation of a
theoretical term, that is traditionally seen to reflect non-locality, as local as well—the
wave-function. It mathematically describes the usual suspects that are responsible for
time evolution, which are the necessary conditions for change. And as we have seen they
stem from somewhere and go to somewhere. And here, they go to the mental:
Oti
∆
t,t0
i,k
// M̂ t0k O
t
j
∆
t,t0
j,k
oo (5.0.1)
the constraints in the substrate being neglected.
Again, who is in charge of executing the tendency for change? The objects Oti and O
t
j
are only the sources for their conditions for change and existence of the mental M̂ t0k . The
situation of the ontological composition is

t0
i
♦
t0
i,k
// ̂
t0
k 
t0
j
♦
t0
j,k
oo (5.0.2)
the diamonds stating the NCCs t0i and 
t0
j at the position x(k, t0) being necessary for
̂
t0
k if the mental was to be the source for an NCC heading for some other object.
This is the kind of thinking to cope with conditions for existence and change of
existence—and not only with respect to the mental but to every kind of conditioning.
And things become even more inconvenient when the whole diagram is taken into account:
the mental being identically necessary for the same object the substrate is necessary for.
The question becomes evident: Which language is appropriate to analyze and describe
ontology? If category theory is just the way all thinking is intrinsically happening, saying
the
”
brain“ and the mental just works like that, in objects and morphisms, how would
one overcome the limitations with respect to emergentism? Maybe the only way to un-
derstand emergentism is its or the experience.
Finally, cognizing is not to be confused with mentalizing. It is not necessary that
the human abilities to refer, to count, or to learn always have to be accompanied by
what we call the mental—unless it is a fact that certain cognitions don’t come without
experience. Cognition itself could be seen as nothing but moving particles in certain ways.
Thus the execution of categorical theorizing at an instance of time t, which is obviously
some concrete cognition, is identical to trajectile behavior that is alike. But that being
alike need not necessarily be subject to scrutiny if one considers certain ways of moving
particles to count as thinking in categories. It is what it is: they are objects, morphisms,
domains of morphisms, codomains of morphisms, identities, which are morphisms, and
compositions of morphisms. One might think it’s all about morphisms, but it is not.
There are still objects that are, after all, the sources and targets of the arrows. And as we
put it, the arrows ontologically only reflect the materialized conditions for change, saying
‘It’s the objects that really matter!’
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Following the attempt to leave the natural, i.e. objects and (materialized) morphisms
in U t, behind and discover or develop anything over and above the natural, concepts
seem to be most suitable to show that the endeavor is doomed to failure at the outset.
Certainly one could reply, it is the first-person experience that seems to be the hard
problem, but what are concepts without qualia? Cognition. And cognition is, as seen,
not at all striking, meaning it hasn’t got any touch of supernatural at all. Thus, what
has to be done is risk an attempt to probe a natural, i.e. an ontological, approach to
‘cognition with an experience’, or experienced cognition: pattern classification resulting
in or being accompanied by an experience.
The starting point for defining concepts is to be clear about representations, and then
again, once we have a working substitution. And the ingredients ought to be in DUCKs,
since it was the goal to unify the domains of the mental and the physical, for example,
using minimalist, but well defined notions. Naturally, sometimes one has to fall back on
established concepts, which hopefully can be overcome over the course.
A representation can be seen as a binary relation R = (GR, A,B) over sets A and
B with the directed graph GR = Graph(R) ⊆ A × B = {(a, b)|a ∈ A, b ∈ B} and
aRb := (a, b) being the infix notation of ‘a is a representation of b’. Now, the intuition
for the representation aRb is that a and b have some structure in common, and R has to
allocate the appropriate attributes they share.
In the compilation of a proper notion of what is meant by ‘is a representation of’, one
can refer to [43, 102]. Three candidates for relations are debated for specifying structural
commonality:
(i) Similarity: A represents B iff A is similar to B.
(ii) Isomorphism: A represents B iff there is an isomorphism between A and
B, that is to say A and B are two isomorphic structures.
(iii) Homomorphism: A represents B iff there is a homomorphism between
A and B.
For further considerations, it has to be clarified what exactly A and B relate to? Here,
we compared objects and diagrams in DUCKs, and the assignment was: A relates to the
1st-order system 1M t
′
k in U
t′ being accompanied by its 1st-order emergent object 1M̂ t
′
k ,
and B to the 2nd-order system 2Stk in U
t. And as seen, there is no structure other than
the 1st-order structure 1Σtk,l that can be ontologically referred to.
Finally, the process of categorization is tightly connected to the perception of similarity.
And it is an intriguing question to ask what it is that is being perceived anyway. Is it
structure that is immanent in the universe and then being reflected in the mental or is
it structure that is genuinely produced in or by the mental without having an objective
precursor in the universe. In [37, 1], it is stated
Whether category structure determines how similarity is perceived or whether
perceived similarity dictates the existence of categories is more a question of
metaphysics than of empirical investigation.
But what is this structure the author talks about? In our view, we assume that all
there metaphysically is, is objects moving in space: ∆t,t
′
i,j : O
t
i −→ O
t′
j , which is pure
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geometry enriched with some necessity conditions determining the future geometry. And
sometimes the eternal objects necessitate some emerging mental object, and then there
is the mental, too. The consequence is the emergence of objective 1st-order structures.
However, those structures are not meant in the above citation.
In general, structures are supposed to be certain organizations of entities which are
then called the components which is actually more than entities since it is said that they
make a whole being “instances of concepts and therefore share a structure specified by
the concept”.1 Thus, concepts come first, and no structure without concepts for them.
And the natural next question would then be: what is the criterion for a structure being
an instance of a concept? First of all it has to be a perceived structure, whether or not it
is one. And the claim in DUCKs is that the perception itself is the criterion—in partic-
ular perceived similarity. That eventually opens the key question whether concepts are
nothing but just that: perceived similarities. The goal then would be to find a kind of sim-
ilarity measure that in turn results in some conceptual distance measure that obviously
has to be connected—again by some ‘nothing but’-relation—to geometrical distances of
the existents, in the way: that is a concept due to its exemplars are similar due to a
certain measure, and that is due to some spacial geometry of parts. But that had to be
discussed after having had recapitulated the traditional view of concepts, but that already
in a category theoretical formulation.
In order for a structure to be approachable for scientific study it has to be determined
by structural properties, so-called features, but these features are perceived structures
themselves. Thus in order to detect some similarity for structures, first a similarity
measure for their features has to be at hand. It is obvious, the process lacks a starting
point. And anyhow, if one wishes to build a model for concepts, axioms of a model theory
have to be satisfied by an instance of the concept. Well then, axioms are themselves
concepts, and something is lacking again.
If one wishes to state an ontology for concepts, the point of departure has to be lo-
cated in the existent, i.e. in the above defined objects. In short, we are not allowed to
recruit any kind of symbolic treatment unless the logics refers to an inherent behavior
of the universe. And here is the starting point: the ontic universe is consistent with the
category U t which allows us to use the symbolic apparatus of category theory with the
defined objects and morphisms, and the challenge will be to find some similarity measure
within U t that at the core will be some equivalence class that has to be sufficiently vague
in order for exemplars not to be classified similar. That seeming insuperability of ontic
subjectivity of the mental could give a first hint that concepts, or better the instances,
are indeed just certain processes that finally get lost in deep space.
Thus, searching for an objective measure for similarity of concepts is a taxing endeavor
since similarity itself is a concept and therefore not existent. If one tries to reduce sim-
ilarity to the existent, one must finally refer to the existent, and those are the mental
objects and their underlying substrates. Aiming then, as an outlook, at a criterion for a
measure for similarity, we find that there are two kinds of comparison: intra-personal and
inter-personal comparison of mental objects. With that, a quite important new notion
cames into play—the intuitive concept of person2, and one could use the above measure
1Cf. [37, 1].
2Cf. [80].
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for similarity of mental objects to mark out persons. And yet we are debating their per-
sistence and identity.3 In the following then it would be to provide additional tools for
identifying persons and give them some near enough identity.4 A first step then would
be to pass on the criterion of similarity: Two mental objects 1M̂ t
′
i and
1M̂ t
′
k are similar,
and thus their substrates, iff their 2nd-order systems 2Sti and
2Stk are. And that would
be some objective anthropic and anthropocentric means of dividing up the universe—into
persons.
3Cf. [6].
4Cf. [32].
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